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Chapter 1 
Preface  
This study aims to shed light on the role of accounting standards on discipling 
accounting practices with a focus on the exploration of determinants for accounting 
conservatism.   
In face of the increased demands for relevance and comparability in accounting 
information from international capital markets, several standards have been introduced 
or revised to narrow the gap between Japanese standards and international financial 
reporting standards, as well as the U.S generally accepted accounting principles in 
recent years. Among them are the asset impairment standards which were mandated in 
fiscal year 2005. Much attention is given in the academic to examine management’s 
propensity to engage in earnings management as the standards leave substantial room 
for managerial discretion on when to implement an impairment loss (e.g., Francis et al. 
[1996], Rees et al. [1996b], Riedl [2004a], Enomoto [2006], Szczesny and Valentincic 
[2013]). However, pressure on management to disclose a downward change in asset 
values will increase acutely over time when signs for value deteriorations become evident 
as required by statute. Findings in Lawrence et al. [2013] provide empirical grounds for 
such disciplinary feature of accounting standards with a focus on accounting 
conservatism, wherein the authors term the regulatory force of generally accepted 
accounting principles in disciplining timely loss recognition as non-discretionary 
conservatism. To the best of my knowledge, there still lacks empirical evidence with 
respect to non-discretionary conservatism in Japan and China. As outlined previously, 
the purpose of this study is twofold. The first essay seeks to fill the void concerning the 
effects of accounting standards on conservatism. The second essay then aims to identify 
the underlying determinants, aside from non-discretionary conservatism, for accounting 
conservatism which could counteract/facilitate timelier disclosure of adverse accounting 
information.  
The first essay examines the role of non-discretionary conservatism in disciplining 
timely loss recognition after the introduction of accounting standards on asset-
impairment. Asset impairment interprets conservative accounting through writing off 
unperformed investment before its useful lives come to an end, if there is reasonable 
evidence that the future cash inflows generated by the asset have fallen below its present 
value. In theory, a timely asset impairment allows for better informed decisions between 
stakeholders in a reporting entity. It provides investors with more value-relevant 
information regarding the underlying economic value of the assets while assists creditors 
in preventing expropriation of firm resources by management. Furthermore, under the 
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historical cost convention, accounting standards require immediate recognition of 
impairment losses in devalued fixed assets whilst asset gains are still deferred until 
realized. Therefore, asset impairments are a key way in which earnings exhibit 
accounting conservatism within the current framework of accounting principles. Hence, 
the introduction of procedural accounting rules should promote reliability of accounting 
information and impels accounting conservatism. The theory of non-discretionary 
conservatism is brought to the front of discussion by Lawrence et al. [2013] owing to the 
rise of this line of thought. They document a considerably positive relationship between 
non-discretionary conservatism and asset impairment losses in the U.S listed firms, 
suggesting that demands for accounting conservatism essentially come from the 
authoritativeness of accounting standards which deters managerial discretions in the 
implementation of asset impairment. They also propose the incorporation of non-
discretionary conservatism into Basu’s [1997] framework to further sophisticate the 
measurement for conditional conservatism.  
On the other hand, a primary issue in the context of asset impairment is management’s 
willingness to recognize impairment losses as they occur. A sizable study points out that 
accounting conservatism is influenced by managerial incentives to avoid reporting losses 
(e.g., Francis et al. [1996], Riedl [2004a], Ramanna and Watts [2012]). This study aims 
to shed new insight in line with this debate while provide initial empirical evidence with 
respect to non-discretionary conservatism in the context of Japanese listed firms. 
Following Lawrence et al. [2013], this study constructs a metric for effects of accounting 
standards (i.e., ASSET-BTM). It is measured as total assets deflated by the sum of 
market capitalization and total assets minus common equity, both measured at the end 
of fiscal year t－1. ASSET-BTM predicts major loss recognition as it rises beyond the 
value of one. In other words, as the present value of the future economic incomes is 
manifested as a company’s market value, when the market value of a company is lower 
than the book value of its total assets, a higher than one ASSET-BTM thereby implies a 
considerable decline in asset values. The company accordingly is expected to write off 
the assets whose values have greatly deteriorated. However, the current accounting 
standards grant the management with certain level of discretion over how and when to 
recognize such losses. Through a careful examination on the relationship between non-
discretionary conservatism and the asset impairment accounting practice in Japanese 
listed firms, I found that non-discretionary conservatism does explain a substantial 
proportion of impairment losses. However, non-discretionary conservatism alone does 
not constrain managerial opportunism as much as that found in the U.S. setting. For 
instance, firms, whose market value is higher than the book value at the beginning of 
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the fiscal year, generally exhibit higher level of accounting conservatism. Nonetheless, 
test results also indicate that such firms do not necessarily recognize as much asset 
write-downs as predicted by the theory of non-discretionary conservatism when the scope 
of accounting practice is narrowed to asset impairment. Taken together, findings in the 
first essay suggest that managerial opportunism still impedes the recognition of 
timeously asset impairment losses.  
On other hand, analysis in the first essay also implies a seemingly improved accounting 
standard does not necessarily lead to its intended consequence in financial reporting 
when introduced to another accounting regime. For example, even though the U.S and 
Chinese listed firms are required to report asset impairment losses under a highly 
resembled set of accounting standards, non-discretionary conservatism is inferior to 
financial leverage in predicting asset write-downs in the Chinese setting, which coincides 
the findings in the Japanese setting. In other words, test results in the first essay 
indicate that unity of accounting rules do not necessarily engender identical 
interpretation in practice. Aside from accounting standards and capital structure, the 
quality of accounting information is also determined by other institutional factors. This 
motivates the second study which focuses on the role of ownership structure as well as 
the influence of accounting standards and capital structure on accounting conservatism 
through comparison between Japan and China.  
The second essay investigates how ownership structure characteristic in Japan and 
China shapes conservative accounting practice. More importantly, this study 
differentiates itself from prior studies in that it also focuses on disentangling how 
associations between ownership structures and other determinants discussed in the 
previous section, i.e., capital structure and accounting regulations, affect accounting 
conservatism in the two accounting domains. 
The first ownership structure discussed in the Japanese setting is stable shareholdings. 
Corporate governance in Japan has commonly been compared to that in the Anglo-
American business world. Specifically, compared to the widely dispersed shareholding 
in the U.S., shares are owned by a relatively small network of shareholders in Japan. 
Usually, such shareholders consist of financial institutions affiliating to the same 
conglomerate and companies with long-term business partnership. I posit that a higher 
proportion of stable shareholdings leads to lower demands for accounting conservatism 
as the closely-held ownership structure gives rise to private comminution channels for 
both debtholders and shareholders other than pubic accounting information. Especially, 
to the extent interests of shareholders are intertwined with management, major loss 
recognition would on the contrary cut back on their economic gains in the long run.  
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Note: 
 Please refer to Essays 1 and 2 for further details on variable definition.  
 
Consistent with the expectation, stable shareholdings are negatively associated with 
conservative accounting. 
In the Chinese setting, I examine how state shareholding affects the level of accounting 
conservatism. In a similar vein, I expect that firms with higher proportion of state 
shareholders would be less timely in recognizing losses as the state cares more about 
financial stabilities and political reputation than value maximization. Test results firmly 
support my expectation that state shareholdings are negatively associated with 
accounting conservatism in China. 
 On the other hand, the second essay also sets out to explore the influence of foreign 
equity in both Japan and China. While some existing literature links foreign investors 
with improved information transparency and operation efficiency, others maintain that 
foreign investors face more severe asymmetric information and higher monitoring costs 
such that they are unable to execute the presumable influence. Although no substantial 
difference is found for firms with higher proportion of foreign equity in both Japan and 
China, dual listing in the B- and H-share market proves to be an effective way to enhance 
Figure 1 : Determinant Analyzed in this study  
 Determinants 
Accounting Standards 
(Non-discretionary Conservatism) 
Ownership Debt Contracting 
Accounting Conservatism 
Essay 1 
ABTM: total assets deflated by the sum of market  
capitalization and total assets minus  
common equity. 
 
 
 
 
LEVMV: total liabilities deflated by market value  
of common equity. 
Essay 2 
ABTM: total assets deflated by the sum of market capitalization and total  
assets minus common equity. 
CLVMV: change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market  
capitalization  
STABLE:  the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth 
largest shareholders and other persons or companies affiliated 
with the company  
STATE: the number of state-owned shares deflated by the total number 
of shares outstanding 
FOREIGN: the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or 
institutions 
BHMARKET: the number of H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total 
number of shares outstanding 
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accounting conservatism in the Chinese setting.   
As an important feature of this study, I also incorporate leverage and non-discretionary 
conservatism into the regression model. I expect the interactions between the three 
factors would deepen our understanding on how accounting conservatism is shaped in 
firms under different circumstances. The correlation between ownership structure and 
financial leverage is worth noting because debt contracting has traditionally been 
deemed as in favor of conservatism across different accounting regimes. 
Notwithstanding, the interaction term between leverage and stable (state) 
shareholdings remains negative, indicating that demands from the debtholders fail to 
suppress the negative influence of stable (state) shareholdings. This in turn reflects a 
multi-facet firm-bank relationship in Japan and China. On the other hand, the 
interaction term between leverage and foreign equity is positive, which implies that, as 
proportion of foreign equity increases, a constrained financial leverage is more likely to 
evoke higher level of accounting conservatism. The second essay further confirms the 
role of accounting standards enforcement on accounting conservatism in firms with 
characteristic ownership structure. As with the first essay, I employ the measure of 
ASSET-BTM and analyze its correlation with different types of shareholding structure. 
Overall, test results attest to a more powerful enforcement environment in Japan while 
that in China still needs significant improvements. For example, the interaction term 
between ASSET-BTM and stable shareholdings is positive, indicating that when asset 
value is over evaluated, commitment to timely loss recognition will compel management 
to rectify assets balance even in firms with higher proportion of stable shareholders. By 
contrast, the interaction term between non-discretionary conservatism and state 
shareholdings is significantly negative which mirrors a relatively weak regulatory 
infrastructure in China.  
This study adds insight to the extant literature in the following aspects. First, I employ 
the quantile regression (QR) (e.g., Koenker and Bassett [1978]) and the Adaptive LASSO 
regularized Quantile Regression (LASSO: Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection Operator) 
(e.g. Wu and Liu [2009], Fan et al. [2014]) in this study to carefully explore relationship 
between the response variable and independent variables, which otherwise will be 
overlooked by conventional statistical regression methods. For instance, the application 
of LASSO intuitively illustrates the prominent power of financial leverage in predicting 
asset write-downs in the Japanese and Chinese setting, offering direct evidence against 
findings based in the Anglo-American setting (i.e., Lawrence et al. [2013]). Moreover, in 
order to ensure the robustness of the test results, this study employs as many metrics as 
possible to measure the degree of accounting conservatism from both the market 
6 
 
perspective and accounting perspective. The first essay employs two market-based 
measurement (i.e., measure c and T_SCORE) and an accounting-based model (accrual 
model). In addition to the above-mentioned measurements, the second essay applies 
another accounting-based measure i.e., CONSKEW, to test the sensitivity of findings in 
this study. Except for the additional test based on accrual model in the second essay, test 
results are robust to different measurements of accounting conservatism. Second, this 
study highlights the influence of institutional features over accounting quality. Test 
results from the interaction of predictors of accounting conservatism, which include 
ownership structure and financing feature or accounting standards enforcement, suggest 
that, improvement in compliance to accounting standards depends on the interplay 
between demands for high-quality reporting, the extent of regulatory infrastructures, 
and managerial incentives. Finally, this study compliments findings in previous studies 
by providing new evidence with respect to managerial opportunism in the 
implementation of asset impairment accounting. While the intention of granting 
discretion in impairment accounting is for management to signal private information, 
the findings in this study suggest that management might take advantage of the 
subjectivity inherent in the accounting standards to delay major asset write-downs. In 
other words, the introduction of hortative accounting rules fails to engage management 
into timely loss recognition. The next few years are likely to witness a further 
convergence of accounting rules worldwide. In light of such movement, findings in this 
study will provide useful reference towards further convergence for standard setters. 
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Chapter 2  
the Role of Non-Discretionary Conservatism in Asset-Impairment Accounting 
 
1. Introduction    
While studies highlighting the benefits and consequences of accounting conservatism 
abound in academic literature, research on how accounting standards influence 
conservatism to the concerns of standards setters is still underdeveloped (Dichev et al. 
[2013]). This study aims to investigate how non-discretionary conservatism1 functions 
in Japanese listed companies as identified through the implementation of asset 
impairment accounting standards. 
Japanese accounting standards incorporate a two-step approach which heavily relies 
on management’s estimations and judgements. In general, information asymmetry will 
be reduced should more information be available. However, information related to the 
procedures performed by management is withheld from outside parties. Consequently, 
it is possible that management increases their wealth at the expense of shareholders by 
exercising discretionary accounting without violating related accounting standards (e.g., 
Healy and Wahlen [1999], Leuz et al. [2003], Ali and Zhang [2015]). I therefor posit that 
due to the subjectivity in the accounting standards for asset impairment, the 
implementation of asset write-downs would likely fail to reconcile with the demands for 
conservatism even when strongly warranted by circumstances. Using 17,152 firm/year 
observations after the asset impairment standards were adopted in Japan, I found that 
non-discretionary conservatism fails to drive a timelier loss recognition in Japanese as 
it does in the U.S.  
A company’s market value originates from its future economic gains and is ultimately 
derived from its current assets. An abnormally high book-to-market ratio in this case 
indicates the level of non-discretionary conservatism and underscores the deterioration 
in the asset values of a firm. In other words, as per the demands for conservatism, when 
the book-to-market ratio continues to increase, corrective actions shall ensue. After a 
careful examination of the correlation between the beginning-of-period book-to-market 
ratio, I found that asset impairment execution rises abruptly as the assets’ market value 
drops to become equal to its book value and peaks when the book-to-market ratio slightly 
exceeds one. Since there are few numerical requirements concerning the implementation 
of asset impairment, this discontinuity can certainly be construed as normal 
                                                   
1 Non-discretionary conservatism is defined as the regulatory force of accounting principles. On the 
other hand, discretionary conservatism is defined as accounting choices arising from the discretional 
application of conservatism in accounting standards.  
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conservatism so far as the market value is higher than the book value. However, there 
is a prominent tendency of the asset impairment execution to diminish as the book-to-
market ratio elevates to two, which indicates that a considerable number of listed 
Japanese companies intentionally evade loss recognition even when their assets’ values 
have greatly diminished. This confirms my prediction that flexibility in accounting 
standards allows some leeway for management to exercise their discretion.  
I then continue to investigate influencers for efficient execution of asset impairment. 
Among the root causes proposed in prior studies, conservatism is commonly theorized as 
an efficient contracting mechanism between stakeholders, in particular, between 
creditors and borrowers (Watts [2003a], Ahmed et al. [2002], Zhang [2008b], Nikolaev 
[2010a], and Aier et al. [2014]). With their potential payoff capped at the interest 
payment, creditors benefit from conservative financial reporting should they be able to 
detect default risks in a timelier manner. I expect that, despite the presence of 
management’s incentives to eschew conservative accounting, a higher level of external 
financing would lead to a higher demand for conservatism. Results in this paper confirm 
that debt contracting, as opposed to other variables (e.g., non-discretionary conservatism, 
the presence of intangible assets, litigation risk, a weak financial performance etc.) is 
the dominant driver for asset write-downs in Japanese listed companies.     
To explore variation in conservatism across Japanese listed companies, I employ the 
quantile regression (QR) (e.g., Koenker and Bassett [1978]) and the Adaptive LASSO 
regularized Quantile Regression (LASSO: Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection Operator) 
(e.g. Wu and Liu [2009], Fan et al. [2014]) in this study. The subjects of financial 
accounting research are always under the influence of a variety of factors, QR test and 
QR-LASSO may provide the needed solution to solve conflicting interpretations and 
divergent opinions documented in previous studies. I choose the QR test as an 
alternative solution to conventional linear regression because the conditional 
distribution of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM and current-period asset write-downs 
may fail to fulfill the basic assumption of homoscedasticity. On the other hand, QR-
LASSO analysis can detect predictors with the strongest influence on asset write-downs 
at any quantile. Additional details concerning QR and QR-LASSO are provided in 
Appendix 1. 
The findings of this study contribute to the recent debate on the role of unconditional 
conservatism in financial reporting. Even though Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB hereafter) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) exhibit strong 
inclinations to purge conservatism from accounting’s conceptual framework,2 empirical 
                                                   
2 FASB responded to questions on the role of conservatism as follows: 
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evidence suggests that conservatism is useful because it reduces, rather than increases, 
information asymmetry between inside managers and outside investors (e.g., LaFond 
and Watts [2008]). Findings in this study reveal that when legal enforcement fails to 
control reporting incentives and accounting discretion, unconditional conservatism plays 
a fundamental role in the properties of accounting numbers.  
Furthermore, this study advances the literature on the effects of economic framework 
on accounting choices. Evidence from this study supports the insight that discrepancies 
in the companies’ reporting stance across countries are probably due to the existence of 
ex-ante differences in the institutional settings. To begin with, Japanese accounting 
principles vary from those adopted in the U.S. Some of the factors include goodwill 
treatment, recognition over consolidated subsidiaries, leases, and so on. Such diversities 
in principles may intervene in the management’s interpretation of accounting 
information. For example, goodwill recognized in consolidation transactions (which 
continues to be subject to an impairment test) requires to be amortized within 20 years 
in Japan. When faced with a constrained bottom line, the management would become 
less willing to recognize losses out of concern for their reputation or penalty from the 
capital market. Second, Japanese public firms operate under a triune regulatory 
framework where companies should comply not only with the Securities and Exchange 
Law but also the Commercial Code and the Tax Code, implying that all stakeholders’ 
interests (e.g., government, creditors, and shareholders) must be taken into account. 
Therefore, accounting disclosure in Japan, in this sense, could be less oriented towards 
the market than it is in the U.S. Furthermore, a well-maintained bank-firm relationship, 
also known as “Keiretsu” or main-bank system, could have paralyzed banks’ monitoring 
function that hinders the abandonment or adjustment of underperforming investments 
(e.g., Skinner [2008], Kang and Liu [2008], Kobayashi and Osano [2011], Skinner and 
Srinivasan [2012],and Kato et al. [2017]). A better understanding of business 
environment’s influence on actual accounting choices is potentially important for 
regulators and policy-makers engaged in the work towards convergence of accounting 
principles.  
Third, there are still conflicting arguments about the validity about the validity of the 
“Asymmetric Timeliness coefficient” developed in Basu [1997] (Basu coefficient 
hereafter). Dietrich et al. [2007] and Patatoukas and Thomas [2011] assert that Basu 
                                                   
“Financial information needs to be neutral – free from bias intended to influence a decision or outcome. 
To that end, the common conceptual framework should not include conservatism or prudence among 
the desirable qualitative characteristics of accounting information. However, the framework should 
note the continuing need to be careful in the face of uncertainty.” 
This statement explicitly expresses the concerns of FASB that the existence of conservatism will lead 
to more information asymmetry. 
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coefficient should be avoided because the problems of endogeneity and scale effect. On 
the other hand, Ball et al. [2013a] disputed the previous findings on the basis of variable 
definition. Furthermore, Ball et al. [2013b] confirmed that the overall accuracy of Basu 
coefficient can be substantially improved by controlling firm characteristics like size, 
BTM ratio and leverage. Given that disagreement remains about the validity of some 
measures for conditional conservatism, I applied 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 (e.g.,Khan and Watts [2009]), 
the asymmetrically timely recognition of gains and losses using accruals and cash flows 
from operation (e.g.,Ball and Shivakumar [2006a]) to verify the robustness of the 
findings in this paper.  
Although the findings of this study agree with statistical results, this study nonetheless 
possesses the following limitations. First, all the samples are divided at equal intervals 
to test the features of each group. Such an artificial subdivision lowers the comparability 
between groups. However, it is almost impossible to completely remove arbitrariness 
regardless of the division. Moreover, securing a sufficient number of observations in each 
group will be difficult if they are broken down at much smaller intervals. 
Second, it is still unclear to what degree the aggregated measure of ASSET-BTM3 
captures the extent of non-discretionary conservatism. The numerator (book value of 
total assets) is underestimated when those assets are recorded on the balance sheet – an 
effect attributable to the adoption of unconditional conservatism. In addition, assets 
subject to other impairment accounting standards, such as software, are included in the 
equation. Thus, even if the beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM is less than one, 
impairment accounting procedures for assets other than fixed assets may have been 
taken according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP hereafter). Another 
concern is that an asset (group) with a beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM higher than one 
                                                   
3  The measure for non-discretionary conservatism is developed by Lawrence et al. [2013] and is 
constructed as follows:  
ASSET-BTM ＝ 
total assets
 market capitalization+ total assets− common equity
 
 Roychowdhury and Watts [2007] indicated that conditionally conservative accounting is positively 
related to beginning-of-period BTM but not necessarily to the end-of-period BTM. Thus, a higher 
beginning-of-period BTM than the previous period may suggest that the value of certain assets might 
have declined. Because the end-of-period book value is measured after taking such write-downs, this 
study used the beginning-of-period BTM as the proxy of non-discretionary conservatism. 
Under Japanese accounting standards, the book value and the recoverable amount (net realizable 
value or value in use) of the underlying asset (group) are indispensable in determining whether an 
asset (group) should be written down. However, while the book value of the fixed asset can be easily 
identified, the information that management employed to estimate the recoverable amount (i.e., 
discount rate, future cash flows) is almost impossible to obtain. This constraint in turn affects the 
accuracy of the computing result. Considering the above limitation, it can be assumed that the 
aggregate measure ASSET-BTM can also be applied to the investigation of Japanese companies. 
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could be overlooked due to the principle of materiality. As a result, the current-period 
actual impairment loss caused by fixed assets would be lower than the expectations. In 
other words, the adoption of ASSET-BTM might potentially bias the outcome.   
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews some previous 
studies. Section 3 explains the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design of 
this study. Section 5 presents the statistics. Section 6 summarizes additional discussion 
of the test results and concludes the study. 
 
 
2. Previous Research    
The approach to understanding conservatism has undergone a dramatic change over 
the past three decades due to the efforts to empirically quantitate conservatism. One of 
the most pioneering studies to model conservatism can be attributed to that of Basu 
[1997]. He defined conservatism as a tendency for bad news to be dealt with in a timelier 
manner than good news (i.e., accelerate the recognition of loss and defer the recognition 
of gains) and developed the Basu coefficient for measuring earnings conservatism. In 
other words, the Basu coefficient captures the different timeliness with which bad and 
good news are reported in contemporaneous earnings. Among the available empirical 
methods for evaluating earnings conservatism, Basu’s (1997) framework (Basu model 
hereafter), which was later designated as conditional conservatism, has become 
dominant in the literature.  
 Unconditional conservatism is primarily described as understating the book value of 
net asset relative to its market value on the balance sheet (i.e., recognition of cost is 
enforced before real depreciation is observed in asset value) (e.g., Watts [2003a]). Beaver 
and Ryan [2000] employed the measurement of BTM ratio to examine and explain the 
nature of unconditional conservatism. They defined conservatism as a systematic and 
persistent bias in the recognition of income and regressed the BTM ratio on lagged 
returns to filter out the temporary or transitory effects due to other economic factors. 
Another line of thought (e.g., Beaver and Ryan [2005], Pae et al. [2005]) has attempted 
to bridge these two conceptual frameworks and examine how the two forms of 
conservatism interact with each other. Roychowdhury and Watts [2007] noted that the 
annual estimate of the Basu coefficient is affected by firms’ failure to record asset write-
downs because previous asset value increases were not recorded due to conservatism (the 
“buffer” problem), and higher asymmetric response to bad news vs good news would 
eventually generate lower BTM ratio over longer horizons. Lawrence et al. [2013] adds 
to this line of thought by offering an alternative explanation from the perspective of non-
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discretionary conservatism that indicates the necessity of controlling the BTM when 
measuring the Basu coefficient. In particular, they documented a non-monotonic and 
exceptionally positive relation between asset write-downs and the BTM ratio in region 
with beginning-of-period BTM ratio greater than one led by the enforcement of GAAP.  
Lawrence et al. [2013] also integrates the concept of conservatism to relate to the study 
on earnings management. They found that the incentives to follow accounting standards 
are positively associated with penalties under enforcement mechanisms. They asserted 
that although the subjectivity inherent in the accounting standards gives rise to 
discretional activities, GAAP plays an important role in facilitating contracting 
efficiency by deterring management from engaging in further discretional activities. 
Roychowdhury and Martin [2013] characterized non-discretionary conservatism as 
“normal conservatism”. They indicated that reporting opportunism arising from 
contractual factors not only has a great impact on discretionary conservatism, but also 
weighs against non- discretionary conservatism as it can mold the form of “normality”.  
On the other hand, there is a paucity of literature on effects of change in accounting 
standards on companies’ conservative reporting policies. Oler [2014] investigated the 
impact of certain FASB standards (SFAS 87, 106, 121, 142, and 123R4) on accounting 
conservatism (that lower the probability of firms having a BTM ratio greater than one). 
He found that SFAS 121, as well as SFAS 123R, caused decreases in conservatism, which 
he attributed to the greater flexibility in SFAS 121 on the timing of an impairment. 
Ramanna and Watts [2012] focused on the implementation of SFAS 142, which also 
solely depends on management estimates of goodwill’s fair value to determine these 
write-downs, and indicated that goodwill write-downs are subject to motives predicted 
by agency theory such as CEO compensation and debt-covenant. The results of this study 
are closer to that of Oler [2014] and Ramanna and Watts [2012] in that certain 
accounting standards, however strictly enforced, may not correspond to the expectations 
of regulators to improve the usefulness of accounting information.    
FASB has consistently attempted to marginalize conservatism, reflecting the line or 
reasoning which holds that understatement of net assets and cumulative profits 
generated by conservatism presumably interferes in the decision-making process of 
financial statements users. Movement, actions such as capitalization of development cost, 
apparently abhorrent to the principle of conservatism has become prevalent in the realm 
                                                   
4 SFAS 87: Employers’ Accounting for Pensions; 
 SFAS 106: Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pension; 
SFAS 121: Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be 
Disposed Of; 
SFAS 142: Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets; and 
SFAS 123R: Share Based Payments 
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of accounting regulations. In other words, the need for neutrality or relevance prevails 
over the need for a defense against uncertainty.  
However, chances are that management prioritizes their own interests over those of 
other stakeholders, maintaining unconditional conservatism in accounting practices will 
offset such managerial opportunism. When book value of assets is kept sufficiently low 
from the beginning or is not capitalized at all, managers will find few assets subject to 
accounting discretion if the economic environment changes adversely. Therefore, this 
study focuses on the effect of accounting discretion on the implementation of impairment 
accounting standards.  
To the best of my knowledge, there still lacks study on non-discretionary conservatism 
in Japan. In this work, I try to fill this void. In addition, when impairment accounting is 
performed, more often than not, the losses run into considerable sums. These significant 
declines in earnings will be matched by high volatility in the capital markets. Thus, an 
understanding of how accounting standards affect impairment accounting is of great 
interests not only to researchers, but also of essential importance to standard setters, 
shareholders, and lenders. This is the primary motivation for this study. 
 
 
3. Hypotheses  
The first question I address is whether impairment accounting standards allow for 
discretional management in Japanese companies. Beaver and Ryan [2005] suggested 
that the BTM ratio primarily reflects the extent to which unconditional conservatism 
forestalls the application of conditionally conservative accounting. Thus, the beginning-
of-period BTM is expected to be positively associated with asset write-downs, hereby 
proxies for conditional conservatism. Although the two-step procedures are expected to 
serve to prevent the abusive use of impairment (big bath), as well as reduce operational 
burdens, the abstract recognition criteria involving management subjectivity judgment 
gives rise to the concern that it will eventually spur the demands for discretional 
accounting choices (e.g., Bartov et al. [1998], Elliott and Hanna [1996], Rees et al. 
[1996a]). On top of that, a large body of research has indicated that management has 
strong incentives to adapt accounting standards in ways that maximize their own 
benefits (e.g., Dechow et al. [1999]).  
Figure 1 demonstrates the correlation between current-period write-downs on fixed 
assets (𝑊𝐷 plotted on the vertical axis) and beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 
plotted on the horizontal axis), using past performance figures of Japanese listed 
companies from fiscal year 2005 to 2014. Figure 1 shows that, as 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 approaches one, 
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the gentle curve formed from the two indicators undergoes a dramatic rise and 𝑊𝐷 
peaks just after 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 exceeds one. In other words, when 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 is sufficiently low, 
there is little need to activate conditional conservatism. Hence, I predicted that a 
discontinuity exists as the beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM approaches one. This leads 
to my first hypothesis. 
 
H1: The relation between beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM and current-period asset 
write-downs is positive and nonlinear. 
 
However, the deterrent effect of unconditional conservatism begins to recede as the 
total impairment loss seems more likely to decline when the beginning-of-period ASSET-
BTM moves beyond one.  
 
Figure 1:  
 
Note:  
Figure 1 demonstrates the correlation between current-period asset write-downs (𝑊𝐷) and beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀). Data was standardized for further tests.  
       
One of the explanations for the deviation comes from the institutional distinctions 
between the two accounting regimes. Particularly, U.S. accounting rules prohibit 
expensing goodwill unless it is deemed impaired. In addition, impairment losses 
recognized under ASC 360-10 cannot be allocated to goodwill and other non-amortizing 
intangible assets, even if those assets are included in the asset groups being tested for 
recoverability. 5  In contrast, Japanese listed companies must amortize goodwill 
                                                   
5 Applying the same implementation process to goodwill may have altered the size of the buffer zone 
but have little influence on non-discretionary items. 
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regularly over a period not exceeding 20 years. Because amortized goodwill is recorded 
as selling, general, and administrative expenses attributable to operating income, 
extensive amortization of goodwill could squeeze the reported financial performance for 
years. Proponents of goodwill amortization stress that purchased goodwill should be 
reflected on income statements before any deterioration in real earning capacity is 
observed. They argue that goodwill acquired by M&As is non-durable and gradually 
replaced internally-developed goodwill. It is a reasonable assumption that internally 
developed synergies need effort to achieve and time to accumulate. Thus, Japanese 
companies are reluctant to record additional asset impairment losses when they believe 
an asset (group) is overly depreciated. 
The other source of the differences between Japan and the U.S., which were identified 
in the implementation of asset impairment accounting standards, is reporting incentives. 
Shaped by capital market forces and institutional factors, financial reporting incentives 
strongly influence financial reporting because the application of accounting standards 
involves discretion and judgement (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman [1986], Ball et al. [2003]). 
Riedl [2004b] also suggested that earnings management related to impairment loss 
tends to rise because of the intrinsic nature of its accounting setting. Therefore, 
opportunistic behavior in financial reporting by management will not be completely held 
back as a result of market imperfections, namely information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts. Consequently, I state my second hypothesis in its null form and expect it would 
be rejected based on the previous discussion. 
 
H2: The positive relation between the beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM and current-
period asset write-downs is stronger for companies whose beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM is greater than one. 
 
 
4 Research Design   
4.1 Grouping  
 First, all samples will be divided into eight groups according to their beginning-of-
period ASSET-BTM at intervals of 0.2.6 All samples would initially be separated using 
                                                   
6 The entire sample is divided into eight groups based on their rank of beginning-of-period ASSET-
BTM. However, this approach is only effective when the companies belonging to the same group have 
a similar degree of conservatism throughout the entire observation period. In general, the beginning-
of-period ASSET-BTM is affected by the accounting procedures executed at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. For example, if a significant impairment procedure has been performed at the end of the 
previous fiscal year in a company belonging to a high-ranking group, there is a strong possibility that 
such a company’s beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM would drop sharply. Therefore, test results obtained 
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beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM of one as a dividing line. Then, they will further be 
divided into smaller groups based on the same interval of 0.2. The eight groups are 
arranged in an ascending order of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. I expected 
companies belonging to Group 1 would show the least need for asset write-downs, 
whereas companies belonging to Group 8 would show the opposite tendency. Groups 5 
and 6 are the cohorts of most interest as they reflect samples whose beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTMs are just less or greater than one.  
 
4.2 the Adaptive LASSO regularized Quantile Regression (QR-LASSO) 
A sizable literature in conservatism empirically supports the assertion that the 
contracting theory links debt structure and conservatism (Aier et al. [2014], Nikolaev 
[2010b], Khan and Watts [2009], Beatty et al. [2008], Zhang [2008a], Ball et al. [2008]), 
since debt-holders’ fixed financial claims on earnings render them the first-order 
demander for accounting conservatism (e.g., Guay [2006], Roychowdhury and Martin 
[2013]). On the other hand, agency theory characterizes a large body of research on 
management’s incentives to choose aggressive accounting over conservatism. Evidence 
in Lawrence et al. [2013] contrasts previous studies in that it documents a strong 
disciplinary effect of accounting standards on accounting conservatism (i.e., non-
discretionary conservatism). In particular, non-discretionary conservatism 
demonstrates higher predicting power for conservative accounting than debt contract. 
Since Lawrence et al. [2013] is based on the U.S. setting, the issue then arises as to how 
effective non-discretionary conservatism is to prevent departures from conservatism in 
Japan. I apply the Adaptive-LASSO penalized quantile regression (QR-LASSO) (e.g., Wu 
and Liu [2009]) to address the problem above.  
QR-LASSO is an integrative approach to variable selection which can screen out 
irrelevant noise for variables affecting the dependent variable by pushing coefficients on 
the less significant predictors to zero and in the meantime, evaluate effects of predictor 
variables at any quantile. A smaller set of predictors with the strongest effects not only 
increases prediction accuracy but also boosts a better understanding of how each 
predictor influences the response variable. In other words, the select process of variables 
tests whether the theory of non-discretionary conservatism readily applies in the 
Japanese setting, When beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM is included in the model and 
enters the model earlier than other predictors analyzed in this test, it thereby attests to 
the paramount effectiveness of non-discretionary conservatism in disciplining 
recognition of asset impairment.    
                                                   
from the companies belonging to low-ranking groups might have been distorted. 
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4.3 Quantile Regression (QR)   
 To provide evidence of a discontinuity in the relationship between beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM and asset write-downs, I also adopt the robust technique of Quantile 
regression. Although Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is extensively utilized in regression 
analysis, its effectiveness largely depends on strong assumptions about the distribution 
of residuals. Solutions produced by OLS are highlighted in Figure 2 as the black solid 
line. Applying OLS in this instance would generate a coefficient estimate that is not fully 
indicative of the effects on the lower tail of the distribution as the empirical distribution 
of asset write-downs closely approximates a continuous inverted U-shape. On the other 
hand, quantile regression models heterogeneous effects of variables on a response and 
allows for heteroscedasticity. As per H1, I predict that dependent variables will respond 
incrementally stronger to the current-period asset write-downs as quantiles grows 
higher within the area wherein 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀t−1 gradually approaches/deviates the value of one. 
In other words, if the coefficient on 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀t−1  displays a dramatic change as the 
beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM reaches one (specifically between Group 5 and Group 
6), it thereby upholds the conjecture in this study that asset write-downs grow 
nonlinearly along with the increase in the ratio of ASSET-BTM. 
 
4.4 Variables Explanation  
Other than ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀), I examined the following variables, which have been 
deemed influential in shaping accounting choices for asset impairment and/or 
conservatism. The variables are firm size ( 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ), debt contracting ( 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉 ), and 
proportion of goodwill to total assets (𝐺𝑊).  
Firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) is commonly referred to as the market value of a company’s equity. 
Given the four drivers of conservatism advanced in Watts [2003a],7 larger companies 
are more motivated to reduce regulatory cost and litigation risk arising from non-
compliance with accounting regulations and corporation law. However, larger firms also 
enjoy comparative advantages of highly diversified business models and deeply 
interdependent management structure over smaller firms. Such flexible business 
environment allows for management to exercise discretion, making it more difficult for 
outside parties to retrieve information on true economic performance.  
Debt covenants are viewed as the one of the primary inputs for conservatism (Watts 
[2003a]). Earlier studies document robust empirical relations between debt covenants 
and timely loss recognition. However, debt-contracting incentives might evoke 
                                                   
7  Watts [2003a] hypothesized four resources of conservatism, which are contracting, shareholder 
litigation, taxation, and regulation. 
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aggressive accounting policies (e.g., Lawrence et al. [2013], Nikolaev [2010b]). Therefore, 
the question of how tradeoffs affect implementation of asset impairment by listed 
companies in Japan becomes empirical in nature.  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  represents debt contracting in this study, measured as the ratio of total 
liabilities8 to market value of common equity (e.g., Beaver and Ryan [2000]). Goodwill 
primarily consists of future economic benefits and synergies in existing operations. As 
stated in Section 3, I added the variable for goodwill (𝐺𝑊) because it indicates one of the 
differences existing in the two accounting systems.  
 Viewed in general terms, companies with a high BTM ratio are more likely going 
through financial distress and, therefore, are in even greater need of financial support. 
(e.g., Jung et al. [1996], Smith and Watts [1992]). It is possible that a rise in the amount 
of equity and/or debt will alter the management’s accounting choices. I employed two 
variables indicating two dominant sources of external financing, 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1  and 
𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1, to denote proceeds from debt issuance and sale of common stock in year t－
1 (deflated by market capitalization), respectively. 
Instead of controlling for industry, I added the proportion of property, plant and 
equipment assets to total assets in year t－1 (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1). As accounting standards generally 
apply to all firms, there is no a priori reason to suppose that conservatism will be higher 
for a certain industry. On the contrary, failing to control for the size of fixed assets might 
cause the effects of other variables to be misrepresented.  
Finally, I apply two dummy variables to control for the non-discretionary element in 
conditional conservatism. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡−1  takes a value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  is below 5% and 0 
otherwise. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴 and is computed as the average value of 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾 reveals a company's ability to generate earnings from its 
investments. 𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐷𝑡−2 indicates the accounting slack accumulated over time. It takes a 
value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−2 is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise. When both variables take the 
value of 1, companies with higher than 1 ASSET-BTM in the previous two accounting 
periods undoubtedly require a higher level of conservative accounting. 
 
 
 
                                                   
8 Instead of market value of total liabilities, I used book value of total liabilities to compute market 
value leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉). Long-term liability such as corporate bonds is required to be recognized at 
amortized cost under Japanese accounting standards. Other liabilities are also required either to be 
marked to market (i.e., bank loans) or to be recorded extremely close to their market values (i.e., reserve 
for retirement allowance).  Furthermore, book value of liability is customarily used as proxy for market 
value in studies of corporate finance (i.e., the calculation of corporation value). In summary, book value 
of liability is an appropriate substitute for its market value. 
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Figure 2 
 
Note: 
 Figure A demonstrates the effects of beginning-of-period ABTM on asset write-downs estimated by OLS analysis. 
𝑊𝐷：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t /market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year 
t－1. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀: total assets / market capitalization + total assets - common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal 
year t－1. Data was standardized for further tests. 
 
The QR test uncovers trends among variables across all quantiles on the basis of Eq. 1.  
 
𝑄𝑊𝐷𝑡
(𝜏|𝑋𝑖) =  ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝜏          𝜏 ∈ (0,100)        𝑖 ∈ [1,10]              1 
 
Here, τ  denotes the quantile, and 𝑦  represents current-period asset write-downs 
(𝑊𝐷𝑡). 𝛽𝑖,τ represents the slope coefficient of a specific variable, selected by Step 2, on 
the dependent variable (𝑊𝐷𝑡) for a specific quantile τ. For instance, for τ = 75, 𝛽1,75 
denotes the effect of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 at the 75th percentile of 𝑊𝐷𝑡.  
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 𝑊𝐷𝑡      = current-period asset write-downs 
𝑋𝑖: 
 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1  = total assets deflated by the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus common 
equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1                     
 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1   = natural logarithm of market value at the end of fiscal year t－1                   
 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  = total liabilities deflated by market value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t－1. 
𝐺𝑊𝑡−1    = book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 
𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡−1 = 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is below 5% and 0 otherwise. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed as the 
average value of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1   = proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets, measured at the end of 
year t－1. 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1   = proceeds from the issuance of bonds in year t－1 deflated by market capitalization of 
common equity at the end of year t－1. 
𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 = proceeds from the issuance of common stock in year t－1 deflated by market capitalization 
of common equity at the end of year t－1.  
𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐷t−2    = 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−2 is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise. 
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4.5 Test for Non-Discretionary Conservatism  
 LSS declared that as beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM becomes greater than one, non-
discretionary conservatism plays an increasingly influential role. Given the different 
distributions (Figure 1) shown by samples with respect to Japanese listed companies, I 
predict that non-discretionary conservatism does not function as effectively in Japanese 
listed companies as it does in American listed companies. To learn more regarding non-
discretionary conservatism, I conducted a close investigation into the sub groups defined 
in Section 4.1. In addition, I trace and compare the levels of all groups’ conditional 
conservatism based on the models applied by Basu [1997], Pae et al. [2005], Khan and 
Watts [2009], and Ball and Shivakumar [2006a]. 
 
 
5 Sample and Descriptive Statistics   
5.1 Sample Selection  
 The initial sample in this study includes all Japanese listed firms with necessary data 
on NIKKE NEEDS Financial Quest covering an analysis period from fiscal year 2005 to 
2014. I collect stock return data from NPM Daily Return Database (Financial Data 
Solutions). To reduce analytical complexity, financial institutions, companies with a 
fiscal year ending other than March; companies who have been delisted; and those who 
had changed their year-end in the middle of a fiscal year were excluded from the 
observations. I eliminated a total of 853 firm/year samples which do not have sufficient 
data to compute the measure of ASSET-BTM (i.e., total assets and market capitalization). 
A further 22 firm/year samples with negative common equity and one sample with 
negative asset write-downs were also excluded from the analyses. The final sample 
includes 17,152 firm/years fulfilling the requirements.  
Table 1 presents the sample selection process and the number of samples in each group. 
 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics    
Table 2 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for variables of particular importance in 
this study. 𝑊𝐷t denotes asset write-downs scaled by market capitalization measured at 
the end of fiscal year t－1. Observing a higher mean value (0.0081) than the median 
value (0) and 3rd quartile (0.0008) for 𝑊𝐷𝑡 indicates the presence of “big bath” – that is, 
a minor portion of the samples take up the majority of asset write-downs recognized at 
each year end. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 denotes ASSET-BTM measured at the end of fiscal year t－1, 
computed as the book value of total assets deflated by the sum of market capitalization 
and total assets minus common equity. 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷t−1 is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise. The mean value of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 
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and 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡−1  are 1.0305 and 0.5262, respectively, both of which show that 
approximately more than half of the samples have lower market values than their book 
values.9  
Panel B of Table 2 compares some important statistical results across groups. First, 
recall that groups are classified by ASSET-BTM measured at the end of year t－1 in an 
ascending order. As expected, the mean 𝑊𝐷 of Groups 6, 7 and 8 are 0.0102, 0.0117, 
and 0.0218, respectively, all of which noticeably surpass those of groups with a 
beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM lower than one.  
 
TABLE 1  Process of Sample Selection 
Panel A : Process of Sample Selection 
 initial sample 
27670 
1 analytical complexity  Δ9643 
2 required accounting data Δ853 
3 negative common equity and asset write-downs   Δ22 
total 17152 
Panel B : Number of Samples in Each Group 
  𝑁  
Group1 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 <0.2 170 
Group2 0.2≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 <0.4 371 
Group3 0.4≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 <0.6 980 
Group4 0.6≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 <0.8 2280 
Group5 0.8≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1<1 4325 
Group6 1≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1<1.2 4749 
Group7 1.2≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1<1.4 2328 
Group8 1.4≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 1949 
Note: 
Panel A: The required accounting data includes total assets, common equity and market capitalization. In order to 
reduce analytical complexity, firms with fiscal year ending other than March, companies who have been delisted; 
and those who had changed their year-end in the middle of a fiscal year were excluded. Samples which do not have 
sufficient data to compute the measure of ASSET-BTM and those with negative common equity and asset write-
downs were also excluded.  
Panel B: The samples were separated into eight groups using an interval of 0.2. Then, the eight groups were 
arranged in an ascending order of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. I expected companies belonging to Group 1 
would show the least need for asset write-downs, whereas companies belonging to Group 8 would show the opposite 
tendency. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus common equity, both 
measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑁 denotes the number of observations in each ASSET-BTM group. 𝑁% 
                                                   
9 This differs hugely from the analysis performed in Lawrence et al. [2013], who reported that only the 
upper 25% of the observations were expected to write down their assets. 
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denotes the percentage of each group’s firm/years in all observations.  
 
From Panel B, a trend toward a rapid decline in Firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) is evident from Group 
3 to Group 8, which is consistent with the trend observed in previous research, indicating 
that larger companies have a preference for more conservative accounting (e.g., Watts 
and Zimmerman [1986]).  
A growing number of studies have shown that debt covenants are a most important 
reporting incentive to predict loss recognition timeliness. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉  peaks in Group 6 
(3.7706), but decreases sharply with Group 8 (1.6959) being the lowest among groups 
with higher than one beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. 
The pecking order theory predicts that management prioritizes debt issuance over 
equity when external financing is required. In other words, the issue of debt implies 
underestimation of stock price and the issue of equity otherwise. (e.g., Jung et al. [1996], 
Smith and Watts [1992]). Consistent with the pecking order theory, firms from Group 8 
issue considerably more new stock than the other groups as leverage ratios decline 
rapidly through Groups 6 － 8.  
Panel C in Table 2 considers the operating performance of all samples. 𝑅𝑡−1 is the buy-
and-hold return on common stock for the 12 months ending three months after the end 
of fiscal year t－1. Return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) is used extensively to investigate a company’s 
earning capacity. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is computed as income before extraordinary items at the end of 
fiscal year t scaled by the book value of total assets. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, 
computed as the average value of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡−1 is a dummy variable, 
that takes a value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is below 5% and 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 denotes proportion 
of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets, measured at the end of year t－
1.  
𝑅𝑡−1  decreases as ASSET-BTM grows and bottoms at －0.0695 in Group 8. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴 
negatively interacts with ASSET-BTM, with Group 8 the lowest (0.0152). The result for 
𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾  is briefly accordant with the rank of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. In 
particular, the financial performance of Groups 5 to Group 8 is relatively weaker than  
that of the other groups with lower beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾 for Group8 
runs up to 0.9112, suggesting that more than 90% of the observations belonging to Group 
8 suffered depressed financial performance. 10 
 
                                                   
10 It is noteworthy that 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾 for US listed companies, as documented by Lawrence et al. [2013], 
ranges from 0.603 (0.3≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 <0.5) to 0.847 ( 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 > 1.2). In other words, Japanese listed 
companies in high ASSET-BTM groups exhibit lower operational effectiveness than their counterparts 
in America, whereas those in low ASSET-BTM groups enjoy financial performance surpassing their 
American counterparts. 
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TABLE 2  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistic for All Samples  
 mean std. 1st quartile median 3rd quartile 
𝑊𝐷𝑡 0.0081  0.0669  0.0000  0.0000  0.0008  
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 1.0305  0.3631  0.8281  1.0160  1.1995  
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡−1 0.5262 0.4993 0 1 1 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 10.1709  1.8129  8.8706  9.9396  11.2959  
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistic for Each Group 
 𝑊𝐷𝑡 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡−2 
Group1 0.0002  9.5272  0.3802  0.0035  0.0116  0.3176  
Group2 0.0005  9.7000  0.2318  0.0033  0.0171  0.0943  
Group3 0.0009  10.2374  0.3783  0.0066  0.0143  0.0918  
Group4 0.0015  10.3327  0.7927  0.0105  0.0092  0.1443  
Group5 0.0040  10.3913  1.9592  0.0219  0.0120  0.2860  
Group6 0.0102  10.1591  3.7706  0.0281  0.0130  0.7412  
Group7 0.0117  9.9731  2.4685  0.0140  0.0075  0.9055  
Group8 0.0218  9.8699  1.6959  0.0080  0.0217  0.9523  
Notes: 
𝑊𝐷t：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t /market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal 
year t－1. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end 
of fiscal year t－1. 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷t−1: dummy variable which take a value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is higher than 1, and 0 otherwise. 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1: book value of total 
liabilities deflated by market value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1:  proceeds from debt 
issuance deflated by market capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1: proceeds from sale of 
common stock deflated by market capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 
 
Panel D compares 𝑊𝐷 and 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 on a yearly basis. An economic deterioration, such 
as the global financial crisis in 2008, which put stock markets around the world on a 
downward trajectory, can significantly affect the implementations of asset impairment. 
The mean value of 𝑊𝐷 over time shows that asset impairment losses soared to 0.021 in 
2009, which underscores the unprecedented challenges posed by the financial crisis. This 
is coincident with 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀, which records its peak value (1.2082) in the same accounting 
period. Although the economy has steadily emerged from the financial crisis (the mean 
value of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 declined from 1.2082 to 1.0305), Japanese listed companies are still 
struggling as 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 has remained over 1 since 2009. 
Panel A of Table 3 contains the results of the actual asset write-downs in terms of 
frequency and volume. 𝑁 denotes the number of observations in each ASSET-BTM 
group. Among all the observations of 17,152 firm/years, 5,085 sampling firms wrote down 
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their assets. 𝐺𝑁  represents the number of companies who have written down their 
assets. 𝑊𝐷𝑁% represents the percentage of such companies in all samples (17,152 
firm/years). Group 6, together with Groups 7 and 8, occupy a dominant portion of 53% 
with respect to 𝑊𝐷𝑁%. 𝑊𝐷𝑁𝐺% equals the percentage of companies who have written 
down their assets in each group. Groups with high beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM 
(Group 6 through Group 8) do not exhibit a tremendous difference between each other. 
On the other hand, 𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑊𝐷𝐺 represents the sum of actual asset write-downs in each 
group. 𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑊𝐷% compares the amount of actual asset write-downs between the eight 
groups. In this respect, the three groups with a beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM higher 
than one (Group 6 through Group 8) constitute approximately 84% of the total actual 
asset write-downs. In brief, groups with higher ASSET-BTM outrank the other groups 
not only by the frequency but amount as well. From this, it is clear that when ASSET-
BTM exceeds one, the application of impairment standards explodes.  
If the “non-discretionary conservatism takes over theory” holds, both the frequency and 
amount of asset write-downs are expected to increase monotonically from Group 6 to 
Group 8. However, Groups 7 and 8 only take up 14% and 11% of 𝑊𝐷𝑁%, respectively, 
levels that are inferior to Group 6 (28%) even after Groups 7 and 8 are combined. In 
addition, the indicator 𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑊𝐷% of Group 6 (35%) is also higher than that of Group 7 
(19%) and Group 8 (30%). According to a previous analysis on changes of ASSET-BTM 
over time, more than 40% of the entire observations have ASSET-BTM greater than one 
for three years in succession, indicating that a considerable proportion of Japanese listed 
companies postpone the application of impairment standards when circumstances 
warrant.  
Panel B of Table 3 reports on a deeper examination of groups with beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM greater than one. 𝑁 denotes the number of observations in each ASSET-
BTM group. 𝑁1 depicts the number of companies who did not record asset write-downs 
at the end of fiscal year t. 𝑊𝐷1%, the third row in Table 3, represents the percentage 
per group of such companies. Approximately 68% and 65% of the companies in Groups 7 
and 8, respectively, potentially delayed the implementation of impairment even when 
their beginning-of-period ASSET-BTMs strongly imply a decline in the value of their 
assets. 𝑁2 depicts the number of companies who shelved the impairment procedures for 
two fiscal years in a row. 𝑊𝐷2%, the last row in Table 3, then represents the percentage 
of such companies in each group. Although the number of such companies decreases by 
18% in Group 6 (from 67% to 49%), the percentage of companies leaving their 
depreciating assets untouched in Group 7 (62%) and Group 8 (62%) remains surprisingly 
high despite the presence of such red flags for two consecutive fiscal years. This is 
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consistent with my expectation that non-discretionary conservatism is not as prevalent 
in Japanese listed companies as it is in American listed companies. 
 
TABLE 2  Descriptive Statistic (Continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistic for Each Group 
 𝑅𝑡−1 𝐷𝑅𝑡 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 
Group1 0.8041  0.4647  0.0486  0.4471  0.0340  0.1342  
Group2 0.1922  0.5499  0.0494  0.3720  0.0136  0.1857  
Group3 0.1318  0.5418  0.0473  0.3878  0.0139  0.2349  
Group4 0.0695  0.5390  0.0372  0.6408  0.0104  0.2929  
Group5 0.0316  0.5618  0.0250  0.8238  0.0068  0.3320  
Group6 0.0467  0.5639  0.0186  0.8922  0.0057  0.3031  
Group7 －0.0425  0.5438  0.0209  0.8922  0.0040  0.3015  
Group8 －0.0695  0.5526  0.0152  0.9112  0.0039  0.2913  
       
Panel D: Descriptive Statistic for Each Year 
 𝑊𝐷𝑡 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 
 mean 3rd quartile mean 3rd quartile 
2005 0.0010  0 0.9630  1.1008  
2006 0.0020  0 0.8000  0.9721  
2007 0.0005  0 0.8838  1.0649  
2008 0.0063  0.0002  0.9886  1.1611  
2009 0.0214  0.0061  1.2082  1.3596  
2010 0.0112  0.0049  1.1323  1.2782  
2011 0.0117  0.0033  1.1278  1.2875  
2012 0.0089  0.0029  1.1762  1.3280  
2013 0.0114  0.0035  1.0010  1.1723  
2014 0.0061  0.0028  1.0047  1.1820  
Notes: 
𝑅𝑡−1: the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending three months after the end of fiscal 
year t－1. 𝐷𝑅𝑡: dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝑅𝑡−1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡：income before 
extraordinary items / book value of total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t: lag indicator for 
𝑅𝑂𝐴, computing as an average value of 𝑅𝑂𝐴 for the previous two accounting periods. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡−1: dummy variable, 
taking a value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is less than 5%, and 0 otherwise. 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1: book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, 
both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1: proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total 
assets, measured at the end of year t－1. 
 
 
 
26 
 
TABLE 3  Descriptive Statistic 
Panel A:  
Results of Actual Asset Write-downs in terms of Frequency and Volume 
 𝑁 𝐺𝑁 𝑊𝐷𝑁% 𝑊𝐷𝑁𝐺% 𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑊𝐷𝐺 𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑊𝐷% 
Group1 170 18 0.10% 11% 0.0282  0% 
Group2 371 66 0.38% 18% 0.1717  0% 
Group3 980 197 1.15% 20% 0.8333  1% 
Group4 2280 555 3.24% 24% 3.4093  2% 
Group5 4325 1260 7.35% 29% 17.4105  12% 
Group6 4749 1573 9.17% 33% 48.2238  35% 
Group7 2328 742 4.33% 32% 27.1528  19% 
Group8 1949 674 3.93% 35% 42.4499  30% 
Total 17152 5085 29.65% 100% 139.6795 100% 
       
Panel B:  
Further Details of Groups with Beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM Greater than One 
 𝑁 𝑁1 𝑊𝐷1% 𝑁2 𝑊𝐷2% 
Group6 4749 3176 67% 2336 49% 
Group7 2328 1586 68% 1441 62% 
Group8 1949 1275 65% 1217 62% 
Note: 
𝐺𝑁 represents the number of companies who have written down their assets. 𝑊𝐷𝑁% represents the percentage of 
companies who have written down their assets in all samples. 𝑊𝐷𝑁𝐺%  equals the percentage of companies who 
have written down their assets in each group. 𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑊𝐷𝐺 denotes the sum of actual asset write-downs in each group. 
𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑊𝐷%  denotes the percentage of each group’s actual asset write-downs in the total actual asset write-downs. 
𝑁1 depicts the number of companies who did not record asset write-downs at the end of fiscal year t. 𝑊𝐷1%  
represents the percentage of companies who delay the application of impairment standards in each group. 𝑁2 
depicts the number of companies who shelved the impairment procedures two fiscal years in a row. 𝑊𝐷2% 
represents the percentage of companies who shelve the impairment procedures for two fiscal years. 
 
 
5.3 Tests of Nonlinear Relation    
5.3.1 the Adaptive LASSO regularized Quantile Regression (QR-LASSO)  
Results of the QR-LASSO at the 70th, 75th, 80th, 85th, 90th, and 95th quantiles, 
respectively, are shown in Figure 3.11 The upper plots show how the model at a specific 
quantile evolves through the selection process. Each colored line represents the value 
taken by a different variable. The vertical axis reveals the fit statistics of the variables 
                                                   
11 I also performed the tests for samples below the 70th quantile, but no variables are validated as 
effective at lower than the 70th quantiles. 
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and assesses the relative importance of the effects selected at any step of the selection 
process. The horizontal axis provides information as to when effects of the selected 
variables enter the model. The lower plot in the panel shows the stopping criterion used 
to choose the model and how it changes as variables enter or leave the model. The vertical 
gray line connecting the upper plot and the lower plot indicates the maximum number 
of steps, which when reached, denotes the termination of the selection process. In QR-
LASSO, the regularization term is set to be a constant value beneath the weighted 𝐿1 
norm in the OLS solution. The effects chosen by then are viewed as the optimal model to 
explain the response variable for that quantile.  
I applied the Adjusted R-square statistic (𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅2), Akaike’s information criterion (𝐴𝐼𝐶), 
Corrected Akaike’s information criterion (𝐴𝐼𝐶𝐶 ) and Schwarz Bayesian information 
criterion (𝑆𝐵𝐶) in all the tests to evaluate the quality of the models produced by the QR-
LASSO. Eventually, all models are selected by 𝑆𝐵𝐶, which favors a smaller model than 
𝐴𝐼𝐶  and 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝐶 . Moreover, because the information criterion is usually used in the 
context of comparing models, not as an absolute criterion by itself, the magnitude of the 
information criterion (𝐴𝐼𝐶/ 𝑆𝐵𝐶) for a specific model is less of interest.  
As previously noted, conservative accounting pertaining to asset write-downs disclosure 
may involve a set of managerial incentives rather than a single constraint. 9 predictors 
are considered in the model: beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀), firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), 
financial leverage ( 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉 ), proportions of goodwill to total assets ( 𝐺𝑊 ), the  
proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets (𝑃𝑃𝐸 ), operating 
efficiency (𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾) and accumulated accounting slack (𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐷).  
First of all, the financial leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉) is the first variable to become active in the 
effect selection process at all quantiles tested. It can be intuitively observed from all plots 
that leverage ( 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉 ) and the proportion of fixed assets ( 𝑃𝑃𝐸 ), rather than the 
beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀), is the dominant impetuses for asset write-
downs. This evidence rejects the findings in Lawrence et al. [2013] who argues the 
primary influence of accounting standards over management’s decision to implement an 
asset impairment.  
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Notes:  
The upper plots show how the model at a specific quantile evolves through the selection process.  I performed QR-LASSO at the 70th, 75th, 80th, 85th, 90th, and 95th quantile, respectively. The vertical axis reveals 
the fit statistics of the variables and assesses the relative importance of the effects selected at any step of the selection process. The horizontal axis provides information as to when effects of the selected variables 
enter the model. The lower plot in the panel shows the stopping criterion used to choose the model and how it changes as variables enter or leave the model. The vertical gray line connecting the upper plot and 
the lower plot indicates the maximum number of steps, which when reached, denotes the termination of the selection process. I used the Adaptive LASSO as the shrinkage method in the selection process. The 
horizontal axis represents maximum permissible values of the weighted 𝐿1 norm. Each colored line represents the value taken by a different variable. 
𝑊𝐷 ：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t /market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀1: total assets / the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus 
common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸1: the natural logarithm of market value at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐺𝑊1: book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, both measured at 
the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉1: book value of total liabilities deflated by market value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾: a dummy variable, that takes a value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is below 
5% and 0 otherwise.  𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t: lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed as the average value of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2.  𝑃𝑃𝐸1 : proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets, measured at the end of 
year t－1. 𝐵𝑇𝑀D2 : a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−2 is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇1  : proceeds from the issuance of bonds in year t－1 deflated by market capitalization of 
common equity at the end of year t－1. .𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌1 : proceeds from the issuance of common stock in year t－1 deflated by market capitalization of common equity at the end of year t－1.  
SBC = n log (SSE/n) +  𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑛), where n denotes the number of observations and p denotes the number of parameters including the intercept. SSE is the error sum of squares.  
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As the amount of shrinkage decreases from left to right on the horizontal axis, the model 
complexity increases. More predictor variables are retained to explain the extreme asset 
write-downs. However, the selected effects enter/leave the model in different sequences 
at different quantiles. Particularly, as indicated in Table 4 Panel B, the beginning-of-
period ASSET-BTM exceeds the value of 1 around the 80th quantile from where 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 
begins to show statistically significant effects.  
With 𝑆𝐵𝐶 being the stopping criteria, the lower the 𝑆𝐵𝐶 value, the more the model 
fits the given data. Hence, the effect selection process stops when dropping or adding any 
effect increases the 𝑆𝐵𝐶 statistic. Cumulatively, the variable that denote impact from 
intangible assets (𝐺𝑊), debt issuance (𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇), and sale of common stock (𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌) show 
almost no contribution to asset write-downs. 
 
 
5.3.2 Test of Nonlinearity by Quantile Regression  
In this section, I employ the Quantile Regression (QR hereafter) (Koenker and Bassett 
[1978]) to identify nonlinearity in the relationship between beginning-of-period ASSET-
BTM and asset write-downs. QR estimates conditional quantiles of variables for a 
probability distribution. Application of QR also paints a broader picture of how asset 
write-downs interact with the selected variables along lower or upper boundaries.  
In Table 4, Panel A reports slope estimates produced by OLS with beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀) being the only predictor variable. Panel B reports the QR solutions 
(𝛽
𝜏
∗) when beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1) is the only predictor for write-
downs. Panel C reports QR solutions estimated by models selected by the QR-LASSO. 
For brevity, only slope coefficients (𝛽𝑖,𝜏) estimated at the 70th, 75th, 80th, 85th, 90th, and 
95th quantiles are reported. 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑡  indicates the plot number corresponding to that 
quantile. Quantile standard errors are bootstrapped, using 100 replications. 𝑊𝐷𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 
denotes the mean value for the current period asset write-downs, while 𝑊𝐷𝜏 denotes 
the value of the current period asset write-downs at the τ th quantile. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 
(𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛) denotes the mean value (the median value) of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 corresponding to 
the value of 𝑊𝐷t at the τth quantile. Similarly, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛) represents 
the number of subgroup (specified in Section 4.1) corresponding to samples with asset 
write-downs from the (τ − 1)th to the (τ + 1)th quantile. For example, 𝑊𝐷80 shows that 
asset write-downs are 0.0023 at the 80th quantile. On the other hand, 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 at the 
80th quantile (1.03) denotes the mean value of ASSET-BTM ratio for samples having 
recognized asset write-downs at 0.0023. Furthermore, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 at the 80th quantile 
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TABLE 4  Test Results 
Panel A: Slope Estimates Produced by OLS 
 Plot 𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 intercept 𝑊𝐷𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 
OLS Fit a/1 0.0173*** －0.001*** 0.0081 1.0305 1.0160 6 6 
         
Panel B: Slope Estimates Produced by QR 
𝑄𝑊𝐷(𝜏|𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1) =  𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,𝜏
∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝜏       𝜏 ∈ (0,100)                                          1
∗ 
𝜏 Plot 𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,𝜏
∗ . intercept 𝑊𝐷𝜏 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 
70th  － 0.0019*** －0.1179*** 0 0.80  0.80  4.52  5 
75th  Fit b 0.0097*** －0.1019*** 0.0008  0.97  0.95  5.32  5 
80th  Fit c 0.0216*** －0.0759*** 0.0023 1.03  1.03  5.57  6 
85th  Fit d 0.0433*** －0.0269*** 0.0051 1.07  1.03  5.73  6 
90th  Fit e 0.0813*** 0.0647*** 0.0107  1.11  1.06  5.93  6 
95th  Fit f 0.1870*** 0.3329*** 0.0281 1.19  1.12  6.25  6 
 
Panel C: Slope Estimates for Models Selected by QR-LASSO 
𝑄𝑊𝐷(𝜏|𝑋𝑖) =  ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝜏          τ ∈ (0,100)                                                        1 
𝜏 Plot 𝛽𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉,𝜏 𝛽𝑃𝑃𝐸,𝜏 𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,𝜏 𝛽𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐷,𝜏 𝛽𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸,𝜏 𝛽𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾,𝜏 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌,𝜏 𝛽𝐺𝑊,𝜏 intercept 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 
70th  Fit 2 0.02***         －0.11***  0.80  
75th Fit 3 0.05***  0.0048***        －0.09***  0.95  
80th Fit 4 0.11***  0.0082***  0.004***       －0.06***  1.03  
85th Fit 5 0.19***  0.0142***  0.008***  0.0064***      －0.003***  1.03  
90th Fit 6 0.35 *** 0.0255***  0.016***  0.0107***  －0.009***     0.103***  1.06  
95th  Fit 7 0.77 ***  0.0441***  0.047***  0.0274***  －0.016***  －0.013*** 0.078* 0.006** 0.383***  1.12  
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Notes: 
Panel B reports numerical slope estimates for each variable involved. I performed QR test at the 70th, 75th, 80th, 85th, 90th, and 95th quantile, respectively. 𝑋  denotes a set of independent variables 
characterized as predictors of conservatism. 𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,𝜏
∗  : coefficients on 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀t−1 at the τth quantile when 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀t−1 is the only predictor in the model.  𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,𝜏:  coefficient on 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀t−1 at the τth 
quantile. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: the total assets /  market capitalization + total assets － common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝛽𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸,𝜏: coefficients on 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 at the τth quantile. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: 
the natural logarithm of market value at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝛽𝐺𝑊,𝜏: coefficients on 𝐺𝑊t−1 at the τth quantile.  𝐺𝑊𝑡−1: book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, both measured at the end 
of fiscal year t－1.  𝛽𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉,𝜏: coefficients on 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1 at the τth quantile.  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1: book value of total liabilities deflated by market value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝛽𝑃𝑃𝐸,𝜏:  
coefficients on 𝑃𝑃𝐸t−1 at the τth quantile. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1: the proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets, measured at the end of year t－1. 𝛽𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾,𝜏: coefficients on 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾t at the τth 
quantile. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾t: a dummy variable, that takes a value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is below 5% and 0 otherwise. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t: lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed as the average value of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2. 𝛽𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌,𝜏 : 
coefficients on 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌t−1 at the τth quantile. 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1: sale of common stock deflated by market capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 𝛽𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐷,𝜏: coefficients on 𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐷t−2 at the τth 
quantile. 𝐵𝑇𝑀Dt−2 : a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−2 is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise. 𝑊𝐷𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛: the mean value for the current period asset write-downs. 𝑊𝐷𝜏 : the value of the 
current period asset write-downs at the τth quantile. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛): the mean value (the median value) of the beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛): the mean value 
(the median value) of the number of subgroup specified in the research design (Step 1). ***, **,* indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
 
Figure 4                                                   Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
Figures 4 demonstrates the effects of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀) on asset write-downs estimated by regular QR analysis, while Figure 5 demonstrates the effects of variables selected 
by the QR-LASSO estimated by QR analysis on scatter plots of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀) and asset write-downs (𝑊𝐷). 𝑊𝐷：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t 
/market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀: total assets / market capitalization + total assets - common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. The black solid 
lines (Fit a and Fit 1) denote solutions derived from OLS. Each line indicates a QR solution corresponding to a specific quantile. Data in QR estimates are standardized to assure variables measured 
on different scales contribute equally to the analysis. 
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shows that samples with asset write-downs around 0.0023 (from the 79th to 81th 
percentile in all samples) belong to Group 6. 
In Panel C, it is noteworthy that the slope coefficient on leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉) strengthens 
incrementally as quantiles increase and outweighs that of beginning-of-period ASSET-
BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀) across all quantiles. Comparison of Panel B (𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,𝜏
∗ ) and Panel C (𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,𝜏) 
reveals that the influence of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM markedly decreases along 
the quantiles tested after specific variables are controlled. For instance, slope coefficients 
estimated at the 95th quantile plunge from 0.1870*** (𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,95
∗ ) to 0.047*** (𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,95). 
Furthermore, when beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀) accounts for 1% and 4% of 
total asset write-downs at the 90th and 95th quantiles, leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉) accounts for 
about 35% and 77% of total asset write-downs at the same quantiles, which also reflects 
the findings in Figure 3 that beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM is not the leading driver 
for asset impairment. However, effects from the beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM 
(𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀) do intensify for extreme asset write-downs, as coefficient on 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 at the 95th 
quantile (𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,95) is almost three-fold stronger than that for the 90th quantile (𝛽𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,90 
= 0.016***). Furthermore, the last column in Panel C (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛) also infers that, in 
general, samples with extreme asset write-downs (i.e., from the 80th through the 95th 
quantile) cluster between an area with 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ranging from 1.03 to 1.12. The 
disproportionally increase in coefficients on 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1  (from 0.004*** to 0.047***) in 
samples with 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ranging from 1.03 to 1.12 is thereby consistent with H1 in this 
study which propose a discontinuity in the relationship between the implementation of 
asset impairment and the ratio of ASSET-BTM right after this ratio reaches the value 
of one.  
To check the robustness of the models selected by the QR-LASSO, QR estimates 
produced by Eqs. 1∗ and 1 are plotted on scatter plots of beginning-of-period ASSET-
BTM and asset write-downs in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. In other words, Figures 4 
and 5 compare the fitness of estimates produced by the conventional regression model 
and the quantile regression. The black solid line denotes the solution derived from OLS 
in both charts (Fit a/ Fit 1). Other lines indicate QR solutions corresponding to a specific 
quantile.12 It is evident that QR estimates fit better than those produced by OLS. In the 
meantime, models selected by the QR-LASSO demonstrate even higher descriptive 
power than the regular QR analysis. On the other hand, Figure 5 also makes it apparent 
that regression slopes for all variables at the 99th quantile (Fit 7), which locates directly 
                                                   
12 I also tried to plot solutions below the 70th quantile for Eq. 1∗ and Eq. 1, but those lines almost 
parallel to the horizontal axis and thus are not shown in the figures.   
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above 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1=113, are steeper than other estimates produced at lower quantiles. This 
further implies that asset write-downs at higher quantiles respond more sensitively to 
beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM and confirms the presence of a discontinuity in the 
relationship between asset write-downs and beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. However, 
it contradicts findings in Lawrence et al. [2013] in that the implementation of asset 
impairment accumulates in an area closer to 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1=1. According to Lawrence et al. 
[2013], extreme asset write-downs (e.g., from the 90th through the 95th quantiles) are 
more likely to be identified in areas with much higher 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 (e.g., 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1>1.4). In 
other words, firms whose assets have greatly deteriorated compared to their market 
value (e.g., 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1>1.4) have not executed impairments losses appropriately as 
opposed to their counterparts in the U.S. Figure 6 displays the hypothesized difference 
between Japan and the U.S. The solid blue line in Panels A and B denotes asset write-
downs recognized in year t. The horizontal axis denotes beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM 
(𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1) scaled by interval of 0.2. The left side to the vertical axis contains samples in 
Groups 1 through 5, whose 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is lower than one. The right side, on the other hand, 
contains samples belonging to Groups 6 through 8, whose 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is higher than one. 
Panel B is produced based on Lawrence et al. [2013] (Fig. 5 P.127). It can be observed in 
Panel B that extreme asset write-downs (e.g., from the 90th through the 95th quantiles) 
are more likely to be identified in areas with much higher 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 (e.g., 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1>1.4) 
in the U.S, which attests to the influence of non-discretionary conservatism. On the 
contrary, test results in this section offer limited evidence with regards to asset write-
downs implemented in areas with much higher 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1. The dashed lines in Panel A 
present two scenarios for effects of non-discretionary conservatism in Japan. The thin 
dashed line supposes that, although extreme impairment losses gather around an area 
of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1=1, listed firms implement asset write-downs more insensitively and thereby 
exhibit higher level of accounting conservatism in area with considerably high 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1. 
In contrast, the thick dash line supposes that firms with extreme 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 possibly 
delay the recognition of impairment losses which lead to lower level of accounting 
conservatism in area with considerably high 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1. 
To summarize, results of QR test suggest that effects from the beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀) and accumulated accounting slack (𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐷) hold positive on asset 
write-downs, which shows that GAAP does motivate management against arbitrary 
accounting choices. However, the weak performance (𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾), another variable which is 
                                                   
13 The ratio of ASSET-BTM on the horizontal axis in Figures 4 and 5 is standardized to have a mean 
of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1=1. Hence, Fit 7 in Figure 5 indicates that asset write-downs at the 95th quantile occur 
right after 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 reaches the value of one. 
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supposed to control for the non-discretionary component in conservatism, shows a 
countervailing effect on asset write-downs. Furthermore, though beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM accounts for a portion of extreme asset write-downs, it is not the 
predominant driver of accounting conservatism. These lines of evidence indicate that 
Japanese impairment accounting practices fit better to the thick dashed line shown in 
Panel A Figure 6. This may lead us to conclude that high-quality reporting is unlikely to 
be secured by accounting standards alone, however strictly enforced.  
Nevertheless, factors that affect actual asset write-downs are not limited to those 
proposed in this study. Furthermore, I did not take interaction terms into consideration. 
Future analyses should explore more variables and employ a better-fitting analytical 
model. 
In the following section, I replicate the test suggested in Lawrence et al. [2013] and 
measure the degree of accounting conservatism in each subgroup defined in Section 4.1 
to further confirm effects of non-discretionary conservatism in Japan. 
 
Figure 6 
Panel A : Japan                             Panel B : U.S.A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
ABTM: total assets / the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus common equity, both measured at 
the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑊𝐷: current asset write-downs deflated by market capitalization measured at 
the end of fiscal year t－1.  
 
 
5.4 Test for Non-Discretionary Conservatism    
5.4.1 OLS Model 
This section performs the same test as in Lawrence et al. [2013] to compare results on 
the same basis. As with Lawrence et al. [2013], Eq. 2 regresses beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1) on current asset write-downs (𝑊𝐷𝑡). Eq.3 is not an empirical 
equation, wherein the two parameters 𝛿0̂ and 𝛿1̂ denote the predicted values of the 
same coefficients produced in Eq.2, respectively. 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝑡  denotes the estimate of the 
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required asset write-downs. 𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 in Eq.4 denotes the difference between the actual 
asset write-downs and the estimated asset write-downs.  
 
𝑊𝐷t =  𝛿0 + δ1𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                 2 
𝑃𝑊𝐷𝑡 =  𝛿0̂ +  𝛿1̂ ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1                                                               3 
𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 = 𝑊𝐷𝑡 −  𝑃𝑊𝐷𝑡                                                                        4 
 
In other words, a positive 𝐴𝑊𝐷  indicates that the actual asset write-downs are higher 
than the predicted value. Had firms with excessively high 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1  implemented 
impairment losses properly, the mean values for 𝐴𝑊𝐷 in Groups 6 through 8 should be 
positive. More importantly, we should be able to observe a spike in the mean values of 
𝐴𝑊𝐷 as 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 gradually deviated from the value of one. Regression results for this 
method are summarized in Table 5. 
 
 
TABLE 5  Test Results (OLS Model) 
Panel A : Regression Results of Eq.2 
  Japan U.S.A 
 Exp. sign Estimate T − value Estimate T − value 
𝛿1̂  ＋ 0.0173***  (12.37) －0.048*** 14 (－4.92) 
𝛿0̂   －0.0097*** (－6.35) 0.018*** (4.59) 
𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅2   0.0088 0.0247 
𝑁   17152 47259 
 
Panel B : Computing Results of Eq.3 and Eq.4 
 𝑁 𝑊𝐷t 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝑡 Exp. sign 𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 T − value 
Group1 170 0.0002  －0.0076   0.0077  88.2893*** 
Group2 371 0.0005  －0.0043   0.0047  32.2874*** 
Group3 980 0.0009  －0.0008   0.0017  8.7875*** 
Group4 2280 0.0015  0.0026  － －0.0011  －8.5881*** 
Group5 4325 0.0040  0.0060  － －0.0020  －6.3035*** 
Group6 4749 0.0102  0.0092  + 0.0010  0.7324  
Group7 2328 0.0117  0.0125  + －0.0009  －0.6381  
Group8 1949 0.0218  0.0197  + 0.0021  0.8202  
                                                   
14 Different from LSS, the data for impairment loss is charged as positive numbers under Japanese 
accounting standards. Therefore, the expected sign for parameter δ1 is positive, opposite to that of LSS. 
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Note: 
𝑊𝐷𝑡：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t /market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal 
year t－1. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus common equity, both 
measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. Test results for the U.S is drawn from Lawrence et al. [2013]. 𝑁 denotes 
the number of observations in each ASSET-BTM group. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% 
confidence level, respectively. The samples were separated into eight groups using an interval of 0.2. Then, the eight 
groups were arranged in an ascending order of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. I expected companies belonging to 
Group 1 to show the least need for asset write-downs, whereas companies belonging to Group 8 would show the 
opposite tendency. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1： total assets / the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus common equity, 
both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑊𝐷𝑡：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t /market 
capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑁 denotes the number of observations in each ASSET-BTM 
group. 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝑡 represents estimated for asset write-downs required. 𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 represents the difference between actual 
asset write-downs and estimated asset write-downs. ***, **,* indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% 
confidence level, respectively. 
 
In Panel B, 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝑡 shows the predicted means for asset write-downs in each subgroup. 
𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡  shows the means of differences between 𝑊𝐷𝑡  and 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝑡 .The last column 
presents the T-statistic for a two-tailed test which analyzes whether 𝑊𝐷𝑡 and 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝑡 
are significantly different in each subgroup. The evidence presented in Table 5 is 
consistent with the prediction in the beginning of this study. As demonstrated in Panel 
B, the mean values of 𝐴𝑊𝐷 for Groups 4 and 5 are relatively more negative (－0.0011 
and －0.0020) and statistically significant (t-statistic: －8.5881*** and －6.3035***), 
but are relatively more positive (0.0010) for Group 6, 15 which suggests that asset write-
downs undergo a dramatic increase in the region surrounding an ASSET-BTM of one. 
This evidence is consistent with that of LSS and supports H1 in this study. However, 
difference between 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝑡 and 𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 is not statistically significant for all three groups 
with higher than one 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1. Furthermore, mean 𝐴𝑊𝐷 for Group 7 drops sharply to 
a negative value of －0.0009, implying asset write-downs may even have declined in 
Group 7. In other words, contrary to LSS, who asserted that an increase in ASSET-BTM 
promotes the implementation of asset impairment, evidence produced in this section fails 
to confirm an intensified positive relationship between 𝑊𝐷𝑡 and 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1. Test results 
in this section also implies that management could have willfully delayed the 
implementation of an asset’s impairment despite a high beginning-of-period ASSET-
BTM. 
 
 
5.4.2 Measuring Conditional Conservatism based on Basu Model    
In the absence of a single generally accepted empirical measure of conservatism, I use 
three alternative measures to more precisely determine the level of conditional 
                                                   
15 I narrow the interval to 0.1 in Groups 5 and 6 to examine these two groups more accurately. This 
refinement had no appreciable impact on the results. 
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conservatism in each group. If non-discretionary conservatism entails appropriate 
exertions of asset write-downs after ASSET-BTM exceeds one, as depicted in the study 
of LSS, all measures of Group 8 should be significantly higher than that of Groups 6 and 
7.  
The first metric measure 𝐶 is proposed in Pae et al. [2005], who resorts to Basu’s [1997] 
framework.16 As with Pae et al. [2005], I further divided the samples of each partition 
into good news and bad news sets. If the return at the end of fiscal year t was negative, 
it would be subsumed to the bad news set; and to the good news set otherwise. Then, all 
the necessary data will be substituted into Eq.5 and Eq.6 for each ASSET-BTM partition 
to calculate measure 𝐶 － a metric that gauges the degree to which bad news is reported 
in earnings in a timelier manner than good news. 
 
𝐸𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                                                                        5 
 
𝑐𝑗 =  𝛽𝑗
𝐵𝐷 − 𝛽𝑗
𝐺𝐷                                                                           6 
 
The dependent variable 𝐸𝑡  represents net income for fiscal year t deflated by the 
market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝑡 , the explanatory variable, 
represents the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending three 
months after the end of fiscal year t, and 𝜀𝑡 is the residual. The coefficient 𝛽𝑗 on 𝑅𝑡 
denotes the measure of asymmetric timeliness (Basu coefficient), which is developed 
from the study of Basu [1997]. In the given samples, I estimate coefficient 𝛽𝑗 for each 
subset. That is, 𝛽𝑗
𝐵𝐷 denotes the timeliness with which bad news is reflected on firm j’s 
income statement, and 𝛽𝑗
𝐺𝐷denotes the timeliness with which good news is reflected on 
firm j’s income statement. Accordingly, the measure 𝑐𝑗  represents the firm-specific 
degree of conditional conservatism. A higher measure 𝐶 implies a stronger tendency 
toward conditional conservatism. The computing results for measure 𝐶 are summarized 
in Table 6. 
                                                   
16 Basu [1997] is one of the seminal studies in the literature on accounting conservatism. Basu [1997] 
developed a measure of “asymmetric timeliness coefficient” by inversely regressing earnings on returns. 
The following model is the regression equation employed in the study of Basu [1997].  
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽0𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡  +  εi,t  
  
𝐸𝑡 denotes the net income in fiscal year t deflated by market capitalization measured at the end of 
fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝑡 denotes the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending 
three months after the end of fiscal year t. 𝐷𝑅𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 𝑅𝑡 is negative 
and is 0 otherwise. In this regression equation, which is also known as the Basu model, the slope 
coefficient (𝛽1) represents the difference in sensitivity of earnings for bad news versus good news. 
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TABLE 6 : Computing Results of measure 𝐶  
 
interval 𝛽𝑗
𝐵𝐷 𝛽𝑗
𝐺𝐷 𝑐𝑗 =  𝛽𝑗
𝐵𝐷 −  𝛽𝑗
𝐺𝐷 
Group1 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 <0.2 0.0261 －0.00005 0.0262 
Group2 0.2≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 <0.4 0.0291 －0.0027 0.0318 
Group3 0.4≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 <0.6 0.0498 0.0074 0.0424 
Group4 0.6≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 <0.8 0.0436 0.0149 0.0287 
Group5 0.8≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1<1 0.0736 0.0125 0.0611 
Group6 1≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1<1.2 0.2484 －0.0612 0.3096 
Group7 1.2≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1<1.4 0.8146 －0.0438 0.8584 
Group8 1.4≤  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 0.3865 －0.4072 0.7937 
mean 0.2090  －0.0600  0.2690  
t-statistic   (2.4423**) 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1<1 0.0559 －0.0002 0.0561 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ≥1 0.4125 －0.2046 0.6171 
Note: 
The samples were separated into eight groups using an interval of 0.2. Then, the eight groups were arranged in an 
ascending order of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. I expected companies belonging to Group 1 would show the 
least need for asset write-downs, whereas companies belonging to Group 8 would show the opposite tendency. 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus common equity, both measured at 
the end of fiscal year t－1. .𝐸𝑡 represents net income for fiscal year t deflated by market capitalization at the end of 
fiscal year t－1. 𝛽𝑗
𝐵𝐷: the degree with which bad news is reported in earnings for group j. 𝛽𝑗
𝐺𝐷: the degree with which 
good news is reported in earnings for group j. 𝑐𝑗: the degree by which bad news is reported in earnings in a timelier 
manner than good news. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively 
 
In general, the difference between 𝛽
𝑗
𝐵𝐷 and 𝛽
𝑗
𝐺𝐷 is 0.2690, with a significant t-statistic 
of 2.4423 (5% two-tailed). The measure 𝐶 for Group 6 is 0.3096, which is extreme, much 
higher than that of Group 4 (0.0287) and Group 5 (0.0611). This is in line with hypothesis 
1 and LSS, that there exists a substantial leap in asset write-downs around region of 
having a beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM of one. Similarly, measure 𝐶 for Group 6 is 
0.3096, which comprises only about 36% of that found for group 7 (0.8584). However, 
measure 𝐶  for Group 8 drops back to 0.7937. Group 8 contains all samples with 
beginning-of-period ASSET-BTMs greater than 1.4, which is considered to be the group 
that confronting the most imminent need for asset impairment. The remarkable decline 
in measure 𝐶 for Group 8 strongly suggests that non-discretionary conservatism was 
overridden by the demand for managerial discretion. In other words, the results of this 
test invalidate H2 and broadly support the prediction in this study that non-
discretionary conservatism does not acquire the same competence in Japanese listed 
companies as it does in American listed companies.  
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To check the robustness of the results of measure 𝐶, I perform an additional analysis 
by applying 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 (e.g., Khan and Watts [2009]). 
Khan and Watts [2009] incorporated three firm-specific characteristics into the Basu 
model to estimate an annual across-sectional Basu coefficient. These are firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), 
marker-to-book ratio (𝑀𝑇𝐵), and market value leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉). 𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 in Eq. 7 
denotes the timeliness of good news being reflected on income statements, and 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 
in Eq. 8 denotes the incremental timeliness of bad news being reflected on income 
statements. However, Eq. 7 and Eq. 8 are not regression models. Instead, Khan and 
Watts [2009] substituted them into the Basu model to estimate parameters 𝜇
𝑖
 and  𝛾𝑖 
(i=1~4). Then, 𝜇
𝑖
 and  𝛾𝑖  (i=1~4) were in turn substituted into Eq. 7 and Eq. 8 as 
empirical estimators to compute annual 𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸  and 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸  for each firm/year 
sample. 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸  is thus the sum of 𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸  and 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 , which measures the 
degree of conditional conservatism.  
Unlike Khan and Watts [2009]17, I employed pooling data to verify the robustness of 
findings. The model applied in this study is outlined below, where 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 represents the 
natural log of market capitalization; 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 represents the ratio of market capitalization 
to the book value of common equity at the end of the year t. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡 represents leverage 
which is calculated as book value of total liabilities deflated by the market capitalization. 
In this study, 𝐸𝑡, the dependent variable in Eq. 9, denotes the net income in fiscal year 
t deflated by market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝑡 is the 
buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending three months after 
the end of fiscal year t. As with Basu [1997], 𝐷𝑅𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
𝑅𝑡 is negative and is 0 otherwise.  
 
𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸＝𝛽3 =  𝜇1̂ + 𝜇2̂𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝜇3̂𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +  𝜇4̂𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡                                   7 
 
𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 =  𝛽4 =  𝛾1̂ + 𝛾2̂𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛾3̂𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +  𝛾4̂𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡                                    8 
 
𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡(𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡   +  𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡  ) + 𝐷𝑅𝑡𝑅𝑡( 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +
 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡  ) + ( 𝛿1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +   𝛿3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡   +  𝛿4𝐷𝑅𝑡𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐷𝑅𝑡𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡  +  𝛿6𝐷𝑅𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡  ) +  𝜀𝑖 9 
 
Table 7 reports the regression results for the estimation of Eq. 9. As with prior studies 
(e.g., Basu [1997], Khan and Watts [2009]), coefficients on bad news companies are all 
statistically significant. The coefficient on 𝐷𝑅𝑡* 𝑅𝑡 (0.8266***) indicates that earnings 
                                                   
17 Khan and Watts [2009] estimated the regressions annually to allow the coefficients to vary annually, 
and report the mean coefficients over an analysis period of 43 fiscal years. 
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are generally conservatively processed. Khan and Watts [2009] argued that companies 
holding greater market values are usually either willing or obliged to provide more 
internal information to reduce information asymmetries. As a result, larger companies 
are considered to have lower demands for conservatism. Therefore, the expected sign for 
(𝐷𝑅𝑡* 𝑅𝑡* 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡) is negative and the result (－0.0828***) of this study is consistent with 
that of Khan and Watts [2009]. They also predicted a positive coefficient for 𝐷𝑅𝑡 * 
𝑅𝑡* 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 (𝐷𝑅𝑡* 𝑅𝑡* 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡), implying that companies with more growth options (higher 
leverage) are more in favor of conservative accounting choices. The results of this study 
(0.0042 and 0.0772***) are identical with their predictions. 
Table 9 reports the results for the sum of 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 and 𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 (𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 hereafter). 
Though they do not completely correlate with the rank of ASSET-BTM, Groups 6, 7, and 
8 prominently lead in 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸, which is consistent with hypothesis 1. However, when 
comparing these three groups one by one, their 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 ranking takes up exact the 
opposite order of that of ASSET-BTM. Group 6 has the highest 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 of 0.2528. This 
clearly justifies the prediction that non-discretionary conservatism is less directly 
evident in Japanese listed companies.  
 
TABLE 7 : Regression Results of Eq. 9 
 Exp. sign pooled data Khan and Watts[2009] 
𝛽1(intercept)  －0.0106 0.083*** 
𝛽2(𝐷𝑅)  0.0341 －0.024*** 
𝜇1(𝑅) + 0.0368 0.031 
𝜇2(𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + －0.0045 0.005** 
𝜇3(𝑅 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵) － －0.0002 －0.006** 
𝜇4(𝑅 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉) － －0.0098*** 0.005 
𝛾1(𝐷𝑅 ∗ 𝑅) + 0.8266*** 0.237*** 
𝛾2(𝐷𝑅 ∗  𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) － －0.0828*** －0.033*** 
𝛾3(𝐷𝑅 ∗  𝑅 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵) + 0.0042 －0.007 
𝛾4(𝐷𝑅 ∗  𝑅 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉) + 0.0772*** 0.033 
𝑁    17152 115516 
 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅2  0.0394 0.24 
Note: 
𝑁 denotes the number of observations in each ASSET-BTM group. 𝐸𝑡 denotes the net income in fiscal year t, 
deflated by market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝑡 is the buy-and-hold return on common stock for 
the twelve months ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 𝐷𝑅𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals one if 
𝑅 is negative and is zero otherwise. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 represents the natural log of market capitalization. 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 represents 
market capitalization to book value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉
𝑖,𝑡
 represents leverage, which 
is calculated as book value of total liabilities deflated by market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t. ***, **, * 
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indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
 
 
5.4.3 Measuring Conditional Conservatism based on Accrual Model 
Considerable controversy remains as to whether the Basu model yields reliable 
estimations for conditional conservatism in applying the reverse earnings-on-returns 
regression. To reduce the noise, I employed the accrual-based regression model proposed 
in Ball and Shivakumar [2006a].  
Accruals are required to best reflect the economic effects of changes in expected future 
cash flows before actual cash flows occur (the gain and loss recognition role of accruals). 
Examples of loss accruals are accounts receivable write-downs (i.e., decreases in expected 
future cash collections), inventory write-downs (i.e., decreases in expected future cash 
flows from the investment in inventory such as physical loss, damage, obsolescence, and 
declines in market value), decreases in values of trading securities and derivatives, 
provisions for litigation settlements, and asset impairment losses. Examples of gain 
accruals are increases in values of trading securities and derivatives.  
In line with Basu [1997], Ball and Shivakumar [2006] argue that conservatism also 
induces asymmetry in the timeliness of gain and loss accrual recognition in which 
operating cash flows indicate the bad news and the good news. According to their 
framework, a decline in operating cash flows, more often than not, indicates a reduction 
in the asset’s value (bad news). Hence, loss accruals should be captured in a timelier 
manner as conservatism requires management to reflect such value deterioration at the 
time the information arises. Empirical evidence agrees with their prediction that 
accruals are also asymmetric in the recognition of losses against gains. One of the 
limitations of the work of Ball and Shivakumar [2006] is that a rapidly growing company 
may have negative operating cash flows as it expands, whereas a contracting company 
may exhibit positive cash flows when spending falls at a faster rate than earnings. This 
dispels the explicit assumption that negative (positive) change in future expected cash 
flows is positively associated with decreases (increases) in current-period operating cash 
flows based on which they established the theory.  
Ball and Shivakumar [2006a] suggest three alternative models (i.e., COF model, 
Dechow and Dichev [2002] model [DD model], and Jones model) and three different 
measures (i.e., the level of cash flow, changes in the cash flow, and industry-adjusted 
cash flow) for asymmetrically timely recognition of gains and losses in different 
combinations to assess conditional conservatism.   
In this study, I employed the Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model to examine 
the degree of conditional conservatism. Besides its higher explanatory power exhibited 
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in the study by Ball and Shivakumar [2006], only the Jones model controls variations in 
periodical performance (working capital) that mitigate impact from accrual reversals. 
Second, it also explains the magnitude of investment in long-lived assets that filter out 
the effects of depreciation accruals. I don’t apply the industry-adjusted measure in this 
study because all samples had already been divided into smaller groups and further 
disaggregation would possibly bias the test results for certain groups. Nonetheless, I did 
not find support for H2 in other combinations including the modified Jones model and 
the COF modified Jones model. In addition to the dependent variable employed by Ball 
and Shivakumar [2006] (ACCt), I also applied other accrual measures to each model (i.e., 
non-operating accruals proposed by Givoly and Hayn [2000], total accruals proposed by 
Kothari et al. [2005]18, net income less cash flows from operations (𝑁𝐼－𝐶𝑂𝐹), and asset 
impairment losses. The results of those analyses are consistent with the prediction in 
this study (the results are not documented for brevity). Moreover, consistent with the 
findings in Ball and Shivakumar [2006], incorporating conditional conservatism into the 
Jones model appreciably increased the average  𝑅 − 𝑠𝑞  value from the non-linear 
accruals model relative to that based on the traditional linear model. Tables 8 reports 
the regression results for Eqs. 10 and 11.  
 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝐶𝐹𝑡  +  α2∆𝑅𝐸𝑉t +  𝛼3𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛼4𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t + 𝜀𝑡                    10 
                              
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1∆𝐶𝐹𝑡  +  α2 (∆𝑅𝐸𝑉t − ∆𝐴𝑅) +  𝛼3𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸 + + 𝛼4𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t +  𝜀𝑡            11 
 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 denotes total accruals in year t. It is computed as earnings before extraordinary 
items minus cash flow from operation. ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡  denotes changes in cash flows from 
operations. 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 is negative and 0 
otherwise. ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 denotes changes in net sales in year t. 𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸t denotes gross property, 
plant, and equipment. ∆𝐴𝑅𝑡  denotes changes in accounts receivable and 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
includes all the interaction terms. The variables employed in Eqs. 10 and 11 are all 
deflated by average total assets in year t. As in Jones model, changes in sales control for 
non-discretionary accruals of current assets and liabilities, while property, plant and 
equipment control for the non-discretionary component of depreciation expenses. Again,  
                                                   
18 Kothari et al. [2005] employed the following method to measure total accruals in year t.  
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡＝∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 － ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡  － (∆𝐶𝐿𝑡  － ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡) － 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑡   : change in current assets 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡  : change in cash and cash equivalents  
∆𝐶𝐿𝑡    : change in current liabilities  
∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡   : change in current liabilities transformed from non-current liabilities 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡    : depreciation expenses   
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Table 8 : Test Results for Accrual Model  
Note:  
 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 denotes total accruals in year t. It is computed as earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operation. ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 denotes changes in cash 
flows from operations. 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 is negative and 0 otherwise. ∆REVt denotes changes in net sales in year t. 
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 denotes gross property, plant, and equipment. Variables are all deflated by average total assets in year t. ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑛 indicates results for the Hausman 
test which differentiates between fixed effects model and random effects model in panel data. 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑢𝑠𝑐ℎ& 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑛 indicates results for the Breusch–Pagan test 
which checks for the linear form of heteroscedasticity. Coefficients on interaction terms are omitted for brevity. 
 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1∆𝐶𝐹𝑡  +  α2∆𝑅𝐸𝑉t + 𝛼3𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸 + + 𝛼4𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t + 𝜀𝑡                               10  
Group1 Group2 Group3 Group4 Group5 Group6 Group7 Group8 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 0.0386 －0.005 0.0023 －0.0018 －0.0019 0.0021 －0.0012 0.0124** 
∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 －0.3544*** －0.5106*** －0.49*** －0.3464*** －0.2971*** －0.6122*** －0.505*** －0.2935*** 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 0.2181 0.0544 0.0924 －0.2416*** －0.4639*** 0.2372*** －0.0251 －0.1673** 
intercept 0.0077 0.0083 0.0051 －0.0094 －0.0069 0.0109*** －0.0106 －0.0201** 
F 8.47 74.72 43.00 121.16 227.31 247.09 109.88 108.00 
         
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1∆𝐶𝐹𝑡  +  α2 (∆𝑅𝐸𝑉t − ∆𝐴𝑅) +  𝛼3𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸 + + 𝛼4𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t +   𝜀𝑡                    11 
 Group1 Group2 Group3 Group4 Group5 Group6 Group7 Group8 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 0.1571*** －0.0439** －0.003 －0.003 －0.0141*** －0.0063 －0.0166* 0.0221** 
∆CFt 0.8644*** －0.4736*** －0.496*** －0.3222*** －0.2932*** －0.6216*** －0.6481*** －0.1337* 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 －1.0754** －0.157 －0.1452 －0.2979*** －0.6655*** 0.2106*** 0.1693 －0.2749** 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 −  ∆𝐴𝑅 －0.0346 0.0306 －0.0493* 0.0201*** 0.0261*** 0.0267*** 0.0578*** 0.0224 
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 －0.3301 －0.4324*** －0.0988* －0.0428* －0.0444*** －0.1004*** －0.0316 0.2219*** 
intercept －0.0579 0.084*** 0.0081 －0.0195** －0.0131** 0.0045 －0.0199* －0.1005*** 
F 4.00 38.02 27.06 69.58 175.62 178.95 74.30 38.70 
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as with Basu (1997), 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t measures the extent to which firms are conservative. 
Under conservative reporting, 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t is expected to be positive.    
Table 9 reports the comparison of the computing results for the degree of conditional 
conservatism by each methodology. Columns ticked with boxes are the group with the 
highest value for that measure. Taken as a whole, groups with higher beginning-of-
period ASSET-BTM possess a higher degree of conditional conservatism. However, none 
of those measures exhibit a monotonic rise in pace with the rise in ASSET-BTM, which 
confirms the prediction of this study regarding the features of non-discretionary 
conservatism peculiar to Japanese listed companies. These lines of evidence again 
indicate that Japanese impairment accounting practices fit better to the thick dashed 
line shown in Figure 6 Panel A. 
 
TABLE 9 : Comparison of Measures for Conditional Conservatism 
 𝑐𝑗 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹 
 
  
Jones model 
Modified 
Jones model 
Group 1 0.0262 0.0098  0.2181 －0.748***19 
Group 2 0.0318 －0.0601  0.0544 －0.157 
Group 3 0.0424 －0.0824  0.0924 －0.1452 
Group 4 0.0287 －0.0382  －0.2416*** －0.2979*** 
Group 5 0.0611 0.0860  －0.4639*** －0.6655*** 
Group 6 0.3096 0.2528  0.2372*** 0.2106*** 
Group 7 0.8584 0.2069  －0.0251 0.1693 
Group 8 0.7937 0.1828  －0.1673** －0.2749** 
Note: 
The samples were separated into eight groups using an interval of 0.2. Then, the eight groups were arranged in an 
ascending order of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. I expected companies belonging to Group 1 would show the 
least need for asset write-downs, whereas companies belonging to Group 8 would show the opposite tendency. 𝑐𝑗: 
measure of conditional conservatism proposed in Pae et al. [2005]. 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸: the sum of 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 and 𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 
(measure of conditional conservatism proposed inKhan and Watts [2009]). 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t: measure of conditional 
conservatism proposed in Ball and Shivakumar [2006]. 
 
It goes without saying that impairment accounting only constitutes one part of 
conditional conservatism. Since each measure captures conditional conservatism in its 
entirety, it is quite possible that impairment proceedings may have been performed 
                                                   
19 Result of Breusch and Pagan test for Group 1 suggests that the ordinary least squares analysis is 
preferred. Hence, I replaced the test result for Group 1 by fixed effect model (－1.0754**) with that 
produced by OLS (－0.748***).  
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properly in high-rank groups even if their values turn out to be lower. However, once 
impairment accounting procedures are conducted, a substantial amount of extraordinary 
loss would be recorded at the end of that fiscal year, accompanied by a rapid decrease in 
the underlying assets’ (group’s) book value. It seems evident that impairment accounting 
produces a great influence on accounting conservatism. In conclusion, the application of 
those measures, as in this study, is fully justified. 
  
 
5.5 Effects of the Financial Crisis  
This study investigates the magnitude of discretionary asset write-downs for a random 
sample of Japanese listed companies. However, it is undeniable that a volatile global 
stock market and the prospect of recession would affect the management’s accounting 
decisions. This section explores the effects from the financial crisis and the subsequent 
economic malaise.  
Figure 7 include scatter plots of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 and 𝑊𝐷 for each sample accounting period 
(2005~2014). As can be inferred from Figure 7, management did not act promptly 
according to the accounting standards for asset impairment when it came into effect at 
the end fiscal year of 2005. However, the shape of the scatter plots for fiscal years 2008
－2014 is in line with that displayed in Figure 1. The historical economic downturn, in a 
sense, improved compliance with established standards. Nonetheless, whether the 
accounting practice has been performed as required is open to discussion.   
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 Figure 7 demonstrates the correlation between current-period write-downs (𝑊𝐷) and beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM (ABTM). 𝑊𝐷 ：asset write-downs measured at the end of 
fiscal year t /market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 : total assets / market capitalization + total assets - common equity, both measured at the end 
of fiscal year t－1.  
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6 Discussion of the Test Results and Conclusions  
6.1 Comparison with China and U.S.A 
 In this section, I perform the QR-LASSO analysis on the U.S and China to ensure the 
findings in the previous sections. Since evidence provided by Lawrence et al. [2013] is 
based on a conventional regression method (OLS), it is possible that a closer examination 
of the relationship analyzed in previous research could further advance our 
understanding on the nature of asset impairment accounting in the U.S. I chose China 
as the other test subject because (1) current Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS 
hereafter)20 use the international financial reporting standards (IFRS) as a reference. 
However, China moves closer to the U.S. GAAP with respect to asset impairment 
accounting in that asset impairment reversals are disallowed under the new CAS 
framework. Furthermore, goodwill amortization is also prohibited. Instead, goodwill is 
tested for impairment at least annually. On the other hand, China differs with the U.S 
in economic origin, legal jurisdiction, and corporate culture, etc. In other words, we 
should be able to observe a similar trend between China and the U.S if efficacy of non-
discretionary conservatism also holds in the Chinese setting (e.g., a stronger influence 
of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1). 
Samples for the U.S setting are covered in the Compustat database from 2000 to 2016. 
I remove financial institutions [standard industry classification (SIC) codes between 
6000 and 6999] and utility firms [SIC code between 4910 and 4940] from the sample to 
reduce the analytical complexity. From the remaining firms, I remove firms with missing 
items on total assets, shareholder equity, and market capitalization. I also require the 
sample to have positive shareholder equity as of the fiscal year end. The final sample 
pool consists of 58558 firm/year observations.  
Samples from the Chinese stock market include all listed firms. Analysis period is set 
to 2007-2015 as impairment reversals were previously allowed by the end of fiscal year 
2006. Detailed explanation is provided in Figure 8. Accounting data was collected from 
the WIND database. Banks and financial institutions are precluded from the sample 
because of their distinct regulatory settings. 17149 firm/year observations pass data 
screening and are used in the additional analysis. Table 10 presents the process of 
sample selection.  
 
                                                   
20 Chinese GAAP is also known as Chinese Accounting Standards (CASs). It is issued by the 
Accounting Regulatory Department of the Chinese Ministry of Finance (MoF), which is the sole 
authority that sets accounting standards in China. 
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Figure 8:  
                                                                                                              
1999              2001                                                                        2007             
Table 10 : Sample Selection 
Panel A : Process of sample selection U.S.A. Panel B : Process of sample selection China. 
 initial sample  initial sample 
 75356  18737 
1 analytical complexity  △6310 1 required accounting data △1354 
2 required accounting data △10414 2 negative common equity and asset write-downs   △234 
3 negative common equity and asset write-downs   △74   
total 5855821 total 17149 
                                                   
21 The size of the samples utilized in this study is relatively smaller than that used in Lawrence et al. [2013] (47259 firm/year observations covering an analysis 
period from 2000 to 2009). This may result from the following two reasons: (1) Data used in this study is collected from Compustat merged database. The base 
size of the merged database is originally smaller than the annual database; (2) Lawrence et al. [2013] didn’t specify if they excluded financial institutions and 
utility firms from the sample pool. 
Beginning on January 1, 2007, all companies listed on the 
Chinese mainland stock exchanges were required to apply a new 
set of accounting standards (CAS). CAS No. 8 prohibits listed 
firms from reversing previous long-term asset impairment write-
downs, although it continued to allow reversal of previously 
recognized asset impairments with regards to current assets.  
 
Beginning in 1999, listed 
companies were required to 
recognize asset impairments 
for accounts receivable, 
inventories, and both short- 
and long-term investments.  
By 2001, assets that are subject to impairments were extended to fixed assets, 
construction in progress, intangible assets, and commission loans. Although 
this expansion in the coverage of assets to be impaired was intended to 
enhance the quality of accounting information, it tends to provide 
management with much more discretion managing earnings through the 
subsequent reversal of previous write-downs. 
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Table 11 : Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A : U.S.A 
 𝑊𝐷𝑡 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡−2 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾−1𝑡 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 
mean 0.051  5.841  0.753  2.370  0.085  0.821  0.248  0.687  0.104  0.254  
p25 0.000  4.324  0.431  0.180  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.067  
p50 0.000  5.839  0.679  0.465  0.003  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.035  0.169  
p75 0.000  7.267  0.946  1.181  0.012  0.109  0.000  1.000  0.164  0.375  
Sd. 1.420  2.143  0.610  9.362  2.543  17.441  0.432  0.464  0.144  0.238  
Panel B : China 
 𝑊𝐷𝑡 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡−2 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡−1 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 
mean 0.010  14.645  0.623  1.804  0.021  0.011  0.274  0.641  0.004  0.262  
p25 0.000  14.037  0.355  0.148  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.124  
p50 0.000  14.658  0.537  0.338  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.000  0.229  
p75 0.000  15.317  0.766  0.792  0.003  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.000  0.372  
Sd. 0.104  1.262  0.479  12.999  0.951  0.383  0.446  0.480  0.022  0.179  
Notes: 
𝑊𝐷t：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t /market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal 
year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets 
/ market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1: 
book value of total liabilities deflated by market value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1: 
proceeds from sale of common stock deflated by market capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1:  proceeds from debt issuance deflated by market capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－
1. 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷t−2: dummy variable which take a value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−2 is higher than 1, and 0 otherwise. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡−1: dummy 
variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is less than 5%, and 0 otherwise. 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1: book value of goodwill deflated by 
total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1: proportion of property, plant and equipment assets 
to total assets, measured at the end of year t－1. 
 
 Table 11 reports the basic statistics for samples analyzed in this section. The mean 
value of 𝑊𝐷𝑡 (0.051) for the U.S is larger in magnitude than that for China (0.010) and 
Japan (0.0081). This difference may result from the fact that asset impairment 
accounting is practiced much earlier and more widely in the U.S. compared to the other 
two accounting regimes. The mean value of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 for the U.S (China) is 0.753 (0.623), 
which is lower than that for Japan (1.0305). On the other hand, it is apparent that U.S 
listed firms rely on public market more as the mean value of 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 (0.085) and 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1  (0.821) are both higher than those for the Chinese ( 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 = 0.021; 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1= 0.012) and Japanese listed firms (𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1= 0.021; 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1= 0.011 ). 
 Figure 9 demonstrates the selection process for the same model applied in Section 5.3.1. 
Table 12 reports the regression results produced by quantile regression based on the 
model determined by LASSO. 
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Figure 9 Panel A: QR plots for U.S.A 
 
Table 12 : Test Results for QR-LASSO (U.S.A) 
Panel A : Slope estimates produced by Quantile Regression 
𝑄𝑊𝐷(𝜏|𝑋𝑖) =  ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝜏          τ ∈ (0,100)   
𝜏 𝛼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉,𝜏 𝛼𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,𝜏 𝛼𝑃𝑃𝐸τ 𝛼𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾,𝜏 𝛼𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷,𝜏 𝛼𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇,𝜏 𝛼𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌,τ 𝛼𝑆𝑍𝐼𝐸,τ 𝛼𝐺𝑊,𝜏  𝑃 − 𝑅
2 
85𝑡ℎ  0.0025***  0.0004***     0.0034*** 0.002 
90𝑡ℎ  0.0126*** －0.0032*** 0.0027***     0.0028*** 0.010 
95𝑡ℎ  0.0530*** －0.0089*** 0.0095***   0.0606* －0.001*** 0.005*** 0.040 
Notes: 
𝑊𝐷t：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t /market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1: book value of total liabilities deflated by market value of common equity at 
the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1: proceeds from sale of common stock deflated by market capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1:  proceeds from debt issuance deflated by market 
capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷t−2: dummy variable which take a value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−2 is higher than 1, and 0 otherwise. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡−1: dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is 
less than 5%, and 0 otherwise. 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1: book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1: proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets, 
measured at the end of year t－1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Figure 9 Panel B : QR plots for China  
 
Table 12 (continued) : Test Results for QR-LASSO (China) 
Panel B : Slope estimates produced by Quantile Regression 
𝑄𝑊𝐷(𝜏|𝑋𝑖) =  ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝜏          τ ∈ (0,100)   
𝜏 𝛼𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉,𝜏 𝛼𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀,𝜏 𝛼𝑃𝑃𝐸τ 𝛼𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾,𝜏 𝛼𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷,𝜏 𝛼𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇,𝜏 𝛼𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌,τ 𝛼𝑆𝑍𝐼𝐸,τ 𝛼𝐺𝑊,𝜏  𝑃 − 𝑅
2 
85𝑡ℎ 0.0135*** 0.0087** 0.0028*** 0.0023***   0.009*** －0.0001**  0.23 
90𝑡ℎ 0.0166*** 0.0128***  0.0033***   0.0158*** －0.0001**  0.30 
95𝑡ℎ 0.028*** 0.0199***  0.0067***   0.0153*** －0.0002*  0.41 
Notes: 
𝑊𝐷t：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t /market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1: book value of total liabilities deflated by market value of common equity at 
the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1: proceeds from sale of common stock deflated by market capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1:  proceeds from debt issuance deflated by market 
capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷t−2: dummy variable which take a value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−2 is higher than 1, and 0 otherwise. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡−1: dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is 
less than 5%, and 0 otherwise. 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1: book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1: proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets, 
measured at the end of year t－1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively.
 54 
 
In Figure 9 Panel A, the measure of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is the first predictor to enter the model 
in the three quantiles tested.22 These test results are consistent with those suggested in 
Lawrence et al. [2013], in which 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is the primary determinant for asset write-
downs. They also point out that firms with weaker financial performance (higher 
proportion of intangible assets) is more likely to write off underperforming assets in a 
timely manner. This is also reflected in Panel A in that the variable proxies for weak 
performance (𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡−1) and proportion of goodwill (𝐺𝑊𝑡−1) are both included in the 
model at all three quantiles and are positively related with the implementation of 
impairment losses. Furthermore, both variables exhibit stronger correlation with 𝑊𝐷t 
as the quantile increases. For instance, in Table 12 Panel A, estimate for 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1 at the 
95th quantile (0.005***) is almost twice as large as that at the 90th (0.0028***). The 
increase in economic importance is even more evident for 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1. The coefficient on 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 at the 95th quantile (0.0530***) multiplies by approximately four times to that 
at the 90th quantile (0.0126***). These lines of evidence contrast the findings in the 
Japanese setting, but substantiate those suggested in Lawrence et al. [2013].  
 Panel B in Figure 9 and Table 12 presents test results for Chinese listed firms. Although 
the whole framework of asset impairment accounting standards in China is more similar 
to the U.S. than to Japan, the first variable entering the model is the proxy for leverage 
(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1) at all three quantiles tested. This means the prominent determinant for asset 
write-downs in the Chinses setting is leverage rather than non-discretionary 
conservatism. On the other hand, the proportion of goodwill (𝐺𝑊𝑡−1) does not show a 
significantly positive correlation with the dependent variable (𝑊𝐷t ). Both evidence 
indicate that accounting practice with regards to asset impairment might differ between 
China and the U.S.  
I repeat the test in Section 5.4.1 (OLS Model) in the US and Chinese settings to verify 
the hypothetical differences between the U.S and Japan (China) regarding the 
implementation of asset write-downs. All samples in the US and Chinese setting were 
divided into eight groups based on the same intervals of 0.2 as in the Japanese setting. 
Then, the eight groups were arranged in an ascending order of beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM. Companies belonging to Group 1 are expected to show the least need for 
asset write-downs, whereas companies belonging to Group 8 to show the opposite 
tendency. 𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡  reported in the third column in Table 13 represents the difference 
between the actual asset write-downs and the estimated asset write-downs. T-statistic 
for a two-tailed test which analyzes whether the actual asset write-downs and the 
                                                   
22 I also performed the same test on lower quantiles (the 80th, the 75th, and the 70th) in the two settings. 
However, the QR-LASSO analysis fails to produce effective estimates for those quantiles.  
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estimated asset write-downs are significantly different is also computed for each 
partition. In other words, 𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 will be significantly positive if the actual asset write-
downs are considerably higher than the estimated asset write-downs. Furthermore, 
𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 in Group 8 should exceeds that in Groups 6 and 7 as companies in Group 8 are 
expected to recognize more asset write-downs than those in the other two groups with 
higher than one beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. I also compute degrees of conditional 
conservatism for samples with different 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀 at the beginning of fiscal year in the US 
and Chinese settings following the same procedures suggested in Sections 5.4.2 
(Measuring Conditional Conservatism based on Basu Model) and 5.4.3 (Measuring 
Conditional Conservatism based on Accrual Model). Test results for each measurement 
used in this study are also presented in Table 13. 
 
TABLE 13 : Comparison of Measures for Conditional Conservatism  
Panel A : Test Results of U.S.A 
  𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 𝑐𝑗 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹 
 
    
Jones model 
Modified 
Jones model 
Group 1 ABTMt−1 < 0.2 0.013***  0.046  －0.025  0.120**  0.265***  
Group 2 0.2 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 0.4 －0.001  0.294  －0.031  0.063*  0.059  
Group 3 0.4 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 0.6 －0.020***  0.408  0.005  －0.002  0.012***  
Group 4 0.6 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 0.8 －0.027***  0.624  0.104  0.208  0.217***  
Group 5 0.8 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 1 －0.023***  0.602  0.292  0.115***  0.120***  
Group 6 1 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 1.2 0.009  0.693  0.522  0.125***  0.141***  
Group 7 1.2 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 1.4 0.063  1.036  0.669  0.171*  0.180**  
Group 8 ABTMt−1 ≥ 1.4 0.155**  1.131  1.046  0.181***  0.203***  
       
Panel B : Test Results of China 
Group 1 ABTMt−1 < 0.2 0.006***  －0.011  0.157  0.075***  0.334***  
Group 2 0.2 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 0.4 0.001  0.015  0.077  0.621  0.577  
Group 3 0.4 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 0.6 －0.005***  0.103  0.070  0.401***  0.336***  
Group 4 0.6 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 0.8 －0.009***  0.156  0.081  0.642***  0.682*** 
Group 5 0.8 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 1 －0.009***  0.264  0.103  0.197***  0.204***  
Group 6 1 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 1.2 －0.001  0.208  0.281  0.578***  0.466***  
Group 7 1.2 ≤ ABTMt−1 < 1.4 0.077**  0.382  1.422  0.333***  0.361***  
Group 8 ABTMt−1 ≥ 1.4 0.036***  －0.120  0.933  0.304***  0.320***  
Note: 
 56 
 
The samples were divided into eight groups at the same interval of 0.2. All groups were arranged in an ascending 
order of beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM. I expected companies belonging to Group 1 would show the least need for 
asset write－downs, whereas companies belonging to Group 8 would show the opposite tendency. 𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 : the 
difference between the actual asset write-downs and the estimated asset write-downs in Eq.4. ***, **,* indicate 
significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 𝑐𝑗 : measure of conditional 
conservatism proposed in Pae et al. [2005]. 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸: the sum of 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 and 𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 (measure of conditional 
conservatism proposed in Khan and Watts [2009]). 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t: measure of conditional conservatism proposed in 
Ball and Shivakumar [2006]. 
 
Panel A reports test results for the US setting. In Panel A, 𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡  for Group 8 is 
significantly positive (0.155**) and is higher than all other subgroups. This is consistent 
with the findings in Lawrence et al. [2013] that companies with extremely high 
beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM write off underperforming assets as per instructions 
stipulated in the accounting standards. This is also consistent with the test results 
rendered through comparison of different measurement for conditional conservatism. 
For instance, measure 𝐶 for Group 8 (1.046) is much higher than that for Groups 6 
(0.522) and 7 (0.669), suggesting that firms in Group 8 practice the highest level of 
conservative accounting. In other words, test results of the OLS model and comparison 
between measures for conditional conservatism make it clear that the implementation 
of asset impairment in the US listed firms resembles Figure 6 Panel B. Although Group 
8 in the modified Jones accrual model does not exhibit higher level of conservatism, 
degrees of conservatism increase monotonically in all three groups with extremely high 
beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM, which is consistent with the findings in Lawrence et 
al. [2013] but inconsistent with the pattern shown in Japanese listed firms. 
By contrast, in Panel B, which reports test results for the Chinese setting, Group 7 
records the highest value of 𝐴𝑊𝐷𝑡 (0.077**), indicating that companies in Group 8 do 
not necessarily recognize more asset write-downs than those in Group 7. Moreover, 
Group 8 fails to show higher level of conditional conservatism in all the measurement 
tested in this section. For instance, Group 7 exhibits higher level of accounting 
conservatism than Group 8 in the measure 𝐶 (0.382) and 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 (1.422) specification. 
As discussed in the previous sections, this is similar to the tendency shown in Japanese 
listed firms (Figure 6 Panel A) but contradicts that found in the US listed firms. In other 
words, test results in this section indicate a possibility that establishment of similar 
accounting standards might fail to consolidate accounting information in firms domiciled 
in different accounting regimes. More importantly, it is also possible that firms faced 
with similar business environment could demonstrate similar traits of accounting 
quality even though they are subject to different accounting standards. Future study will 
further explore effects of institutional difference/similarities on accounting conservatism 
to confirm the influence of institutional features on accounting quality.  
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6.2 Effects of the Convergence of Accounting Standards      
Academia was generally divided regarding how the mandatory adoption of IFRS affects 
the quality of earnings (e.g., Ahmed et al. [2013], Barth et al. [2012]). Among them is 
Skinner [2008], which focused on the adoption of deferred tax accounting in 1998. The 
author found that deferred tax assets are used as a tool of regulatory forbearance to give 
the major Japanese banks the appearance of financial health when in fact many were 
insolvent. Skinner [2008] attributed increases in deferred tax assets to the unique 
business environment in Japan and managers’ overly optimistic estimations of future 
earnings. His findings also indicate that the application of GAAP-mandated accounting 
principles might submit to both political and regulatory incentives and firmly 
established conventionality (e.g., Garrod et al. [2008], Iatridis [2012],and Salter et al. 
[2013]). 
In addition to my findings presented in Section 2, I further extended the analysis period 
back to fiscal year 1994. Because asset write-down data are separately available only 
from the year end of 2005, I substituted the extraordinary loss for impairment loss for 
the accounting period between 1994 and 2004.  
 
Figure 10:                                         
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note: 
 Figure 10 demonstrates the correlation between current-period write-downs ( 𝑊𝐷 ) and beginning-of-period 
ASSET-BTM (ABTM). 𝑊𝐷𝑡：asset write-downs measured at the end of fiscal year t /market capitalization measured 
at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets - common equity, both 
measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 
 
Both charts demonstrate the correlation between 𝑊𝐷t (plotted on the vertical axis) and 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀t−1 (plotted on the horizontal axis), using past performance figures of Japanese 
listed companies from fiscal year 2005-2014 and 1994-2004, respectively. While the data 
points are more clustered before 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀t−1 reaches one in the 1994-2004 analysis period, 
the tendencies observed in the areas of an 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ratio higher than 1 are identical. 
This finding confirms the management’s reluctance to record extraordinary losses in 
Japanese listed companies. If changing the accounting rules is not sufficient to alter 
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customary financial reporting practice, then the adoption of commonly agreed-upon 
accounting principles around the world might, on all accounts, fail to bring into being a 
standardized financial reporting system with the same level of reliability.23 
 
6.3 Sources of Variations in Accounting Conservatism between Japan and the U.S.    
I predict that the differences in accounting standards and/or contractual incentives lead 
to the discrepancy existing in the practice of asset impairment accounting. I found some 
support for the opportunistic reporting hypothesis. For instance, firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) and 
weak performance (𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾), which are both supposed to control for the non-discretionary 
component in conservatism, show countervailing effects in domains with extremely high 
ASSET-BTM. This result reasonably justifies the opportunistic reporting hypothesis 
that the effect generated by non-discretionary conservatism may have been nullified; 
otherwise, actual asset write-downs might have been higher than reported in Japanese 
listed companies. However, the impact of these two factors is, though statistically 
significant, limited. Furthermore, significantly negative predictors for middle level asset 
write-downs (i.e., the 70th － 85th quantiles) are indistinct. One of the alternative 
explanations for this is the unquantifiable differences that exist in accounting practice.     
In the U.S, goodwill is not amortized but is annually tested for impairment. 
Furthermore, impairment loss owing to goodwill is also included in the amount of 
deductible expense. Consequently, this presents two scenarios in the U.S.: first, 
management can exercise its discretion to delay the recognition of goodwill impairment 
loss when impairment indicators arise and second, companies can also reduce taxes to 
be paid even if goodwill impairment was enforced.  
 In contrast, in Japan, goodwill has to be equally amortized within 20 years and is 
exempted from tax deduction. 24  In other words, Japanese companies not only are 
ineligible for tax shield benefits but also have to deal with a long-standing burden over 
the bottom line. Differences in tax treatment between the U.S. and Japan may manifest 
in how companies handle asset impairment as is shown in this study (see Figure 6).  
Under GAAP in the United States, impairment tests for assets held for use differ from 
those held for sale.25 Japan accounting standards, in contrast, delineate no specific 
                                                   
23 I also performed the same tests (QR test and LSSSO analysis) on samples collected 
from fiscal year 1994 to 2014. Because asset write-down data is separately available from 
2005, I substitute the extraordinary loss for impairment loss from accounting period 
1994 to 2004. Test results are consistent with the findings in this study. 
24 Only goodwill which is classified as an adjusted asset is required to be included in 
taxable income.  
25 Assets held for sale must be sold within one year from the date they are classified; hence, they are 
exempt from impairment tests. Furthermore, they are also reassessed at their book value or net fair 
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treatments for fixed assets held for sale in. Even so, changes in the stated reason for 
holding fixed asset can be considered indications of impairment; therefore, Japanese 
accountants are subjecting more assets to impairment tests. Conceivably, the more 
assets assigned to an asset group, the more easily can estimation of the entire value of 
the group be adjusted. In other words, increases in target assets may abet managerial 
discretion under Japanese accounting standards.  
Moreover, under Japanese impairment standards, when more than one business unit 
is acquired in a deal wherein goodwill is recognized, the book value of that goodwill is 
allocated pro-rata across business units. Also, the impairment test is performed on a 
larger unit including both the asset group and its related goodwill. If the amount 
recoverable from a business unit is below its carrying amount, impairment losses are 
allocated first to reduce book value of goodwill assigned to it. Any excess over book value 
of goodwill is distributed pro-rata to the other assets based on their book value. In other 
words, goodwill is removed from the balance sheet ahead of physical assets. 
Consequently, higher proportions of goodwill potentially enable management to delay 
decisions to declare assets impaired. 
Additionally, management can also signify its confidence in an asset’s (group’s) 
earnings potential by not impairing it, even if it shows signs of depreciation under 
current assumptions for goodwill amortization. The drawback is that the management 
can abuse the hypothesis of slowly accumulating internally-developed goodwill to inflate 
estimates of future cash flow. In other words, amortization of goodwill invites 
manipulation in recognizing impairments.  
Japanese accounting standards tally impairment losses as the carrying amount of an 
asset (group) minus its recoverable value (the higher of net realizable value or value in 
use).26 Since calculation of value in use involves management discretion (i.e., amount of 
future cash flow, discount rate, and useful life of the primary asset in an asset group), 
management can minimize impairment losses by adjusting its estimation. In other words, 
impairment losses recognized by Japanese listed companies can be much lower than 
those recognized in the United States, other conditions being equal.27 
                                                   
value, whichever is lower. Hence, even such assets are subject to impairment tests, and the impact of 
such an experiment is negligible. 
26 Recoverable value = net realizable value or value in use , whichever is higher. 
 Net realizable value= Market  Value － Sale-Related Expenses 
 Value in use = ∑
future cash flows𝑛 
(discount rate)n𝑛
 
     where n represents the useful life of the primary asset in an asset group. 
27 Unlike USA accounting rules, the cash flow estimation period under Japanese GAAP is the primary 
asset’s remaining useful life or 20 years, whichever is shorter. Japanese impairment standards do not 
exclude infinite-lived or non-depreciable assets (e.g., land) from candidates for the primary asset of an 
asset group. Hence, in general, the longer the period of estimated cash flow, the greater future cash in-
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Taken as a whole, current accounting practices in Japan may have induced more 
discretion (although the cause for this change is not limited to these factors). However, 
some of the effects are empirically difficult to quantize using financial data. 
 
 
6.4 Future research    
To detect non-discretionary conservatism in impairment accounting as a 
characteristic of Japanese listed companies, I applied QR test, coupled with the QR-
LASSO, to evaluate the impact of multiple factors on accounting choices for asset 
impairment. It provides more detailed insights which cannot be achieved by other 
ordinary methods prevailing in most previous research. Results of this study 
substantiate my prediction that non-discretionary conservatism alone is insufficient in 
eliminating managerial discretion. The tests also show that asset write-downs are more 
sensitive to debt covenants than to beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM, which 
complements the argument presented in Roychowdhury and Martin [2013].   
Non-discretionary conservatism is embodied in the unbiased application of accounting 
principles. In addition, non-discretionary conservatism, when embarked upon, will 
invalidate management discretion, thus affiliating efficient contracts stemming from 
information asymmetries. However, the most prominent property I found in Japanese 
listed companies is that management might have studiously avoided certain asset write-
downs even when the beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM suggests a dire need for 
impairment. As pointed out in prior studies, impairment accounting comprises certain 
amount of estimates and judgements. Other assets (i.e., goodwill and inventories) that 
are under the influence of such an accounting process are probably also subordinated to 
managerial discretion. Moreover, management is now empowered to capitalize 
development costs on the balance sheets, which will contribute to a growing 
precariousness of earnings in counties that adopt international financial reporting 
standards. In other words, the argument contained herein breeds new wariness of 
conditional conservatism and underlines the need to embrace unconditional 
conservatism to mitigate further volatility in reporting earnings under uncertain 
economic environments.  
I found evidence for the presence of a buffer zone, which indicates managerial 
opportunism in the timing of asset write-downs. It is also possible that management 
postpones timely loss recognition out of proper judgements either based on its exclusive 
                                                   
flows will be. In regards to audit practice, the impact of this difference in estimation period is hard to 
determine.  
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understanding of the company or those inherent in an accounting regime), which 
Roychowdhury and Martin [2013] refers to as “normal conservatism”. More work needs 
to be done to distinguish the normal component from the buffer zone. On the other hand, 
despite arduous attempts to accurately measure the degree of conservatism, especially 
conditional conservatism, no widely accepted metric exists that can properly reflect the 
degree of conservatism. Until such metric comes into being the development of further 
research on conservatism will suffer. I will work toward these causes while pursuing 
fundamental determinants and traits of conservatism in Japanese companies in my 
future research.  
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Appendix 1: Introduction to Quantile Regression (QR) 
This appendix relates to the technical discussions on Quantile Regression (QR) tests in 
Section 5. Introduced by Koenker and Bassett [1978] as a location model, QR is a 
convenient statistical method for estimating conditional quantile functions. A significant 
feature of QR is that it can provide more accurate information about how each predictor 
drives the response variable at any quantile. In other words, OLS derives parameter 
estimates from the conditional mean of the response variable, whereas QR employs the 
conditional median or any other quantile of the response variable. A typical QR function 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
Q𝑌| 𝑋 (τ) =  𝑋𝛽𝜏 + 𝜀𝜏 28                                                       ⒈ 
 
where 𝑋 denotes a design matrix of p predictors and 𝜀𝜏 denotes the error term for the 
τth quantile. 
For 𝑛 independent observations, the  τth quantile splits the observations into areas τ 
and 1−τ. QR estimates (β
𝜏
) are determined by solving this optimization problem: 
 
𝛽𝜏 =  min
𝛽𝜏
1
𝑛
{∑ 𝜏|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖  𝛽𝜏|
𝑛
𝑖:𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑥𝑖𝛽
+ ∑ ( 1 − 𝜏)|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖  𝛽𝜏|
𝑛
𝑖:𝑦𝑖< 𝑥𝑖𝛽
 }  
 
= min
𝛽𝜏
 ∑ 𝜌
𝜏 
(𝑦
𝑖
− 𝑥𝑖
𝑇  𝛽
𝜏
)𝑛𝑖=1 29                                        ⒉ 
 
where 𝜌
𝜏 
(𝑢) = 𝑢 ∙  {𝜏 − 𝐼(𝑢 < 0)}  is the tilted absolute function shown in Figure A, 
                                                   
28 Suppose Y is a random variable following a cumulative distribution function 𝐹 (𝑦) =
𝑃 (𝑌 ≤ 𝑦). The τth quantile of Y is defined as follows: 
QY (𝜏) = 𝐹
−1 (𝜏) = inf  {𝑦 ∈ 𝑅 |𝐹 (𝑦) ≥  𝜏} , where τ ϵ (0,1)                        ⒊ 
29 The conditional expectation loss function for QR is shown as follows:  
 
 L = E [ρ𝜏 (Y − ?̂?)] = (𝜏 − 1 ) ∫ (𝑦 − ?̂?)𝑑𝐹(𝑦) +  𝜏 ∫ (𝑦 − ?̂?)𝑑𝐹(𝑦)
∞
?̂?
?̂?
−∞
                 ⒋ 
 
A specific quantile can be found for variable Y by setting the derivative of the expected 
loss function to 0.  
∂L
∂?̂?
 = (1 − 𝜏 ) ∫ 𝑑𝐹(𝑦) −  𝜏 ∫ 𝑑𝐹(𝑦)
∞
?̂?
?̂?
−∞
 = 0 
𝐹 (?̂?) =  𝜏                                                                    ⒌ 
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and 𝐼 (𝑢 < 0) is the usual indicator function.30 Thus far, quantile regression also can be 
viewed as the extension of LAD,31 which minimizes a sum of asymmetrically weighted 
absolute residuals by giving asymmetric penalties (1 − τ)|𝜀𝑖|  for over-predicted 
observations and τ|𝜀𝑖| for under-predicted observations.  
 
Figure A: Quantile Regression ρ Function  
 
Note: 𝜌𝜏 (𝑢) = 𝑢 ∙  {𝜏 − 𝐼(𝑢 < 0)}  is the tilted absolute function. τ denotes the τth quantile.  
 
                                                   
30 𝐼 (𝑢 < 0) = {
  𝐼 (𝑢 < 0) = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑢 < 0
  𝐼 (𝑢 < 0) = 0  𝑖𝑓 𝑢 ≥ 0
                                           ⒍ 
31 For 𝑛 independent observations, each observation includes a response and a vector of 𝑝 
predictors. A linear regression function is defined as follows: 
 
 𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖  , 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛.
𝑝
𝑗=1    ( 𝐸[ε𝑖] = 0 , 𝐸[𝜀𝑖
2] =  𝜎2 )                 ⒎      
 
 𝜀𝑖  denotes the error term for observation 𝑖 , measuring the vertical distance between the 𝑖 th 
observation (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) and the corresponding point on the regression line. OLS provides solutions that 
minimize the residual sum of squared errors (RSS).  
  
RSS (β) =  ∑ (𝑦 − 𝛽0 − ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 )
2𝑛
𝑖=1  = ∑ 𝜀𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1                                    ⒏ 
 
For the OLS estimators to approximate the unknown parameters, values of ε𝑖  must be both 
independent (exogeneity assumption) and identically distributed (homoscedasticity assumption). Hence, 
OLS may fail to offer optimal estimators (although still valid) when the homoscedasticity assumption 
is violated.  
The least absolute deviations (LAD) is an alternative to OLS which minimizes the sum of absolute 
errors (SAE). Unlike RSS, SAE represents the sum of the absolute values of the vertical distance 
between points in the data set and the corresponding points on the regression line.  
 
SAE(β) =   ∑ |𝑦 − 𝛽0 − ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 |
𝑛
𝑖=1  = ∑ |𝜀𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1                                     ⒐ 
 
The symmetry of the piecewise linear absolute loss function implies that minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals is equivalent to minimizing the median of the absolute residuals. Note that the 
median is also the 50th quantile. Therefore, we might also define other quantiles as solutions to an 
optimization problem by imposing an asymmetric penalty on the absolute residuals as quantiles differ 
from median.  
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Appendix 2: Introduction to Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection Operator (LASSO)  
This appendix relates to the technical discussion on Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection 
Operator (LASSO) and the adaptive LASSO in Section 5. Developed by Tibshirani 
[1996b] and Belloni and Chernozhukov [2011], LASSO is a shrinkage method that 
imposes an 𝐿1 norm penalty on parameters of an objective function. Shrinkage methods 
are a kind of continuous subset selection by adding constraints on the value of 
coefficients. It minimizes the sum of squared errors, subject to the constraint that the 
sum of absolute values of coefficients (𝐿1 norm of the parameter vector) is less than a 
constant. This constraint removes less important parameters from the model by reducing 
their coefficients to 0, thereby generating a more sophisticated function. The rationale of 
shrinkage methods is to trade some unbiasedness for lower variance to improve overall 
prediction accuracy and to retain variables with impacts large enough to appear in the 
fitted model. LASSO is highly efficacious in selecting independent variables of greater 
importance and estimating regression parameters simultaneously. LASSO has been 
applied to archival research in economics and medicine but not financial accounting. 
Consider a linear model for 𝑛  independent observations, each of which includes a 
response (𝑦
𝑖
) and a vector of 𝑝 predictors (𝑥 = (x1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑝)
𝑇).  
 
𝑦
𝑖
=  𝛽
0
+  ∑ 𝛽
𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛.
𝑝
𝑗=1                                    ⒎ 
 
β = (β0, β1, … , β𝑝)
𝑇  represents a vector of unknown regression coefficients, and 𝜀𝑖 
indicates the error term for the 𝑖th observation. LASSO estimators are determined by 
solving the following optimization problem: 
 
 min
𝛽
{∑ (𝑦 − 𝛽0 − ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 )
2 + 𝑛𝑖=1  𝛾 ∑ |𝛽𝑗|
𝑝
𝑗=1 }                                  ⒑ 
 
𝛾 ∑ |𝛽𝑗|
𝑝
𝑗=1  is the nonnegative penalty term, in which 𝛾 ≥ 0 is a tuning parameter that 
controls the amount of shrinkage: the larger the value of 𝛾, the greater the shrinkage. 
When 𝛾 =0, the estimator is equal to the OLS solution. As 𝛾 increases, more shrinkage 
is imposed on the regression coefficients and the coefficients are shrunk from OLS 
solution toward 0. Since the intercept 𝛽
0
 was left out of a penalty term, predictor 
variables must be standardized in order to strike the intercept. However, the classical 
L1 norm penalty has been criticized for not being able to simultaneously achieve the 
oracle property, namely unbiasedness, sparsity and consistency (e.g., Fan and Li [2001]), 
as it equally penalizes coefficients. For example, large parameters can be overly 
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penalized which induces unnecessary bias into the estimation, while small parameters 
be under-penalized at the cost of sparsity. Furthermore, the LASSO solutions tend to 
remove highly correlated variables altogether or select them all. When related variables 
are all included in the model, they enter the model with different signs. 
The Adaptive LASSO is proposed by Zou [2006] as an extension of the LASSO to 
attenuate the aforementioned limitations. The Adaptive LASSO overcomes the selection 
bias in the standard LASSO by assigning a consistent weight to each variable. In other 
words, such weights can adjust the amount of penalty imposed on each parameter on the 
basis of their relative importance. The superiority of the Adaptive LASSO has been 
confirmed in various fields of study. The estimators regularized by the Adaptive LASSO 
are determined by solving the following optimization problem: 
 
  min
𝛽
{∑ (𝑦 −  𝛽
0
−  ∑ 𝛽
𝑗
𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 )
2
+ 𝑛𝑖=1  𝛾 ∑ 𝑤𝑗 |𝛽𝑗|
𝑝
𝑗=1 }                         ⒒ 
 
where weights are set to be 𝑤𝑗 = |?̂?𝑗|
−𝜆
 (λ > 0).  
 
 On the other hand, neither LASSO or the Adaptive LASSO is robust to high-
dimensional data set with error distribution (e.g., Li and Zhu [2008]).  The Adaptive 
LASSO regularized quantile regression can be then viewed as a solution to alleviate the 
drawbacks of LASSO regularized conditional mean regressions. It performs effect 
selection in the framework of quantile regression. The rationale behind it is to penalize 
the coefficients at different quantiles by using adaptive weights (e.g., Wu and Liu [2009], 
Fan et al. [2014]). For a specific tuning parameter 𝛾, the QR-LASSO finds the solution 
to the following optimization problem at the 𝜏th quantile: 
 
min
𝛽𝜏
 ∑ 𝜌
𝜏 
(𝑦
𝑖
− 𝑥𝑖
𝑇  𝛽
𝜏
)𝑛𝑖=1 +  𝛾 ∑ ?̃?𝑗|𝛽𝜏|
𝑝
𝑗=1                                  ⒓ 
 
 where weights are set to be ?̃?𝑗 =  |?̂?𝜏|
−𝜆
 (λ > 0).  
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Appendix 3: Differences in the process of impairment recognition  
Table A presents differences that are considered as important between US GAAP and 
Japan GAAP.  
 
TABLE A: Differences considered as important 
USA GAAP JAPAN GAAP 
Under USA GAAP, the impairment tests for assets 
to be held and used differ from those held for sale. 
Japan impairment standards do not have such a 
separation for assets tested for impairment. 
The impairment provisions of ASC 360-10 generally 
apply to long-lived assets other than goodwill or 
other intangible assets that are not being 
amortized. However, asset groups may include 
assets and liabilities outside the scope of ASC 360-
10 (for example, goodwill — if certain conditions are 
met — and other non-amortizing intangible assets). 
In this case, the impairment loss will reduce the 
carrying amount of the long-lived assets of a group 
covered by ASC 360-10 on a pro-rata basis using the 
relative carrying amounts of those assets. Thus, in 
no circumstance will goodwill, indefinite-lived 
intangibles or other assets excluded from the scope 
of ASC 360-10 (or liabilities if part of an asset 
group) be affected by an impairment loss recognized 
under ASC 360-10, even if those assets or liabilities 
are included in the asset group being tested for 
recoverability. 
Japanese impairment standards also apply to 
goodwill. Furthermore, when more than one 
business units is acquired in the deal where 
goodwill is recognized, the book value of that 
goodwill shall be allocated to those business units 
on a pro-rata basis, and the impairment test 
should be performed to a larger unit including 
both the asset group and its related goodwill. 
Finally, the amount of impairment loss increased 
by adding goodwill to an asset (group) should be 
allocated to goodwill first, and the excess amount 
over the book value of the goodwill will be 
allocated to the other assets on a pro-rata basis. 
According to ASC 360-10, only long-lived tangible 
asset being depreciated (or identifiable intangible 
asset being amortized) can be the primary asset of 
an asset group, which means property such as 
lands, which do not have a valid period, cannot be a 
primary asset. 
Japanese impairment standards for fixed assets 
do not exclude non-depreciable assets as asset 
candidates for the primary asset. Therefore, while 
the cash flow estimation period is based upon the 
primary asset’s remaining useful life under USA 
GAAP, the cash flow estimation period under 
Japan GAAP is determined by either remaining 
useful life of the primary asset or 20 years, 
whichever is shorter. 
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When an asset (group) is deemed unrecoverable, 
ASC360-10 requires management to calculate 
impairment loss as the excess of the carrying 
amount of an asset (group) over its fair value. 
Japan requires management to calculate it as the 
excess of the carrying amount of an asset (group) 
over its recoverable value (either net realizable 
value or value in use, whichever is higher32). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
32 Recoverable value = net realizable value or value in use , whichever is higher. 
 Net realizable value= Market  Value － Sale-Related Expenses 
 Value in use = Σ𝑛 (future cash flows𝑛/discount rate
n) 
     where n represents the useful life of the primary asset in an asset group 
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Appendix 4: Similarities in the process of impairment recognition   
1. Both USA and Japan standards require management to group assets at the lowest 
level where there are identifiable cash flows that are largely independent of the cash 
flows of other assets (groups). Moreover, they both acknowledge that grouping assets 
involves a significant amount of judgement. 
 
2. To assist management in determining when assets should be reviewed for impairment, 
both USA and Japan standards provide examples of events or changes in circumstances 
that indicate that impairment might exist. However, the list is not meant to be all-
inclusive and management should be alert to potential impairment indicators unique to 
its business circumstances.  
  
3. A fixed asset (group) is tested for recoverability only when indicators of impairment 
are present. 
 
4. After an impairment loss is recognized, the adjusted carrying amount of the asset shall 
be its new accounting basis. Thus, future depreciation or amortization would be based 
on the asset’s new cost basis. 
 
5. Impairment loss is recognized if the undiscounted cash flows used in the test for 
recoverability are less than fixed assets’ (group’s) carrying amount 
 
6. Companies may use their own assumptions in estimating future cash flows. Such 
estimations of future cash flows are used in both impairment tests and the measurement 
of impairment loss. ASC820 employ the same approaches to estimate fair value for long-
lived assets as Japanese standards use to estimate use value for fixed assets (estimate 
future cash flows are adjusted to present value by a certain discounted rate). 
 
7. Subsequent reversal of a previously recognized impairment loss is prohibited. 
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Chapter 3  
Influence of Ownership Structure on Accounting Conservatism 
     
1. Introduction  
This study seeks to explore the influence of ownership structure on accounting 
conservatism by examining two relatively unique ownership structures. This study also 
investigates the role of debt contracting and the regulatory efficacy of accounting 
standards in navigating management’s compliance to timely loss recognition. Extant 
literature grounding on the Anglo-America setting maintains that a firm’s financing 
position affects its choice over accounting conservatism. Prior research also suggests that 
accounting standards activate conformity in speed with which bad news is reflected into 
earnings. However, effects of the abovementioned mechanism distinguish in counties 
with different legal and institutional features, which makes it clear that findings based 
in a specific disclosure environment requires careful interpretations when they are to be 
applied in another accounting regime. This paper focuses on effects of ownership 
structure, which is a crucial building block of corporate governance, on accounting 
conservatism. I find that the proportion of stable shareholdings (state shareholdings) is 
negatively related with the degrees of conservative accounting in Japanese (Chinese) 
listed firms. Moreover, debt contracting is latent in disciplining conservative accounting 
practice, which could be attributed to the unique financing arrangements in Japan and 
China. Nonetheless, accounting standards restore the credibility of accounting reports 
in Japan owing to the strict regulatory enforcement. In comparison, accounting 
standards lack equal deterring power against managerial discretion in China. Finally, 
although foreign equity displays little relevance to the level of accounting conservatism 
in both counties, it exhibits higher demands of conservative accounting information 
whenever there is a change in capital structure or a well-rounded disclosure environment.       
Great strides have been made in demonstrating empirically the effects of ownership on 
accounting conservatism in both Japan and China. For instance, Usui [2015] document 
time series characteristics of accounting conservatism in Japan and investigate effects 
of ownership structure on the level of accounting conservatism. His research reveals how 
conflicting interests of different stakeholders (e.g., management vs. creditors, 
shareholders vs. employees, or large shareholders vs. minority shareholders) affect the 
timeliness of bad news to be reflected in the earnings. Findings in Usui [2015] confirm 
that firms with more powerful shareholders or larger institutional shareholders exhibit 
higher level of accounting conservatism. On the other hand, Cullinan et al. [2012] 
examine influence of controlling shareholders on accounting conservatism in Chinese 
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listed firms using samples from fiscal year 2007 to 2009. They find that the presence of 
controlling shareholders leads to lower degrees of conservatism.  
This study relates to both studies but extends their findings in the following three ways. 
First, this study not only focuses on the effect of a specific type of ownership but also 
seeks to explore the cross-effects of debt contracting and accounting standards 
disciplines. As suggested in previous studies, accounting conservatism differs between 
firms with different capital structure (e.g., Ahmed et al. [2002], Usui [2015], Ishida 
[2016]). However, the unique firm-bank relationship in Japan and China, where banks 
have better communication channels with the firms other than public accounting reports, 
may considerably alleviate information asymmetricity between firms and the creditors. 
The deterioration in creditors’ effectiveness to monitor could be even more profound in 
firms where shareholders are more influential. Furthermore, firms domiciled in different 
countries often face different accounting practices and regulations. Therefore, whether 
accounting standards could still play an active role in facilitating contracting beyond its 
institutional structure is also of research interest. This study aims to disentangle how 
these factors, when combined, predict the level of accounting conservatism chosen by the 
management in the Japanese and Chinese settings.  
Second, this study employs two market-based measures and two accounting-based 
measures in view of previous studies on quantitative characteristics of accounting 
conservatism. The first model is based on Basu [1997] which evaluates firm’s sensitivity 
to bad news against good news using an earnings-return regression. The second measure 
T_SCORE and the third measure CONSKEW are proposed in Khan and Watts [2009] and 
Givoly and Hayn [2000], respectively. T_SCORE  is developed under Basu’s [1997] 
framework and takes firm specific fundamentals into consideration. CONSKEW, on the 
other hand, measures the difference between cash flows and earnings. As documented 
in Givoly and Hayn [2000], earnings will be more negatively skewed when unrealized 
economic losses are recognized in the financial statements in a timelier manner than 
economic gains (e.g.,Ball et al. [2000a], Lang et al. [2006]). To ensure the robustness of 
the findings in this study, I also employed an accrual-based model suggested in Ball and 
Shivakumar [2006b], which assesses the asymmetric timeliness of bad news to be 
charged into earnings through accruals. To analyze influence of ownership type on 
accounting conservatism, this study also employs a model selection technique (i.e., GLM-
SELECT). 
Finally, when Japan has attracted a big chunk of foreign equity, China has also become 
one of the most important destinations of foreign investment. With the growing 
importance of foreign holdings in both countries, an investigation on how entry of foreign 
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investment affects accounting quality will further extends our understanding on the 
impact of ownership over accounting conservatism. To this end, this study also seeks to 
shed new light on the role of foreign investors and how they can improve accounting 
conservatism with regard to differences in institutional infrastructure. 
 Empirical results are generally consistent with my expectations with regards to stable 
and state shareholdings. Moreover, findings in this study offer substantial support that 
firms with a dual listing status are more likely to recognize bad news in a timelier 
manner in China. However, no significant evidence is found to explain effects of foreign 
shareholdings on accounting conservatism in this study. Prior studies suggest that the 
involvement of foreign investors in corporate governance practice can be an effective way 
to lower agency cost. Evidence in this study suggests that, despite their expertise and 
experience, foreign investors may still play a secondary role in corporate monitoring as 
they still lack opportunity to observe day-to-day accounting practices. 
Unlike the cross-country focus of several prior studies (e.g., La Porta et al. [1999], Fan 
and Wong [2002], Thomsen et al. [2006], Bushman and Piotroski [2006], Lee and Chung 
[2017], Chen et al. [2017]), this study analyzes the cross-sectional effects of ownership 
on accounting conservatism in each country separately. This approach allows me to 
eliminate cross-country confounding factors and thereby exploit firm-level variation in 
ownership and accounting conservatism. Furthermore, as these countries are among the 
biggest economic powers in the world, a deep understanding of their institutional 
features is worthy of the endeavors. Overall findings in this study suggest that 
conservatism will benefit capital markets more when proper enforcement mechanisms 
are in place.   
Findings in this study shed new insights to the existing conservatism literature on the 
nature of debt contracting, i.e., creditors’ monitoring function in different information 
environment where creditors’ economic gains coincide with those of large shareholders. 
These findings are of potential interest to both regulators and international investors.  
More importantly, this study adds to our understanding on the impact of institutional 
differences on accounting quality. While authorities and academia strive to 
accommodate international accounting standards, progress may lag on a practical level. 
In other words, imitating and adopting newer accounting standards cannot really 
account for changes in earnings quality, due to the environments of various countries in 
which economies grew in indigenously. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the features of the 
institutional settings in Japan and China. Section 3 develops the hypotheses and 
specifies the measures and empirical models used for hypothesis testing. Section 4 
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summarizes the sample selection process and data sources and presents the descriptive 
statistics. The test results of the main regressions, and robustness checks are presented 
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes and presents implications of the findings. 
 
 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 International Studies 
The effects of ownership on financial reporting received prominence from the work of 
Jensen and Meckling [1976]. As ownership structures are inherently more disperse in 
Anglo-American settings, the research interest of the literature mainly has been 
confined to managerial ownership (e.g., Warfield et al. [1995], Cheng and Warfield 
[2005],Erickson et al. [2006], Lafond and Roychowdhury [2008], Kim and Lu [2011], 
Kannan et al. [2014], and Basu et al. [2016]). Other studies have shown that ownership 
structure explains, for example, earnings informativeness (e.g., Fan and Wong [2002]), 
analyst following (Lang et al. [2004], Boubaker and Labégorre [2008]), dividend policy 
(e.g., Faccio et al. [2001] ), and corporate social responsibilities (e.g., Surroca et al. [2013]). 
However, research attempts to explore the influence of ownership on accounting 
conservatism is still limited. García Lara et al. [2009] argue that strong corporate 
governance facilitates conservatism, and not vice versa. The authors develop an 
aggregate measure comprised of antitakeover protection and CEO involvement and 
observe an overall positive relationship between governance and conservatism. Velury 
and Jenkins [2006] examines the impact of institutional monitoring on earnings quality 
(i.e., reporting timeliness). They find that, while institutional ownership is positively 
correlated with timely disclosure in general, such effects are impaired as institutional 
ownership becomes concentrated.  
On the other hand, a growing body of literature has sought to understand the economic 
effects of concentrated ownership on a firm’s informational environment across the globe.  
The presence of large shareholders is traditionally viewed as optimal as large 
shareholders are more incentivized than small shareholders to engage in monitoring 
activities (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny [1986], Huddart [1993]). In other words, the 
theoretical advantage of concentrated ownership is that bigger shareholders have higher 
incentives and ability to become effective monitors of management. However, the 
interests of large shareholders are not necessarily aligned with those of other investors, 
and therefore, it is inconclusive whether the presence of large shareholders reduces 
information asymmetry.  
For instance, Haw et al. [2004] show that large control ownership, in the absence of 
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extra-legal regularities, induces aggressive income management for a large sample from 
9 East Asian and 13 west European economies. 33 In addition, combining firm-level data 
and country-level institutional differences, Attig et al. [2008] examine the influence of 
multiple large shareholders on the cost of equity financing in 21 countries in East Asia 
and Europe34 and confirm that the presence of large shareholders lowers equity cost. 
However, Attig et al. [2008] suggest that it is more likely in firms in which voting power 
is proportionate to the voting size between large shareholders. Boubaker et al. [2014] 
investigate the relationship between concentrated ownership and earnings management 
in a French setting. The authors conclude that controlling shareholders choose to conceal 
opportunistic practices to prioritize their own interests.  
Collectively, the effects of ownership concentration are relatively sensitive to 
institutional arrangements across countries and regions, such that these empirical 
findings are not readily generalizable. In this sense, Japanese and Chinese settings 
provide an interesting context for examining the influence of ownership structures on 
firm performance. The following subsection summarizes some institutional features that 
are salient to Japan and China and discusses how these features affect management’s 
disclosure decisions. 
 
2.2 Ownership Structure in Japan  
While accounting standards that originated in common-law countries (e.g., the US, UK, 
Australia, and Canada) prioritize shareholder protection, accounting standards based in 
code-law countries (e.g., Germany, France, and Japan) are characterized as stake-
holders oriented (e.g., Ball et al. [2003]).  
 Japanese corporate ownership is typically concentrated among strategically oriented 
shareholders rather than fragmented among liquid investors, which has been widely 
known as cross shareholding. Japanese corporate ownership differs from the structure 
of multiple large shareholdings in the U.S. in that: (1) a cross-shareholder holds the 
shares as a friendly insider sympathetic to incumbent management; (2) when disposal 
of shares is inevitable, a cross shareholder consults the firm or at least gives notice of its 
intention to sell; (3) rather than focusing on returns to equity or the control rights of the 
firm, cross shareholders focus on enhancing amicable relationships with each other and 
                                                   
33  The analysis subjects in East Asia are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand; the analysis subjects in Europe include Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the U.K. 
34 The analysis subjects in East Asia are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand; the analysis subjects in Europe include Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.  
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emphasize stable development through cross-shareholdings; (4) there is a strong bank 
influence on firms affiliated to the same large business groups (e.g., Prowse [1992], 
Sheard [1994], Yafeh [2000]). As documented by Aoki [1990] and Guo et al. [2015], cross 
shareholding ownership alters the corporate governance environment in Japanese firms 
in two critical ways. First, it makes hostile take-over attempts difficult which enables 
management to focus on long-term value creation for the firm without paying undue 
attention to short-term pressures arising from the market for corporate control. For 
example, Jiang and Kim [2000]  argue that to the extent that cross-shareholdings 
improve the flow of information among investors in the same business group, it 
substantially reduces information asymmetry and enhances the relevance of accounting 
information. Shuto and Kitagawa [2011] find that institutional ownership alleviates 
bond investors’ concern about management incentives and increases debt-contracting 
efficiency. On the other hand, such arrangements imply that cross shareholders take 
only a passive role in corporate governance, thereby delegating considerable discretion 
to management (e.g., Denis and McConnell [2009]). 
 Teshima and Shuto [2008] and Shuto and Takada [2010] present initial evidence of the 
relationship between managerial ownership and conservatism for Japanese listed 
companies. These findings support the incentive alignment perspective regarding 
managerial ownership in which the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is inversely 
associated with extremely high or low managerial ownership. Evidence from Shuto and 
Iwasaki [2014] suggests that management has a strong propensity for earnings 
smoothing once the proportion of stable shareholders begins to increase. Usui [2015] 
explore effects of both internal and external stakeholders on accounting conservatism in 
Japanese listed firms. The author incorporates a time-serious feature into Basu’s [1997] 
model to measure variation in effects of stakeholders on accounting conservatism over 
time. In addition, evidence provided in Usui [2015] supports the conjecture that 
conditional accounting conservatism varies across firms with different ownership 
structure in Japan. A recent study by Nagata and Nguyen [2017] examines the influence 
of ownership structure on management earnings forecasts and find that firms with 
greater bank ownership are more likely to withhold private information and make 
material changes in their management forecasts less timeously.  
As much as there is wide support for theory based on the singularity of ownership in 
Japan, recently, research has placed an on-going evolution of the Japanese business 
system under the spotlight (e.g., Noda [2013], He and Shen [2014], Ullah [2017]). Much 
of this emerging literature focuses on the role of foreign investors in strengthening 
monitoring mechanisms to deter management’s opportunistic behavior. On the other 
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hand, skepticism remains as to how much shareholder capitalism could be diffused to 
Japan. Ahmadjian and Robbins [2005] set out to investigate the effects of foreign 
ownership on firm behavior under a typical stakeholder-oriented Japanese institutional 
framework. Using a sample set of 1108 observations from 1991 to 2000, the authors find 
that the influence of foreign investors on disinvestment is restricted by the level of 
existing domestic shareholders. These findings are complemented by Desender et al. 
[2016]. Whilst acknowledge that foreign ownership contributes to changes in governance 
processes, Desender et al. [2016] also suggest that the effects of foreign investors are 
profound only for firms with lower domestic ownership concentration. 
 
 
2.3 State-ownership and Cross-listing in China 
Although there has been remarkable economic growth in China, a large number of listed 
companies in China’s stock market are still under the substantial control of central or 
local government or government-controlled institutions (e.g., Bai et al. [2004], Chen et 
al. [2009]). This unique information environment, like that in Japan, insulates 
management from capital market pressures and threats of takeovers such that 
management is able to pursue its own objectives which are often at odds with 
shareholder value maximization (e.g., Xu and Wang [1999], Jiang et al. [2008], Yu [2013], 
Cao et al. [2014]).  
An often-cited argument on the effects of state ownership is that managers are more 
concerned about their political careers than about fiduciary duties such that they are 
prone to opacity and are more likely to suppress negative information during their tenure 
(e.g., Chen et al. [2005], Li and Zhou [2005], Piotroski et al. [2015]). Ball et al. [2000b] 
add to this perspective and attribute the lack of timely incorporation of economic losses 
to managers’ incentives to heighten their political standing. Drawing on a sample pool 
from 38 countries, Bushman and Piotroski [2006] focus on the level of investor protection 
embodied in corporate law (i.e., impartiality of the judicial system) and conservatism. 
Their study further confirms that powerful public enforcement slows recognition of good 
news in reported earnings. On the contrary, high state involvement in the economy is 
associated with a decrease in the sensitivity of earnings to bad news. However, China is 
excluded from their samples owing to its socialist legal origin. Cullinan et al. [2012] , 
covering the period 2007 to 2009, attempt to fill this void but fail to detect a significant 
negative effect of state ownership. However, their empirical results show that large 
shareholders prefer lower levels of conservatism in Chinese listed firms.  
On the other hand, the impacts of foreign capital in the Chinese context have also 
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attracted much research effort and have been well documented in the literature. It is 
conceivable that foreign ownership encourages reforms in corporate governance and 
disclosure policies in emerging economies (e.g., Guedhami et al. [2009], Wang and Wang 
[2015], Chen et al. [2017]). Moreover, consistent with research in the Japanese context, 
evidence has accumulated on whether acceptance of foreign investors entails better 
corporate governance, whether financial transparency depends on the home origin of the 
investment, and more importantly, on the type of domestic ownership (e.g., Buckley et 
al. [2007], Greenaway et al. [2014], Chen et al. [2017]).  
In addition to the above-mentioned ownership structures, domestically listed firms in 
China can issue B-shares and H-shares. B-shares are issued exclusively to foreign 
investors and domestic investors with US dollar saving accounts while H-shares are 
traded on stock exchange of Hong Kong. Compared with the mainland stock markets, 
the Hong Kong stock exchange extends a relatively higher level of investor protection. 
Moreover, firms that issue B-shares or H-shares are required to provide financial reports 
in compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards or Hong Kong 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. These financial statements must be audited 
by Big Four auditors. Thus, firms that issue B-shares and/or H-shares are subjective to 
dual regulatory requirements and are expected to provide more certificated information 
(e.g., Brockman and Chung [2003] , Jiang et al. [2008], Huang and Zhu [2015]). 
Nonetheless, not only do government and state-related institutions still have controlling 
stakes in H-listed firms, but also the selection of firms is partly for political reasons. This 
might have undermined the effect of H-share ownership (e.g., Jia et al. [2005], Liu et al. 
[2017]). 
Collectively, it cannot be denied that the roles of differential stakeholders in corporate 
governance and accounting information are constantly evolving in response to rapidly 
changing business environments and increased competition in both China and Japan. 
As there is still a lack of adequate empirical evidence on the effects of institutional 
differences on accounting conservatism, this study aims to reassess the relevance of 
these stakeholders to accounting information quality.  
 
 
3 Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
3.1 Hypothesis Development 
I choose Japan and China as the subjects of this research for the following reason. 
Corporate ownership in Japan is concentrated among a stable network of investors with 
close business ties. Rather than economic gains, these shareholders acquire shares based 
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on strategic needs. Their long investment horizons would possibly prevent them from 
fulfilling a monitoring and advisory role in management (e.g., Sheard [1994]). Bhagat et 
al. [2004] and Chen et al. [2007], among others, argue that while minority shareholders 
and institutional investors aiming for short-term trading gains tend to require timely 
disclosure of bad news, large shareholders with greater access to private information 
might discourage such disclosure owing to their longer investment horizons. In China, 
the government differs from regular stockholders in that profit maximization is not its 
only incentive. A sizable literature has pointed out that China has not yet completely 
moved away from a government-led approach with regards to economic development (e.g., 
Feinerman [2007] Gao [2011]). High volatility of earnings and huge losses may impair 
the government’s reputation and induces skepticism. In other words, earnings are less 
likely to reflect economic losses rapidly in a system featuring interlocking or state-owned 
shareholdings. 
Table 1 shows some of the similarities and differences between listed firms in Japan 
and China. 
 
Table 1 Similarities and Differences between Japan and China 
 Japan China 
Dispersed Shareholdings × △ 
Bank Dependence  ○ ○ 
Monitoring System ○ △ 
Two-step impairment test ○ ○ 
Management Turnover △ △ 
 
Classic conservatism research predicts that conservatism grants debtholders a 
mechanism to monitor managers so that they can respond to declining credit worthiness 
and liquidity in a timely manner. An emerging conservatism literature supports this 
conjecture and argue that creditors are the first order demander for conservatism due to 
their asymmetric loss function (e.g., Ahmed et al. [2002], Beatty et al. [2008], Nikolaev 
[2010a], Aier et al. [2014], Kravet [2014]). As such, greater use of debt contracts should 
increase the demand for conservative accounting. In other words, firms with higher debt 
ratios are expected to provide more conservative information. However, given the 
preceding discussion on Japan’s institutional background, banks in Japan not only play 
an important role as underwriters and lenders to the firms, but also carry the same 
corresponding responsibilities as shareholders (e.g., Sheard [1994], Kang and 
Shivdasani [1995], Kang and Shivdasani [1996]). Arguing from the perspective of 
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governance in the bank system, Kang and Liu [2008] cast doubt on the bank monitoring 
theory and point out that a close bank-firm relationship leads to wealth being transferred 
from bank to borrowers through credit misallocation. Usui [2015] operationalize 
conflicting of interests between shareholders and creditors by incorporating annual 
dividend into the Basu’s [1997] model. Evidence shows that, in Japanese listed firms, 
level of accounting conservatism decreases as influence of shareholders grows stronger.   
On the other hand, even though there has been significant development of China’s stock 
market since its inception in 1990, bank loans remain the predominant form of financing 
for Chinese firms. Brandt and Li [2003] and Chen et al. [2013] confirm that state banks, 
which control more than 90% of the banking assets in China, give preferential treatment 
to state-owned entities due to political and social considerations. For example, state-
owned entities, when grappling with financial deficits, are more likely to secure earlier 
bailouts from the government. Chen et al. [2010] examine effects of lender’s ownership 
on accounting conservatism in the Chinese setting and find that firms borrow more from 
state-owned banks are prone to adopt less conservative accounting policies as opposed to 
those borrow more form commercial banks. In other words, to the extent that corporate 
financing is accomplished through administrative arrangements as opposed to market 
mechanisms, there will be lower needs for conservative financial reports.  
Based on past research, I first expect that a higher percentage of stable and state 
shareholders reduces the needs for timely loss recognitions in Japan and China. On the 
other hand, as debt contracting is conducted more extensively through inside networks 
in Japan and China, I thereby posit that creditors’ monitoring will be less effective as 
the percentage of stable (state) shareholdings increases. 
 
H1a: Companies with higher stable shareholdings are less likely to report losses in a 
timely manner. 
H1b: With respect to change in debt contracting, companies with higher stable 
shareholdings still exhibit lower levels of conservatism. 
 
H2a: Companies with higher state shareholdings are less likely to report losses in a 
timely manner. 
H2b: With respect to change in debt contracting, companies with higher state 
shareholdings still exhibit lower levels of conservatism. 
 
Whether foreign investment is positively related with firm performance and accounting 
quality has been of great research interest in the literature (e.g., Jiang and Kim [2004], 
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David et al. [2006], Leuz et al. [2009], Liu et al. [2017]). To sum, two competing views 
are dominating research on the impact of foreign investors. The first one, termed as 
governance spillover hypothesis, conjectures that foreign investors’ superior knowledge 
and fiduciary duties enable them to execute influence on the firm’s corporate governance 
and stimulate high quality public information. The other one, known as information 
asymmetry hypothesis, posits that distance and other information barrier limits foreign 
investors monitoring capability. Usui [2015] identify a negative relationship between 
foreign shareholdings and accounting conservatism in Japan. The author interprets the 
results as evidence of improved communication between foreign investors and domestic 
shareholders as proportion of foreign equity continues to increase.  
As introduced in Section 2.3, to contend in a globalized market, Chinese listed firms 
have strived to raise capital from foreign investors. Among their attempts to catch up 
with the advanced capital markets is a firm’s decision to cross-list on international stock 
exchanges. Notwithstanding, evidence documented in previous studies indicates that 
while cross-listed firms benefit from better information environments, they still 
demonstrate higher level of earnings management compared with firms based in the 
host capital markets (e.g., Lang et al. [2006], Herrmann et al. [2015]). In other words, 
whether the status of cross-listing will improve compliance to accounting standards and 
propels timely loss recognition in Chinese listed firms is still open to discussion. 
Furthermore, how foreign investors interplay with information demands from the 
creditors is relatively unexplored in the extant literature. 
Based on the above-mentioned discussion, I thereby propose that following hypothesis 
in their null forms. Analyses are then performed according to the institutional 
background for each accounting regime.  
 
H3a: Companies with higher foreign shareholdings are less likely to report losses in a 
timely manner. 
H3b: With respect to change in debt contracting, companies with higher foreign 
shareholdings still exhibit lower levels of conservatism in China. 
 
H4a: Companies cross-list in B- and H-share are less likely to report losses in a timely 
manner. 
H4b: With respect to change in debt contracting, companies with cross-listing status 
still exhibit lower levels of conservatism in China. 
 
On the other hand, accounting standards applied in each country could also lead to 
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variation in accounting quality (e.g., Barth et al. [2008], Peng et al. [2008], Ahmed et al. 
[2013]). Prior research also infer that accounting standards are more likely to improve 
accounting quality when rigorously enforced. For instance, Lawrence et al. [2013] show 
that the timing of impairment loss disclosure is tallied with the requirements mandated 
by accounting standards. Based on these findings, Lawrence et al. [2013] further specify 
the mandatory power of statutory regulations in accounting conservatism as “non-
discretionary conservatism”, which creates an environment conducive to contracting 
thereby mitigating conflicts of interest. In other words, accounting standards, when 
strongly enforced, are expected to constrain, if not eliminate, accounting opportunism.  
As the third largest securities market in the world, Japan has long been honored as an 
economic power with high quality of law enforcement (e.g., Cooke [1992]). However, the 
fallout from recent corporate scandals, such as those involving Olympus and Toshiba, 
has overshadowed Japan’s legacy. Moreover, Japan, together with Germany, is 
traditionally viewed as a polar case of the U.S in terms of corporate governance style. 
Hence, it is uncertain whether the theory of non-discretionary conservatism could be 
readily applied to countries with different institutional features (e.g., Bushman et al. 
[2004]). On the other hand, while the Chinese capital market is undergoing great 
institutional change, evidence from previous studies suggests that overall, China has a 
relatively weak regulatory infrastructure. In other words, it is still unknown that 
whether accounting standards enforcement is rigorous enough to ensure compliance in 
face of a politically-led shareholdings structure. This leads to the final hypotheses in this 
study: 
 
H5a: Non-discretionary conservatism is less effective to impel timely loss recognition in 
firms with higher stable shareholdings. 
H5b: Non-discretionary conservatism is less effective to impel timely loss recognition in 
firms with higher state shareholdings. 
 
 
3.2 Variable explanation  
 To investigate the effect of ownership structure on conservatism in Japan, the following 
five variables are used in the analysis.  
 In this study, 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 represents the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the 
tenth-largest shareholders and other individuals or companies affiliated to the company 
as defined by Quants Research. The data was manually collect from Quants Research. 
An important limitation of this metric is that this measure includes managerial 
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shareholders. Although managerial ownership still constitutes a relatively small fraction 
of total shareholdings in Japanese listed firms (e.g., Shuto and Takada [2010], Shuto and 
Kitagawa [2011]), test results in this study may biased by this limitation.  
 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁  represents the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or 
institutions in Japan. This data was also collected from Quants Research. Foreign 
investors are usually perceived to be more sophisticated in terms of investment 
experience and the ability to analyze accounting information (e.g., Wang et al. [2008]). 
Thus, higher proportion of foreign investors are expected to improve information 
transparency.  
The variable 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 is measured as the percentage of state-owned shares deflated by 
the total number of shares outstanding at the fiscal year-end. This variable reflects the 
extent to which government ownership influence reporting practice.  𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 in the 
Chinese setting is measured as the number of shares issued to foreign investors at initial 
public offering. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 is measured as the percentage of H-shares and B-shares 
deflated by the total number of shares outstanding at the fiscal year-end. Table 2 
demonstrates a basic stock classification in China. 
 
Table 2 Stock Classification in China 
Type Sub Classification Notes 
Stock 
Exchange 
Variable 
A-Share 
Trading limitation35  Government  
Shanghai 
 
Shenzhen 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 
Tradable 
Foreign IPO※ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 
Legal person 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿 
Management 𝑀𝑂 
B-Share Trade in U.S dollars 
𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 
H-Share Trade in U.S dollars Hongkong 
 
As discussed in introduction, reduced incentive in monitoring from creditors leads to 
lower demands for accounting conservatism. In this study, I employ the measure 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 to represent the effects from the creditors. It is measured as the change in 
total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market value of shareholder equity. It is 
conceivable that intense conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers prompt 
                                                   
35 Prior to 2005, listed state-owned entities have maintained a dual share structure where the Chinese 
government owns the majority of non-tradable shares while only a fraction of shares is readily tradable 
on the stock exchange. With a goal to enhance the role of market mechanism, the Chinese government 
lifted the legal and technical restrictions on converting non-tradable shares into tradable shares. 
However, there still remains considerable restrictions on state-owned shares trading.  
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considerable monitoring from creditors. When a tight monitoring system is already in 
place, the extra cost to supervise the additional financial liabilities should be almost zero. 
Simply put, if supplementary monitoring can be implemented at no additional cost, then 
it is logical for creditors to seek for more conservatism. This renders the predicted sign 
for 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 to be positive. On the contrary, management, as the other party in a debt 
contract, has the incentive to deny loss recognition so as not to inflate the debt ratio. A 
unique governance mechanism (e.g., lenders’ insensitiry to change in the borrower’s 
capital cost, a more powerful network of shareholders) can easily trigger such discretions 
over loss recognition. To test H1b, H2b, H3b, and H4b, 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 will interact with 
proxies for all ownership structure.  
In this study, to test H5a and H5b, the measure of ASSET-BTM (𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1) is employed 
to explore the effects of accounting standards enforcement on the level of accounting 
conservatism. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1  serves as a bench mark for the need to write off 
underperforming assets. As demonstrated in Lawrence et al. [2013], when 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 
grows higher, a loss is more likely to ensue if management commits to accounting 
standards. 
 
 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Modified Basu Model 
In line with Lafond and Roychowdhury [2008] and Ahmed and Duellman [2013], this 
study employs a variation of Basu’s asymmetrical timeliness coefficient model to test the 
hypotheses developed in Section 3.1. Under the framework of Basu [1997], an 
asymmetric timeliness measure (ρ
3
) captures the incremental timeliness of current 
earnings and recognizes economic losses versus economic gains.  
 
𝐸t =  ρ0 +  ρ1𝐷𝑅𝑡 + ρ2𝑅𝑡  +  ρ3𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 + εt                            Eq.1                                              
 
𝐸𝑡 denotes the net income in fiscal year t deflated by market capitalization measured 
at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝑡 denotes the buy-and-hold return on common stock for 
the twelve months ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 𝐷𝑅𝑡 is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if 𝑅𝑡 is negative and is 0 otherwise. Accordingly, asymmetric 
timeliness measure (ρ
3
) will be positive if bad news is incorporated into earnings 
information in a timelier manner than is good news. To explore how ownership structure 
delays or exacerbates timely loss recognition, I separately estimate the following 
regression for each country: 
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Model 1:  
𝐸t =  ρ0 +  ρ1𝐷𝑅𝑡 + ρ2𝑅𝑡  +  ρ3𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡  +  ρ4𝑋𝑡−1 +  ρ5 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1  + ρ6𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ7𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 +
ρ8𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +   𝜌8𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜌9𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +  ρ10𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜌11𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 +
 𝜌12𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + ρ13𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜌14𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 +    𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  εt  
 
Model 2:  
𝐸t =  ρ0 +  ρ1𝐷𝑅𝑡 + ρ2𝑅𝑡  +  ρ3𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡  +  ρ4𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  ρ5 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1  + ρ6𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ7𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ8𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +  𝜌8𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +  𝜌9𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + ρ10𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +
𝜌11𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜌12𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + ρ13𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜌14𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 +  𝜌15 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝜌16 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝜌17𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  ρ18𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ18 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1  + ρ17𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ18𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ19𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + εt  
 
𝑋𝑡  denotes ownership characteristics salient to each country with respect to prior 
research, respectively. In view of Japan’s unique institutional environment, variables 
representing stable shareholding ( 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 ) and foreign investors ( 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 ) are 
included in the regressions. For the Chinese settings, variables representing state 
shareholders (𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸), the involvement of foreign investment (𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁), and status 
of cross-listing (𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇) are tested.  
Model 1 is the base line estimation equation in this study. The interaction term 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 indicates the level of accounting conservatism for a particular ownership type. 
H1a (H2a) predicts that companies choose less conservative accounting policy given the 
presence of large (state) shareholders in Japan (China), respectively. Thus , the predicted 
sign for 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 (𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1) is negative. On the other hand, 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1  and 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  measures the influence of foreign 
investors. When the presence of foreign investors or a cross-listing status are effective in 
improving the sensitivity of earnings to bad news, the sign for the abovementioned 
interaction terms is predicted to be positive. 
In Model 2, a dummy variable 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 is employed to examine the level of conservatism 
shown by companies with higher proportion of stable (state) ownership or foreign 
ownership. In the Japanese setting, 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸t−1 and 𝐷. 𝐽𝐿𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1 take the value 
of one if the proportion of stable ownership or foreign ownership is above their means. I 
expected the sign on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸t−1  and 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1  to be 
negative. In the Chinese setting, 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 ( 𝐷. 𝐶𝐿𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1) take the value of one 
if the state or foreign investors is above their means, and zero otherwise.  
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𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 takes the value of one if the firm is cross-listed on the B-share market 
and/or Hong Kong stock exchange. The signs on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸t−1 , 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐷. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁, and 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 are the same in Model 1. 
To ensure the robustness of the test results, three measures are included in Model 1 to 
control for other determinants of conservatism based on prior studies.  𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1  is 
included in this model to verify the effects of accounting standards on management. 
Evidence documented in Lawrence et al. [2013] show that non-discretionary 
conservatism explains a substantial proportion of variation in conservative accounting 
choices. They find that management commits to accounting standards and recognizes 
impairment losses in accordance with the decrease in the asset values. The predicted 
sign for 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is positive. Aside from 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸t−1 
are considered in Model 1 to control for leverage and firm size (e.g., Lafond and 
Roychowdhury [2008], Ahmed and Duellman [2013]). 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸t−1 is natural logarithm of 
the company’s market capitalization.  
Finally, as predicted in previous research, variation in leverage generates different 
demands for timely loss recognition from creditors’ side (e.g., LaFond and Watts [2008], 
Nakamura [2009], Usui [2015], Ishida [2016]). Hence, an increase in debt contracting is 
likely to induce stricter monitoring of the debtholders, implying a higher level of 
accounting conservatism. By the same token, when the asset value shows sign for 
significant devaluation, accounting standards would discipline management to adopt 
more conservative accounting policies. However, in view of the discussion in the previous 
sections, it is logical to assume that when influential shareholders discriminate loss 
recognition, monitoring from the creditors alone may not be effective enough to offset the 
negative impact of other stakeholders. Model 2 is developed based on Model 1 to test the 
cross effects of debt contracting (non-discretionary conservatism) and ownership 
structure. Analyzing their interaction terms would thus generate a fuller picture of the 
effects of ownership under different circumstance. For instance, as the predicted sign on 
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  ( 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 ) is negative, a positive coefficient on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  or 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 then indicates the negative effects of stable 
(state) shareholdings are neutralized. In a similar vein, sign on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  ( 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 ) and 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1   are 
expected to be positive as foreign investors could still restrain management incentives 
and other shareholders’ disclosure preference when financial capacity becomes 
constrained. As indicated in Section 3.2, the measure of 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  proposes two 
alternative scenarios over the influence of leverage change. In other words, when the 
sign on interaction terms between 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 and 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 (𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1) turns to 
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negative, it then infers that stable shareholding (state shareholdings) enables firms to 
adopt less conservative accounting policy as it can compromise monitoring from debt 
holders. A negative sign on interaction terms between 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 and 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 
(  𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 ) then suggest the presence of foreign equity does not counteract 
managerial discretion. On the hand, the expected sign on all interaction terms with 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is positive as strictly enforced accounting standards are anticipated to restore 
conservative reporting in face of any institutional infrastructure.  
 
 
3.3.2 GLM-SELECT  
In this section, I examine how ownership structure affect accounting conservatism by 
letting the main ownership variable interact with leverage and ASSET-BTM ratio. As 
indicated in the introduction, I posit that, given the unique information environment in 
Japan and China, the level of conservatism is determined by the extent to which 
interests of contracting parties involved are opposed or intertwined. For example, 
accounting numbers would be less conservative as influence of the block shareholders 
outplays that of creditors. The interplay of different forces affected by accounting 
conservatism could potentially lead to even lower sensitivity to economic losses. Hence, 
it is crucial to disentangle the reciprocal effects between these stakeholders.  
On the other hand, one of the greatest challenges faced by empirical analysis is the 
selection of a valid set of variables which best fit the observed data. In an effort to 
advance the findings in this study, I perform a general linear models (GLM) selection 
procedure proposed by Osborne et al. [2000]. General linear model selection is a 
diagnostic technique emphasizes the accuracy of a model and more importantly 
accommodates interaction terms under a linear regression framework. In other words, 
it improves predictive performance on the cross-effects between the predictors and in the 
meantime balances goodness of fit. Models 3 and 4 are used to assess the influence of 
ownership structure on firm-level conservatism in Japan and China, respectively. Two 
metrics for accounting conservatism (i.e., T_SCORE, CONSKEW) are employed as the 
dependent variable in each model. 
 
Model 3 (Japan): 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  + 𝛼2𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 +  𝛼3 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 +
 𝛼5𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛼7  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡     
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Model 4 (China):  
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  + 𝛼2𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 +  𝛼3 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 +
 𝛼5 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛼7  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗
𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 +  𝛼10𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛼10𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝛼11𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗
𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡     
 
where  
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 : 
𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 :    a firm-year conservatism measure devised in Khan and Watts [2009].  
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡  :  the difference between the skewness of cash flows from operating 
activities and the skewness of net income using a three-year rolling 
window.36  
ownership variable: 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 :    the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest 
shareholders and other persons or companies affiliated with the 
company as defined in Quants Research  
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1:  the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in      
Japan 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 :     the number of state-owned shares deflated by the total number of shares   
outstanding as of the fiscal year-end 
𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the number of shares issued to foreign individuals or institutions at the 
point of initial public offering deflated by the total number of shares 
outstanding as of the fiscal year-end in China 
𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1:  the number of H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total number of   
shares outstanding as of the fiscal year-end 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 include interacting terms and the following variables.  
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 :  change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market 
capitalization  
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1:      total assets deflated by the sum of market capitalization and total assets 
                                                   
36 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 =  E(
(𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡−𝜇𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡)
𝜎𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡
)3 −  E(
(𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−𝜇𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡)
𝜎𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡
)3   
where  
𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑡: cash flow from operating activities deflated by total assets at the end of year t.  
𝑁𝐼𝑡: net income deflated by total assets at the end of year t. 
𝜇𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 : mean of cash flow from operating activities. 
𝜎𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 : standard deviation of the distribution of cash flow from operating activities. 
𝜇𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 : mean of net income. 
𝜎𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 : standard deviation of the distribution of net income. 
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minus common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1   
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 :       natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalization. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1:        the proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets in 
year t－1. 
𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡 :       a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 or 𝐿𝑅𝑡 is below 5% and 
0 otherwise. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed as the average 
value of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2. 𝐿𝑅𝑡 is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed 
as the average value of 𝑅𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑡−2. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is measured as income 
before extraordinary items deflated by book value of total assets, both 
measured at the end of fiscal year t. 𝑅𝑡 is the buy-and-hold return on 
common stock for the twelve months ending three months after the end 
of fiscal year t. 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 :      proceeds from the issuance of bonds in year t－1 deflated by market 
capitalization of common equity at the end of year t－1. 
𝐺𝑊𝑡−1 :        book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, both measured at the end 
of fiscal year t－1. 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 :      book value of intangible assets deflated by total assets, both measured 
at  the end of fiscal year t－1. 
𝑅𝐷𝑡−1:         expenditure on research and development deflated by total sales, both  
measured at the end of fiscal year t－1  
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1 :     the natural logarithm of firm age 
 
The first dependent variable employed in the model is 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡, which measures the 
degree of conditional conservatism suggested in Khan and Watts [2009]. Based on the 
framework of Basu [1997], they define conditional conservatism as a function of firm size 
(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ), marker-to-book ratio (𝑀𝑇𝐵 ), and market value leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉 ). Although 
Basu’s [1997] approach has been validified in extant literature, controversy still remains 
regarding its model specification and choice of deflator ( e.g., Dietrich et al. [2007]). To 
ameliorate the concerns, I followed Givoly and Hayn [2000] and employed 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 as 
a non-market-based measure for accounting conservatism. It is computed as the 
difference between the skewness of net income and the skewness of cash flows from 
operating activities using a three-year rolling window. The two measures have been 
extensively applied in previous studies (e.g., García Lara et al. [2016], Zhang [2008a]) 
and present advantage of allowing me to examine the relation between conservatism and 
ownership structure on a firm-year level. Both 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 are positively 
correlated with the level of conservatism.  
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As outlined in the previous section, I expect that larger proportion of stable ownership 
(state ownership) will counteract conservative disciplines. Therefore, I expect that they 
will negatively associate with the response variables (𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡) and 
will be included in the selected model. In contrast, when firms with a larger proportion 
of foreign shareholders or a cross-listing firm cut loss and abandon poorly performing 
projects in a timelier manner, the sign on 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 , 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  and 
𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 will be positive.  
To identify the combined effects of accounting standards and leverage, this section also 
focuses on the interpretation of the coefficients on the interaction terms. I expect that 
the existing firm-bank relationship in conjunction with higher concentration in 
ownership will compromise banks’ monitoring efficiency. Interaction terms involve 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 are thereby intended to capture the effect of leverage. To the extent the 
needs for timelier loss recognition diminishes, coefficient on dual interaction term 
(𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1), when associate with stable (state) shareholdings, is expected to be 
negative. Prior study infers that non-discretionary conservatism ( 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ) impels 
accounting conservatism and rules out opportunistic accounting choices. Therefore, I 
expect the inclusion of measure 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 will offset the negative influence of stable 
shareholdings. Therefore, estimates for 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  and 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 are positive. On the other hand, sign on the dual interaction terms 
( 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1  and 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 ) associated with foreign shareholdings and 
cross-listing is expected to be positive if foreign equity is positively correlated with 
accounting conservatism.  
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 include interacting terms and the following predictors. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 stands for the 
tangibility of assets and is measured as the proportion of property, plant and equipment 
assets to total assets in year t－1. Due to the effects of learning curve and survival bias, 
older and larger firms are more likely to be predictable than younger ones. Moreover, 
firm age also indicates the length and quality of bank-firm relationship. Following Fama 
and French [2001] and Shumway [2001], firm age is defined as its “listing age”, measured 
from the year of their first appearance on the database for China. For Japanese listed 
companies, firm age data is collected from Quants Research database. Other variables 
controlling for firm's characteristics affect accounting policy and conservatism include 
the proportion of intangible assets (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡−1) and goodwill (𝐺𝑊𝑡−1) in the total assets. 
Together with 𝑅𝐷𝑡−1, those variables are included to control for investment uncertainty 
and growth opportunity. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡 is a dummy variable, taking a value of one if the firm 
experienced depressed stock performance or a decline in profitability during the last 
fiscal year. It is supposed to control for the profitability and the non-discretionary 
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component in conservatism. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1, on the other hand, controls for capital collected 
from open market where bond securities can be actively traded. I expect that participants 
in this market, who might be exposed to more risks if the value of bond fluctuates, will 
closely follow the issuer’s activities and demands transparency.  
 
 
4. Sample selection  
The initial sample pool for Japanese listed firms consists of all listed firms on NIKKE 
Financial Request. Stock return data from NPM Daily Return Database (Financial Data 
Solutions). Companies with (a) fiscal year ending other than March; (b) missing data to 
compute the measure of ASSET-BTM (i.e., and market capitalization or total assets); (c) 
with negative shareholders’ equity; (d) who had changed their year-end in the middle of 
a fiscal year were excluded from the observations. To reduce analytical complexity, 
financial institutions were also excluded from the analyses. The computation of 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡  reduces the sample size by 1457 observations in the GLM analysis. 
Ownership-related data are manually collected from Quants Research issued by Toyo 
Keizai from the fiscal year 2003 to 2015.  
 
Table 3 Process of Sample Selection 
Panel A : Process of Sample Selection Japan 2005-2015 
 initial sample 
 30437 
1 analytical complexity  Δ10492 
2 required accounting data Δ1502 
3 negative common equity and asset write-downs   Δ25 
4 required data for ownership Δ163 
total 18255 
5. required cash flow data Δ1457 
subtotal 16798 
 
Samples for the Chinese stock market include all listed firms covering an analysis 
period from 2005-2015. Data was collected from WIND Financial Terminal (WFT).37 The 
initial sample includes 32296 firm/years which precludes companies with fiscal year 
ending other than December. Firms in the financial service industry are excluded due to 
                                                   
37 Data for the Chinese setting is collected while I am visiting Shanghai University of Finance and 
Economics under the supervision of Professor HuYiming in the financial accounting department.  
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their distinct regulatory settings. For this sample period, 25414 firm-year observations 
are identified which have all the data required for the modified Basu model and accrual 
model. As the computation of 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 involves a three-year rolling window, another 
3643 observations are excluded for GLM-SELECT analysis. 
 
Table 3 (Continued) Process of Sample Selection 
Panel B : Process of Sample Selection China 2005-2015 
 initial sample 
32296 
1. required accounting data △2893 
2 negative common equity and asset write-downs △499 
3 required accounting data for ownership  △3490 
total 25414 
4. required cash flow data  △3643 
subtotal 21771 
 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics and Test Results  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 This section reports the descriptive statistics of variables used in this study by country. 
A correlation matrix for the variables, with Spearman correlations in the upper quadrant 
and Pearson correlations in the lower quadrant for each country is provided in Appendix 
2. The regression results for calculation of T_SCORE are provided in Appendix 3.  
The first four rows in Panel A shows the proportion of shares owned by stable 
shareholders ( 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 ) and foreign investors ( 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 ), respectively. The 
median value for stable shareholdings (0.491) is lower than its mean value (0.505). A 
similar trend can be observed for foreign shareholdings (mean 0.103 vs. median 0.062), 
indicating concentration of ownership for companies in high percentiles. 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸t−1 
and 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1  takes the value of one if the proportion of stable ownership or 
foreign ownership is above their means, respectively. The median value and the 3rd 
quartile is 0 and 1 for 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸t−1 (𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1), respectively, implying that a 
relatively small number of companies have relatively concentrated ownership in the 
sample. Pearson correlation coefficient on foreign shareholdings (𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1) with 
firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1) is 0.669*. The Pearson correlation coefficient on foreign shareholdings 
( 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 ) and stable shareholdings ( 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 ) is negative (－0.188). These 
findings collaborate with evidence documented in Jiang and Kim [2004] that foreign 
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(institutional) investors selectively choose companies with larger market capitalization 
and avoid stocks with high cross shareholdings. 
On the other hand, ownership levels are skewed in the Chinese setting. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 
represents the percentage of state-owned shares deflated by the total number of shares 
outstanding at the fiscal year-end. 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 in the Chinese setting is measured as 
the number of shares issued to foreign investors at initial public offering.  𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 
represents the percentage of H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total number of 
shares outstanding at the fiscal year-end. Like those in the Japanese setting, 
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1  ( 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1 ) takes the value of one if the proportion of state 
ownership or foreign ownership is above their means and zero otherwise. 
𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 takes the value of one if the firm is cross-listed on the B-share market 
and/or Hong Kong stock exchange. The sum of the mean value of 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1and 
𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 is 0.034. Compared with Japan (𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1=10.3), foreign investors 
still only account for a small proportion in China’s equity market.  
 
Table 4 : Panel A 
Japan 
 mean p25 median p75  sd 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 0.505  0.391  0.491  0.616  0.150  
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 0.481  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.500  
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 0.103  0.013  0.062  0.160  0.113  
𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 0.389  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.488  
 
China 
 mean p25 median p75  sd 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡− 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.21 0.204  
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡− 0.246  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.431  
𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 0.009  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.058  
𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 0.045  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.208  
𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.247  
𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 0.150  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.357  
Notes: 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders and other persons or 
companies affiliated with the company as defined in Quants Research. 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the 
value of one if the proportion of stable shareholders is above the mean and zero otherwise. 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the 
percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in Japan. 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes 
the value of one if the proportion of foreign shareholders is above the mean and zero otherwise. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1: the 
percentage of state-owned shares deflated by the total number of shares outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 
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𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of state shareholders is above the mean and 
zero otherwise. 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 : the number of shares issued to foreign investors at initial public offering. 
𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of foreign ownership is above their means 
and zero otherwise. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: the percentage of H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total number of shares 
outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 𝐷. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the firm is cross-
listed on the B-share market and/or Hongkong stock exchange.  
 
Panel B summarizes statistics for key variables employed in the analyses. The first 
three variables are proposed by Basu [1997] to predict the level of accounting 
conservatism. 𝐸𝑡  denotes the net income in fiscal year t deflated by market 
capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t. 𝑅𝑡 is the buy-and-hold return on 
common stock for the 12 months ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 𝐷𝑅𝑡 
is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝑅𝑡 is negative, and zero otherwise. The mean 
value of 𝐷𝑅𝑡 for Chinese listed firms (0.416) is lower than that for their counterparts in 
Japan (0.554), indicating more Japanese firm experienced negative return than do 
Chinese listed firms across the analysis period.    
 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 denotes ASSET-BTM measured at the end of fiscal year t－1, computed as 
the book value of total assets deflated by the sum of market capitalization and total 
assets minus common equity. Following is a dummy variable 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷t, which takes a 
value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise. Differences in the mean value 
of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1  and 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡  between Japan and China confirm the disparity in 𝑅𝑡  and 
𝐷𝑅𝑡, as more than half of Japanese firms have lower market values than their book 
values ( 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 = 0.53) while fewer than 10% of Chinese-listed firms require asset 
impairment (𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 = 0.097). However, when compared on an accrual basis, Japan 
exhibits a higher profitability as the 3rd quantile of 𝐴𝐶𝐶t is －0.032 for Japan and 0 for 
China, respectively. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1 is measured as the change in total liabilities deflated 
by beginning-of-period market capitalization. It captures the change in capital 
composition, as well as the incremental needs for conservative accounting from creditors. 
I expect that increase in debit incurs stronger monitoring from debtholders.    
Panel C presents the statistics for the control variables in this study. Firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) 
and firm age (𝐴𝐺𝐸) are included as they are likely correlated with ownership structure 
and information asymmetry. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 is calculated as book value of total liabilities 
deflated by market value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1, on 
the other hand, denotes proceeds from debt issuance deflated by market capitalization 
at the end of fiscal year t－1. Public debt accounts for only about 9% and 5% of the total 
liabilities in Japan and China, respectively. This is consistent with the discussion in 
Section 2 that banks play a much more dominant role as a source of firm financing in 
Japan and China. This contrasts their counterparts in America, as public equity plays a 
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much more dominant role as a source of firm financing in the U.S.  𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1  is a 
dummy variable, taking a value of one if the company issued public bonds in the previous 
fiscal year and it shows that there is a growing number of Japanese firms that started 
to seek public suppliers of capital while the proportion of Chinese listed firms seeking 
public funding remains extremely low.  
 
Table 4 : Panel B 
Japan 
 mean p25 median p75  sd 
𝐸𝑡 0.077  0.051  0.095  0.151  0.377  
𝐷𝑅𝑡 0.554  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.497  
𝑅𝑡 0.034  －0.182  －0.030  0.135  2.400  
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 1.036  0.851  1.019  1.187  0.362  
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 0.530  0.000 1.000 1.000 0.499 
ACCt －0.033  －0.060  －0.032  0.004  0.070  
∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 0.001  －0.027  0.001  0.031  0.134  
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 0.476  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.499  
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 0.023  －0.068  0.000  0.079  3.920  
𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 0.130  －0.043  0.097  0.239  0.371  
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 0.060  －0.413  0.032  0.569  0.697  
 
China 
 mean p25 median p75  sd 
𝐸𝑡 0.068  0.010  0.027  0.053  0.753  
𝐷𝑅𝑡 0.416  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.493  
𝑅𝑡−1 0.106  －0.164  0.010  0.256  0.482  
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀t−1 0.623 0.3554 0.5366 0.7661 0.479  
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 0.097  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.296  
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 －0.024  －0.053  0.000  0.023  1.498  
∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 0.007  －0.036  0.006  0.049  0.131  
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 0.385  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.487  
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 0.200  0.000 0.010  0.095  2.932  
𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 0.144  0.060  0.072  0.093  0.674  
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 0.024  －0.360  0.000  0.430  0.653  
Notes: 
𝐸𝑡 denotes the net income in fiscal year t deflated by market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 
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𝑅𝑡: the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending three months after the end of fiscal year 
t－1. 𝐷𝑅𝑡: dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝑅𝑡−1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market 
capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷t : a dummy 
variable takes a value of 1 if 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is higher than 1 and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡: accruals in year t deflated by average 
total assets. ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: changes in cash flows from operations deflated by average total assets. 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: a dummy variable, 
taking the value of 1 if ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡is negative and 0 otherwise. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1: change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-
of-period market capitalization. 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡: a firm-year conservatism measure devised in Khan and Watts [2009]. 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡. the difference between the skewness of cash flows from operating activities and the skewness of net 
income using a three-year rolling window. 
 
Table 4: Panel C 
Japan 
 mean p25 median p75  sd 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 2.182  0.550  1.237  2.514  4.695  
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 0.005  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.022  
𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 0.188  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.391  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 0.298  0.166  0.281  0.400  0.184  
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 10.102  8.885  9.943  11.247  1.960  
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1 4.086  3.951  4.220  4.369  0.491  
 
China 
 mean p25 median p75  sd 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 1.804  0.148  0.338  0.792  12.999  
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 0.012  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.383  
𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 0.095  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.293  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 0.262 0.1243 0.2291 0.3718 0.179  
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 14.645  14.037  14.658  15.317  1.262  
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1 2.799  2.639  2.944  3.091  0.418  
Notes 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1: book value of total liabilities deflated by market value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t－1. 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1:  proceeds from debt issuance deflated by market capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 
𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 : a dummy variable, taking a value of one if the company issued public bond in the previous fiscal year. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1: proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets, measured at the end of year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of firm 
age. 
 
 
5.2 Main Results  
Table 5 presents main test results of the modified Basu model and assess the 
association between ownership and conservatism for Japanese and Chinese listed firm. 
In each panel, the first column presents the regression results for Model 1, which 
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measures the homogeneous effect of each ownership type across all firms. The third 
column presents the regression results for Model 2, which examines effects of higher 
concentration in ownership by replacing the proportion of shares by a dummy variable. 
The estimations are performed using a fixed effects model. Estimates for interaction 
terms on control variables are not shown for brevity. Two-tailed P-values are reported in 
the apprentice.  
 
Model 1:  
𝐸t =  ρ0 +  ρ1𝐷𝑅𝑡 + ρ2𝑅𝑡  +  ρ3𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡  +  ρ4𝑋𝑡−1 +  ρ5 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1  + ρ6𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ7𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 +
ρ8𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +   𝜌8𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜌9𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +  ρ10𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜌11𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 +
 𝜌12𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + ρ13𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜌14𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 +    𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  εt  
 
Model 2:  
𝐸t =  ρ0 +  ρ1𝐷𝑅𝑡 + ρ2𝑅𝑡  +  ρ3𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡  +  ρ4𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  ρ5 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1  + ρ6𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ7𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ8𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +  𝜌8𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +  𝜌9𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + ρ10𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +
𝜌11𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜌12𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + ρ13𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜌14𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 +  𝜌15 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝜌16 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝜌17𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  ρ18𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ18 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1  + ρ17𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ18𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + ρ19𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗  𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + εt  
 
5.2.1 Test Results for Modified Basu Model (Model 1) 
Panels A reports test results for Japanese listed firms. As per H1a, I posit that stable 
ownership, who place importance on maintaining a long-term business ties with the firm 
and the management, engenders lower demand for conservative accounting. Consistent 
with my expectation, the coefficient on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 is significantly negative for 
both model specifications ( － 0.559***), indicating that on average, the level of 
conservatism decreases as the proportion of stable shareholders increases. In model 2, 
ownership proxy is replaced by a dummy variable, taking a value of one if the number of 
stable shareholders is above the overall mean in the sample pool. As shown by the results, 
the coefficient on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level (－0.664***), suggesting that firms with larger stable shareholdings (above the 
mean) become less timely in recognizing economic losses. 
On the other hand, under H3a, I include the proportion of foreign investors to evidence 
whether foreign ownership is associated with higher corporate transparency and lower 
information asymmetry (e.g., Jiang and Kim [2004], Guo et al. [2015]). The results show 
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that the coefficient on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 is statistically positive and economically 
important compared to other control variables included in the model. For example, one-
unit change in foreign ownership could drives loss recognition by almost the same value 
(0.971***). However, although estimate on  𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 in Model 2 is 
positive, it lacks sufficient explanatory power (0.167). One possible explanation for the 
reduced significance is the inclusion of the interaction term of 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1. Overall, test results produced by the modified Basu model offer evidence 
to reject H3a in the Japanese setting and show that the proportion of foreign 
shareholding is positively correlated with conservatism. 
Turning now to Panel B, which details the regression results for state ownership in 
Chinese listed firms. As per H2a, I expect that, unlike the U.S., financial soundness may 
be less relevant for banks to supply capital as the Chinese government has strong 
incentives to keep state-owned entities from defaulting for political and social concerns. 
Furthermore, individual investors in China are less experienced and knowledgeable in 
stock investments and usually traded on market sentiment rather than financial 
fundamentals (e.g., Kang et al. [2002]). Therefore, reduced reliance on publicly available 
information can potentially undercut the propensities for timely loss recognition. 
Consistent with the prediction in this study, the coefficient on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 is 
significantly negative (－0.025*). In model 2, coefficient on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1, which 
stands for the sensitivity to bad news for firms with higher than mean proportion of state 
shareholders, is also significantly negative (－0.007*). These results indicate that firms 
become less conservative as the fraction of state-ownership increases.  
On the other hand, evidence documented in previous studies casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of foreign investors to accelerate bad news recognition. As shown in Panel 
B, coefficient on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 and 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 are negative 
in both models (－0.014 and －0.044), but statistically insignificant. Hence, it is unclear 
whether firms with higher presence of foreign shareholders accrue unrealized losses in 
a less timelier manner. In other words, as with the Japanese setting, no substantial 
difference was found to either reject or support H3a for foreign investors in the Chinese 
setting, too. In comparison, coefficients on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  and 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗
𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 are all positive and significant (0.036*** and 0.082***), indicating a 
sophisticated information environment will reinforce monitoring and improve earnings 
quality.  
 
5.2.2 Test Results for Modified Basu Model (Model 2) 
Model 2 also investigates how ownership structure affects levels of accounting 
 97 
 
conservatism in the Japanese setting under different circumstances. First, with regards 
to the interaction term between 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  and 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 , the coefficient is 
significantly negative ( － 0.422***). As estimate for 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  is 
insignificant (－0.237), it is uncertain how change in leverage influence accounting 
conservatism. However, given the coefficient on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 is significantly 
negative, it is reasonable to infer that stable shareholdings either depresses timely loss 
recognition even when leverage continues to rise or provokes managerial discretion to 
avoid triggering debt covenants.  
Table 5 Test Results for Basu Model 
Panel A : Japan 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 0.069 (0.510) 0.221 (0.078) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 0.004 (0.824) －0.237 (0.099) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 0.601*** (0.000) 0.233* (0.038) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 －0.559*** (0.000)   
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1   －0.664*** (0.000) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1   －0.422*** (0.000) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1   0.589*** (0.000) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 0.971*** (0.000)   
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   0.167 (0.163) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   0.120* (0.031) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   0.305* (0.017) 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 －0.027*** (0.000) －0.035*** (0.000) 
intercept 0.534*** (0.000) 0.404*** (0.000) 
F 27.71 29.19 
N 18255 
Notes: 
𝐸𝑡 denotes the net income in fiscal year t deflated by market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 
𝑅𝑡−1: the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending three months after the end of fiscal 
year t－1. 𝐷𝑅𝑡: dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝑅𝑡−1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: the percentage 
of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders and other persons or companies affiliated with the 
company. 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of stable shareholders is above 
the mean and zero otherwise. 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions 
in Japan. 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of foreign shareholders is above 
the mean and zero otherwise.  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1 is measured as the change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-
period market capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both 
measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal 
year t－1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 5 Test Results for Basu Model 
Panel B : China 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 0.055 0.091 0.087** 0.010 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 －0.003 0.672 0.001 0.944 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 －0.021* 0.026 －0.017 0.164 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 －0.025* 0.026   
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1   －0.007* 0.028 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1   0.010 0.497 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1   －0.046* 0.021 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 －0.014 0.784   
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   －0.044 0.101 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   0.021 0.572 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   0.117* 0.017 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 0.036*** 0.001   
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1   0.082*** 0.001 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1   －0.009 0.739 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1   －0.066 0.063 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 －0.002 0.417 －0.004 0.083 
intercept 0.010 0.415 0.007 0.556 
F 75.62 43.19 
N 25414 
Notes: 
𝐸𝑡 denotes the net income in fiscal year t deflated by market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 
𝑅𝑡−1: the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending three months after the end of fiscal 
year t－1. 𝐷𝑅𝑡: dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝑅𝑡−1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the number 
of shares issued to foreign investors at initial public offering. 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1: a dummy variable takes the value of 
one if the proportion of foreign ownership is above their means and zero otherwise. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: the percentage of 
H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total number of shares outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 𝐷. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: 
a dummy variable takes the value of one if the firm is cross-listed on the B-share market and/or Hongkong stock 
exchange.  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1  is measured as the change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market 
capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the 
end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. ***, **, 
* indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively.  
 
On the other hand, estimate for 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 is positive and 
statistically significant (0.120*) in the Japanese setting. This again infers that foreign 
investors, when work on their own, are less efficient in proving accounting quality. 
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Finally, estimate for 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1  (0.233*) indicates a high level of regulatory 
effect in Japan. In the meantime, estimates for 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 and 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  are both significantly positive (0.589*** and 
0.305*). In other words, non-discretionary conservatism is adequately effective to 
improve conservative accounting in Japan. These test results reject H5a in this study, 
which predicts effects of regulatory enforcement will be neutralized in view of a closely 
connected shareholding structure.  
As with Panel A, Model 2 in Panel B also analyzes the interplay between ownership 
structure and other elements that are deemed influential on the level of accounting 
conservatism in the Chinese setting. However, estimates for 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  and 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 are both insignificant (0.001 and －0.017), which makes it difficult 
to predict the cross effect of debt contracting (non-discretionary conservatism) and each 
ownership structure. Nonetheless, the coefficient on 𝐷𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 is 
significantly negative ( － 0.046*), inferring that the power of non-discretionary 
conservatism is not strong enough to invalidate all downward impact of state 
shareholdings. This contradicts the findings in Lawrence et al. [2013], wherein 
accounting standards deter accounting opportunism and overshadow other factors 
concerning accounting conservatism (e.g., debt contracting, accounting opportunism). 
In summary, test results in this section provide supports that stable shareholdings 
(state shareholdings) are negatively associated with accounting conservatism, while 
cross-listing is positively correlated with timely loss recognition in the Chinese setting. 
Evidence in this section also indicates a weak enforcement environment in China while 
regulations in Japan is relatively more effective in facilitating accounting conservatism. 
In the next section, a model selection technique is employed to determine a more 
powerful predicting model with regards to the combined effects of the factors discussed 
in this section.    
 
5.2.3 Test Results for GLM-SELECT 
This section presents test results for general linear model selection (GLM-SELECT 
hereafter) which detect the relationship between firm level conservatism and ownership 
structure. In order to reduce the selection bias, the adaptive least absolute shrinkage 
and selection operator (LASSO) is implemented as the selection method ( Tibshirani 
[1996a] and Wu and Liu [2009]). It allows predictors to enter or leave the model 
individually, through which only non-zero parameters would be retained in the model. I 
applied the Adjusted R-square statistic (𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑅2), Akaike’s information criterion (𝐴𝐼𝐶), 
Corrected Akaike’s information criterion (𝐴𝐼𝐶𝐶 ) and Bayesian information criterion 
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(𝐵𝐼𝐶)/ Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (𝑆𝐵𝐶) to evaluate the quality of the models 
produced by GLM-SELECT. In all the tests, 𝐵𝐼𝐶 /𝑆𝐵𝐶  introduces a much stronger 
penalty over the other criterion.   
 Figures 1 and 2 report the selection process for Japan and China, respectively.38 The 
upper plots show how the model evolves through the selection process. Each colored line 
represents the value taken by a different variable. The vertical axis reveals the fit 
statistics of the variables and assesses the relative importance of the effects selected at 
any step of the selection process. The horizontal axis provides information as to when 
effects of the selected variables enter the model. The lower plot in the panel shows the 
stopping criterion used to choose the model and how it changes as variables enter or 
leave the model. The vertical gray line connecting the upper plot and the lower plot 
indicates the maximum number of steps, which when reached, denotes the termination 
of the selection process. The effects chosen by then are viewed as the optimal model to 
explain the response variable. 
Table 6 reports the test results for ordinary least square regression based on the 
original model (OLS model hereafter) and the model determined by GLM-SELECT (GLM 
model hereafter). Estimates on control variables are not reported for brevity. It should 
be noted that careful attention is needed on interpretation of test results in this section 
due to measurement error with regards to the dependent variables (𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡   and 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡) applied in the model.  
 
5.2.3.1 Test Results for Model 3 (Japan) 
 Panels A and B report test results for models chosen by GLM-SELECT in the Japanese 
setting. H1a predicts that stable shareholdings generate a lower demand for accounting 
conservatism. Estimate for 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  is significantly negative (－0.176***) in the 
CONSKEW specification. This is consistent with the prediction in this study that higher 
proportion of stable shareholdings reduces bad news sensitivity. On the other hand, sign 
on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  is statically positive in the OLS model (0.032***), indicating that 
leverage serves as a primary driver for conservatism. Moreover, consistent with the 
expectation in this study, coefficients on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1   are significantly 
negative in the OLS model and the GLM model (－0.067*** and －0.025***). This 
implies that despite the existence of increased needs for conservatism, earnings are still 
prone to be less responsive to bad news in the presence of high stable shareholdings, 
which offer supports for the H1b. 
                                                   
38 Due to the update of SAS system which forces local language in descriptive analysis, figures are 
shown in Japanese. The author sincerely apologizes for the mix-up.  
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Under H5a, I also predict that a weakening enforcement environment will fail to 
improve accounting quality which manifests as a negative association between the 
measure 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 and the dependent variables. However, sign on the interaction term 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 is 0.084*** in the T_SCORE specification. This result holds when 
the dependent variable changes to CONSKEW, where coefficient on 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 
is also statistically positive (0.061*), suggesting that negative effects of stable 
shareholdings are offset when assets are over evaluated. These results again reject H5a 
in the Japanese setting. 
H3a predicts that foreign investors do not necessarily promote accounting conservatism 
and spur changes in accounting practices. However, sign on the individual effect of 
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 lacks sufficient explanatory power in both of the T_SCORE and CONSKEW 
specifications, thereby influence of foreign investors are inconclusive in this test. 
Nonetheless, the interaction term of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 is significantly positive and 
is included in the model (0.243***), implying that foreign investors are more vigilant in 
asset overvaluation and assist in prompting loss cut.  
 Findings in this section are similar with those in the previous section with regards to 
the cross effects between debt contracting and foreign equity. Coefficient on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 is significantly positive in both specifications (0.088*** and 0.009**) while 
the individual effect of 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 is not statistically significant and excluded from 
the model. This again implies that effects of foreign investors alone are not enough to 
make an impact in conventional accounting practices. 
 
5.2.3.2 Test Results for Model 4 (China) 
Turning to the Chinese setting, estimates for leverage (𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ) are positive and 
significant at 1% level (0.098***) in the T_SCORE specification. This agrees with prior 
study that a major source of demand for accounting conservatism arises from creditors’ 
needs for timely loss recognition (e.g., Watts [2003a]). H1b predicts that the presence of 
state shareholders moderates the conflicting interests between contracting parties and 
lowers sensitivity to bad news. However, effect of state ownership is insignificant in both 
speculations (－0.017 and －0.074). Hence, it is unclear whether state shareholdings 
induce lower level of accounting conservatism, which leaves H2a unanswered in the 
Chinese setting. On the other hand, the interaction term 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1  is 
negative in both specification (－ 0.148*** and － 0.079**), indicating that higher 
proportion of state ownership ensues lower level of accounting conservatism even when 
leverage increases. This offers supports for H2b proposed in this study. It also should be 
noted that the estimate for 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 is significantly negative (－0.143***) in  
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Figure 1 Panel A: Japan 
Notes:  
𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡: a firm-year conservatism measure devised in Khan and Watts [2009]. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡. the difference between the skewness of cash flows from operating activities and the 
skewness of net income using a three-year rolling window. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders and other persons or 
companies affiliated with the company as defined in Quants Research. 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in Japan.  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1 
is measured as the change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, 
both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1: proportion of property, plant and 
equipment assets to total assets, measured at the end of year t－1. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1:  proceeds from debt issuance deflated by market capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－
1. 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of firm age. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡: a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 or 𝐿𝑅𝑡 is below 5% and 0 otherwise. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, 
computed as the average value of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2. 𝐿𝑅𝑡 is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed as the average value of 𝑅𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑡−2. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is measured as income before 
extraordinary items deflated by book value of total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t. 𝑅𝑡 is the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending 
three months after the end of fiscal year t. 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1: book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡−1: book value of intangible 
assets deflated by total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝐷𝑡−1. expenditure on research and development deflated by total sales, both measured at the end of 
fiscal year t－1. 
 103 
 
Figure 1 Panel B: China 
Notes:  
𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡: a firm-year conservatism measure devised in Khan and Watts [2009]. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡. the difference between the skewness of cash flows from operating activities and the 
skewness of net income using a three-year rolling window. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1: the percentage of state-owned shares deflated by the total number of shares outstanding as of the fiscal year-
end. 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the number of shares issued to foreign investors at initial public offering. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: the percentage of H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total number 
of shares outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1 is measured as the change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets 
/ market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal 
year t－1. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1: proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets, measured at the end of year t－1. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1:  proceeds from debt issuance deflated by market 
capitalization, both measured at the end of year t－1. 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of firm age. 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡: a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 or 𝐿𝑅𝑡 is below 5% 
and 0 otherwise. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed as the average value of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2. 𝐿𝑅𝑡 is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed as the average value of 𝑅𝑡−1 
and 𝑅𝑡−2. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is measured as income before extraordinary items deflated by book value of total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t. 𝑅𝑡 is the buy-and-hold return 
on common stock for the twelve months ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 𝐺𝑊𝑡−1: book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal 
year t－1. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡−1: book value of intangible assets deflated by total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝐷𝑡−1. expenditure on research and development deflated 
by total sales, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1.  
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Model 3 (Japan):  
𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡) =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  + 𝜶𝟐𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛼3 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼5 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 +
𝛼7  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡  
 
Table 6  Test Results for GLM-SELECT 
Panel A : Japan T_SCOREt 
  OLS GLM 
  𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ? 0.032*** (0.000)   
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + －0.089** (0.002)   
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 － －0.027 (0.607)   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 － －0.067*** (0.000) －0.025*** (0.000) 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 － －0.015 (0.748) 0.084*** (0.000) 
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － 0.182 (0.059)   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － 0.028 (0.160) 0.088*** (0.000) 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － 0.249*** (0.000) 0.243*** (0.000) 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  1.223*** (0.000) 0.128*** (0.000) 
Adj − R2  0.266 0.130 
𝑁  18255 
Notes:  
𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡: a firm-year conservatism measure devised in Khan and Watts [2009]. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders and 
other persons or companies affiliated with the company as defined in Quants Research. 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in 
Japan.  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1 is measured as the change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets 
－common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 6  Test Results for GLM-SELECT 
Panel B : Japan 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊t 
  OLS GLM 
  𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ? －0.025 (0.204) －0.002** (0.009) 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 0.085 (0.184) 
  
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 － －0.074*** (0.000) －0.176*** (0.000) 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 － 0.015 (0.627)   
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 － 0.084 (0.432) 0.061* (0.028) 
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － －0.171 (0.272) 
 
  
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － 0.069 (0.125) 0.009** (0.009) 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － 0.169 (0.277)   
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.148 (0.109) 0.201*** (0.000) 
Adj − R2  0.003   0.003  
𝑁  16798 
Notes:  
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 . the difference between the skewness of cash flows from operating activities and the skewness of net income using a three-year rolling window. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: the 
percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders and other persons or companies affiliated with the company as defined in Quants Research. 
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in Japan.  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1 : the change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market 
capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-
tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Model 4 (China):  
𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  + 𝛼2𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛼3 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼5𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 +
𝛼7  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 +  𝛼10𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛼10𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝛼11𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 +
 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡     
Table 6  Test Results for GLM-SELECT 
Panel C : China T_SCOREt 
  OLS GLM 
  𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ? 0.051*** (0.000) 0.098*** (0.000) 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 0.110*** (0.000) 0.145*** (0.000) 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 － －0.017 (0.678)   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 － －0.088*** (0.000) －0.148*** (0.000) 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 － －0.023 (0.715) －0.143*** (0.000) 
𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － 0.086 (0.536)   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － －0.107 (0.667)   
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － －0.194 (0.476)   
𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  － －0.025 (0.456)   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 － 0.031 (0.051)   
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 － 0.014 (0.727)   
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.931*** (0.000) 1.355*** (0.000) 
Adj − R2  0.383  0.315  
𝑁  25414 
Notes: 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡: a firm-year conservatism measure devised in Khan and Watts [2009]. 
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Table 6  Test Results for GLM-SELECT 
Panel D : China 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊t 
  OLS GLM 
  𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 P − value 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ? －0.005 (0.137)   
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 0.008 (0.636)   
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 － －0.074 (0.306)   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 － －0.053 (0.088) －0.079** (0.001) 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 － 0.177 (0.106)   
𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － －0.012 (0.967)   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － 0.114 (0.789)   
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － 0.217 (0.679)   
𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  － 0.073 (0.195)   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 － －0.048 (0.099)   
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 － 0.020 (0.770) 0.061** (0.001) 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.159 (0.093) 0.104*** (0.000) 
Adj − R2  0.007  0.006  
𝑁  21771 
Notes:  
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 . the difference between the skewness of cash flows from operating activities and the skewness of net income using a three-year rolling window. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1: the 
percentage of state-owned shares deflated by the total number of shares outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the number of shares issued to foreign investors at 
initial public offering. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: the percentage of H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total number of shares outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1 is measured 
as the change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured 
at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% 
confidence level, respectively. 
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the T_SCORE specification, which is consistent with the test results in the modified Basu 
model. In short, this supports H5b that accounting standards lack enough deterring 
power to discipline timely loss recognition as state shareholdings increases in the 
Chinese setting.    
On the other hand, public companies listed in a more advanced information 
environment (B-share and H-share market) are usually expected to recognize losses 
more quickly than other companies with a domestic listing only as they are exposed to 
much greater pressures for adequate levels of disclosure placed by investors. As is 
demonstrated in Panel D, although the individual effect of 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  is not 
included in both models, its interaction term with non-discretionary conservatism 
( 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 ) is significantly positive (0.061**) in the CONSKEW 
specification. This implies that non-discretionary conservatism facilitates timelier loss 
recognition when combined with better information infrastructure. 
To sum, findings in this section offer support for H1b and H2b that stable (state) 
ownership depresses accounting conservatism in Japan (China) even when circumstance 
(change in leverage) predicts the opposite. In addition, test results substantiate H5b in 
the Chinese setting that non-discretionary conservatism is less effective in promoting 
accounting quality. On the contrary, H5a is rejected in the Japanese setting as the 
interaction term with 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀  ratio for stable shareholdings is significantly positive. 
Finally, test results documented in the Chinese setting provides additional evidence to 
reject H4a and suggests the importance of an advanced information environment on 
timely loss recognition.   
 
 
6. Additional Test : Accrual Model  
As a final test, I employed a modified accrual model to examine the degree of conditional 
conservatism in this section. In line with Basu [1997], Ball and Shivakumar [2006] argue 
that conservatism also induces asymmetry in the timeliness of gain and loss accrual 
recognition in which operating cash flows indicate the bad news and the good news. 
According to their framework, a decline in operating cash flows, more often than not, 
indicates a reduction in the asset’s value (bad news). Hence, loss accruals should be 
captured in a timelier manner as conservatism requires management to reflect such 
value deterioration at the time the information arises.  
 
 ACCt =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t + 𝛼2∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t +  𝛼4∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 + α5𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸 +  𝜀𝑡                Eq.2 
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where ACCt  denotes accruals in year t.39  ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡  denotes changes in cash flows from 
operations taken form the cash flow statement. 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 is a dummy variable, taking the 
value of 1 if ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 is negative and zero otherwise. ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 denotes changes in net sales in 
year t. 𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡  denotes gross property, plant, and equipment. The variables are all 
deflated by average total assets in year t. As in Jones model, changes in sales control for 
non-discretionary accruals of current assets and liabilities, while property, plant and 
equipment control for the non-discretionary component of depreciation expenses. Again, 
as with Basu [1997], 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t measures the extent to which firms are conservative. 
Under conservative reporting, 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t is expected to be positive. Following García 
Lara et al. [2009] and Haw et al. [2014], I incorporate both the main effect variables and 
their interaction terms into the base-line accrual model to examine the relationship 
between ownership structure and the level of accounting conservatism . 
 
Model 5: 
ACCt =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝐶𝐹t + 𝛼3𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t + 𝛼4𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼5 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼6∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗
∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 +   𝛼8𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +  𝛼10∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + α11𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +
𝛼12𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛼13𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + α14∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛼15𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛼16𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +
 𝛼17𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + α18 ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼19𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 +
𝛼20𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1  + 𝛼21 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼22∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼23𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1  + 𝛼24∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡  + 𝛼25𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡  
 
In model 5, 𝐷. 𝑋𝑡−1  divides samples into two groups with different level of 
concentration in each ownership structure. In the Japanese settings, 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸t−1 and 
𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1 takes the value of one if the proportion of stable ownership or foreign 
ownership is above their means, respectively. In the Chinese setting, 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 
( 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1) takes the value of one if the proportion of stable ownership or foreign 
ownership is above their means.  𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 takes the value of one if the firm is 
cross-listed on the B-share market and/or Hong Kong stock exchange.  
According to H1a and H2a, I expect that the presence of stable (state) shareholders will 
reduce the demand for timelier loss recognition, therefore the predicted sign for  𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗
∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  and  𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1  is negative. In a similar vein, I 
                                                   
39 Following Kothari et al. [2005], accruals in year t are measured based on the following equation:   
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡＝∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 － ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡  － (∆𝐶𝐿𝑡  － ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡) － 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑡   : change in current assets 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡  : change in cash and cash equivalents  
∆𝐶𝐿𝑡    : change in current liabilities  
∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡   : change in current liabilities transformed from non-current liabilities 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡    : depreciation expenses 
 110 
 
expect that influence of foreign investors would be weaker due to the unique institutional 
environments in those two accounting regimes. 
Table 7 summarizes the test results for the modified accrual model. In Table 7, Panel 
A reports the fixed effects regression results for the Japanese setting. With regard to 
H1a in this study, the anticipated sign on the primary variable of interest, 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 
is negative. However, estimate on 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1  is significantly positive 
(0.337***), which differs with test results in the modified Basu models (coefficient on 
DRt ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1and DRt ∗ 𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 is significantly negative (－0.025*** and 
－0.007*)). One possible explanation of the observed change in sign and significance on 
stable shareholdings (𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1) in the accrual-based model could be interpreted as 
effects of a developed regulatory infrastructure in Japan and management’s deviation 
from accrual management. It is consistent with the conjectures made in Cohen et al. 
[2008] and Cohen and Zarowin [2010] that accrual-based earnings management is 
costlier and much easier to be detected by auditors. Therefore, results in Panel A could 
not entirely reject H1a in that firms could still delay loss recognition in non-cash-based 
transactions (i.e., asset impairment losses). Turning to foreign shareholdings in Panel A, 
sign on the dummy variable 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  is － 0.551, suggesting that higher 
proportion of foreign investors does not necessarily lead to higher commitment to 
conservatism. As an additional test, I also replace the main effect to adjusted foreign 
ownership (𝐴. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 ) 40  suggested in Jiang and Kim [2004]. It measures the 
proportion of foreign equity ownership relative to that of stable ownership. Estimate for 
𝐴. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 is 0.056*** (P − value = 0.000). This result shows that foreign investors 
are more likely to actively prompt accounting conservatism in firms whose proportion of 
stable ownership is relatively lower.  
H1b predicts that creditors do not sufficiently facilitate accounting conservatism as 
ownership concentration intensifies among a close network of shareholders in Japan. 
However, estimate for 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  is negative and statistically 
significant (－0.080***), suggesting that the level of conservatism decreases when 
leverage is higher than the previous accounting period. The negative impact comes from 
the cross effect of debt contracting and stable shareholdings (𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
                                                   
40 Adjusted foreign ownership (𝐴. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1) is measured as follows: 
 
𝐴. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 = 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1/(1 − 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1) 
 
where:  
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in Japan. 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 :   the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders and other persons or 
companies affiliated with the company. 
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𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1=－0.071***) could be then attributed to management’s incentives to avoid 
inflated financial leverage when the proportion of stable shareholdings grows higher. In 
conclusion, the accrual model provides additional evidence for H1b. On the other hand, 
sign on 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is positive and significant at the 1% level (0.676***), 
implying a sound enforcement effects of accounting standards. Moreover, estimate for 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  is also statistically positive (0.419***). When 
compared with the estimate for 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 (0.337***), the increased 
economic importance could be attributed to the inclusion of 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1. This shows that 
non-discretionary conservatism has an incremental positive effect on accounting 
conservatism, which is consistent with evidence found in the modified Basu model 
( 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  = 0.589***) and GLM-SELCET analysis ( 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 = 0.084*** and 0.061*) and rejects H5a proposed in Section 3.1. 
Turning to cross effects for foreign shareholdings in Panel A, the coefficient on 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗
∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 is significantly negative (－0.131 ***) in the accrual 
model. This is different with findings in the previous sections wherein the coefficient on 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  is significantly positive (0.120* in the modified Basu 
model; 0.088*** in the GLM − T_SCORE  specification and 0.009** in the GLM −
CONSKEW  specification). 41  The change in the sign on 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  could be attributed to the downward impact of leverage, but it also 
indirectly implies that a higher proportion of foreign equity does not contribute to higher 
level of conservative accounting, which partly substantiate the argument in Usui [2015], 
                                                   
41 To exclude the possibility that the change in sign on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 and 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 
is due to measurement error (use of different deflater), I replaced 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 and 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 with two 
dummy variables, i.e., 𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t  and 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡  using the model specification shown below. Test 
results show that the sign on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 is positive but is not statistically significant (0.029, P − value 
= 0.61) while that on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  is insignificantly negative (－0.018, P − value = 
0.776). I also replace the 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 with 𝐷. 𝐴𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1,  which is a dummy variable takes the 
value of one if 𝐷. 𝐴𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 (the relative proportion of foreign equity against stable shareholdings) 
is above its mean value. The estimate remains significantly negative (－0.110***). Furthermore, test 
results produced by the following model do not change the core findings in this study. 
 
ACCt =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 +  𝛼2∆𝐶𝐹t + 𝛼3𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t + 𝛼4𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼5 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼6∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 +
𝛼7𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 +   𝛼8𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛼9𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛼10∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 +
 α11𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛼12𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼13𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 + α14∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 +  𝛼15𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗
∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 +  𝛼16𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼17𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + α18 ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗
𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼19𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼20𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1  + 𝛼21 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼22∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛼23𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1  + 𝛼24∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡  + 𝛼25𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 +
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡  
 
𝑇𝑟. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 is a dummy variable taking the value of one if 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 is positive and zero otherwise. 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑡 is a dummy variable takes the value of one when 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 is above one, and zero otherwise. 
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who found higher percentage of foreign equity is negatively associated with the level of 
accounting conservatism.  
On the other hand, the positive estimate on 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 
is significantly positive (0.493***). It could be considered as the power of regulatory 
enforcement. This evidence provides additional evidence on the importance of regulatory 
environments on accounting quality. 
Test results for the Chinese setting are presented in Panel B. Under H2a, I posit that 
state-owned entities are favored and supported by the government to achieve certain 
political goals. As a result, even some investment is not profitable, firms with higher 
presence of the state will not cut back on those project in a timelier manner. Evidence in 
Panel C is consistent with my conjecture and findings in the previous sections. Estimates 
of 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1  are negative and statistically significant (－0.299***), 
which further confirms that firms with higher state shareholdings reacts negatively to 
bad news. 
Table 7  Test Results for Accrual Model 
Panel A : Japan 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t 0.471*** (0.000) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 －0.080* (0.011) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 0.676*** (0.000) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 0.337*** (0.000) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 －0.071* (0.029) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 0.419*** (0.000) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 －0.551 (0.168) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 －0.131*** (0.000) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 0.493*** (0.000) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 －0.221*** (0.000) 
intercept 0.017 (0.342) 
F 313.42 
N 18255 
Notes: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡: accruals in year t deflated by average total assets. ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: changes in cash flows from operations deflated by 
average total assets. 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡is negative and 0 otherwise. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: 
the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders and other persons or companies 
affiliated with the company as defined in Quants Research. 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one 
if the proportion of stable shareholders is above the mean and zero otherwise. 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the percentage of 
shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in Japan. 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of 
one if the proportion of foreign shareholders is above the mean and zero otherwise.  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1: change in total 
liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total 
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assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence 
level, respectively. 
 
On the other hand, evidence shows that firms are not timelier in responding to 
unrealized losses with a presence of foreign shareholders as predicted in H3a in the 
Chinese setting. Although it is statistically insignificant, coefficient on 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗
𝐷. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 is negative (－0.139). Since the data employed in this study only includes 
foreign investors as a founding member (IPO legal person share), although it to some 
degree addresses the endogeneity concerns, it also changes the nature of such 
investment. An alternative explanation is that, accruals become an easy target for 
earnings management due to a poorly enforced information infrastructure in China as 
opposed to Japan and the U.S. It is also possible that the cost to implement higher 
reporting practice will be even higher for foreign investors. Therefore, effects of foreign 
investor on accounting conservatism are yet not conclusive in this section. As is forecast 
in H4a, Panel B shows that firms with a cross-listing status show greater level of 
accounting conservatism. The negative relation between accruals and cash flow is more 
profound for cross-listing firms as demonstrated by the significantly positive coefficient 
on 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 (0.484**).  
Panel B also reports the test results for the cross effect between debt contracting and 
non-discretionary conservatism. First, it is noteworthy that estimates for 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 and 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 are both significantly negative (－0.053*** and 
－0.741***), which reflects a weaker regulatory environment in China. Nonetheless, the 
interaction term between 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1  and 𝐷. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   is significantly positive 
(0.701***), extending partial evidence to reject H3b. Moreover, interaction terms 
involving 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  are also positive and statistically significant (0.312*** and 
0.515*), which supplements test results in other analyses applied in this study and 
shows that exposure to sophisticated market does improve earnings quality.  
To summarize test results in this section, empirical evidence overall provides strong 
support for the downward impact of state ownership on accounting conservatism in 
China. Second, findings in this section, together with test results in Section 5.2.3 (GLM-
SELECT), suggest that the relationship between foreign shareholdings and accounting 
conservatism is indirect and weak. Finally, test results also uphold the importance of 
regulatory power and the positive effects of cross-listing on accounting conservatism. 
Table 8 presents the test results for each hypothesis in this study. 
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Table 7  Test Results for Accrual Model  
Panel B : China 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t 1.166*** (0.000) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 －0.053*** (0.000) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 －0.741*** (0.000) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 －0.299** (0.002) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 －0.022 (0.790) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 0.045 (0.776) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 －0.139 (0.594) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 0.701* (0.015) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 0.262 (0.520) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 0.484* (0.013) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 0.312*** (0.001) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 0.515* (0.046) 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹t ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 －0.052* (0.018) 
intercept 0.184*** (0.000) 
F 31.57 
N 25414 
Notes: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡: accruals in year t deflated by average total assets. ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: changes in cash flows from operations deflated by 
average total assets. 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡is negative and 0 otherwise. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1: 
the percentage of state-owned shares deflated by the total number of shares outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of state shareholders is above the mean and 
zero otherwise.  𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 : the number of shares issued to foreign investors at initial public offering. 
𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of foreign ownership is above their means 
and zero otherwise.  𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: the percentage of H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total number of shares 
outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 𝐷. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the firm is cross-
listed on the B-share market and/or Hongkong stock exchange. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1: change in total liabilities deflated by 
beginning-of-period market capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common 
equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the 
end of fiscal year t－1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 8 : Summary of Test Results A 
 Results Japan China 
H1a uphold 
Sign on 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 is significantly negative in 
Models 1 through 3. Contradicting evidence 
found in Model 5. 
 
H1b uphold 
Sign on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  is 
significantly negative in Models 2,3, and 5. 
 
H2a uphold  
Sign on 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 is significantly negative in 
Model 1, 2, and 5. 
H2b uphold  
Sign on CLEVMV𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 is significantly 
negative in Models 4 and 5. 
H3a unanswered No evidence found in all models. No evidence found in all models. 
H3b rejected 
Sign on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  is 
significantly positive in Models 2 and 3. 
Contradicting evidence found in Model 5. 
Sign on CLEVMV𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  is 
significantly positive in Model 5. 
H4a rejected  
Sign on 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 is significantly positive 
in Models 1, 2, and 5. 
H4b rejected  
Sign on 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  is 
significantly positive in Model 5. 
H5a rejected 
Sign on ABTMt−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  is significantly 
positive in Models 2, 3 and 5. 
 
H5b uphold  
Sign on ABTMt−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1  is significantly 
negative in Models 2 and 4. 
Notes:  
Models 1 and 2 modify Basu’s [1997] framework through incorporating ownership variables into an earnings-return 
regression. Model 3 (Japan) and Model 4 (China) utilize a model select technique (GLM-SELECT) with T_SCORE or 
CONSKEW being the dependent variable. Model 5 modifies Ball and Shivakumar’s [2006] framework through 
incorporating ownership variables into an accrual-based model. 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 This study has sought out to add to the extant literature on how ownership structure is 
associated with accounting conservatism in two unique institutional environments. The 
institutional features in Japan and China provide a desirable setting to evaluate the 
impact of ownership on accounting practice, and to investigate whether this impact 
differs systematically with the institutional basics. Prior study has already pointed out 
that the level of accounting conservatism adopted in a firm associates with the relative 
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equilibrium results from conflicting of interests between different stakeholders (e.g., 
Cullinan et al. [2012], Usui [2015]). Findings in this study compliments prior studies and 
show that stable shareholdings and state ownership, both of which can weaken 
shareholders’ incentive to monitor, lead to variation in management’s accounting 
decisions and result in lower level of conservatism.  
This study also aims to examine whether other factors which are in favor of accounting 
conservatism resists or facilitates influence of a unique governance mechanism. For 
example, evidence documented in previous studies has provided much insight on the 
interrelated relation between debt contracting and conservative reporting. (e.g., Qiang 
[2007], Ball et al. [2008], Beatty et al. [2008], Nakamura [2009], Nikolaev [2010a], Haw 
et al. [2014], Ishida [2016]). In short, debt holders need a lower bound on the annual 
reporting to detect value deterioration and thus prevent exploitation from management 
and shareholders. Firms benefit from more conservative accounting to reduce capital 
cost. However, reporting practices varies across different accounting regimes and 
thereby could possibly affect the effectiveness of this mechanism. Table 9 summarizes 
the main findings concerning the cross effects of debt contracting. It demonstrates the 
sign and significance level on the main effect of each predictor tested in this study and 
their interaction terms. First, effects of debt contract on average fluctuate between stable 
(state) shareholdings and foreign shareholdings. Overall, evidence found in this study 
attests to the conjecture that debt holders overlook sign for loss recognition when the 
proportion of stable shareholders (state shareholders) is larger. Nonetheless, monitoring 
from debt holders strengthens when the proportion of foreign equity rises.  
Another explanation for the rising of accounting conservatism is regulator’s demands 
for timely loss recognition (Watts [2003], Qiang [2007]). Notwithstanding, one frequently 
voiced concern in the context of accounting conservatism is management’s willingness to 
recognize losses as they occur. In spite of the fact that management has an asymmetric 
incentive to recognize gains earlier than losses, the flexibilities inherent in the 
accounting standards could have failed to curb such opportunistic accounting behavior 
(e.g., Francis et al. [1996], Riedl [2004a]). In this study, I employed the measure of 
ASSET-BTM proposed in Lawrence et al. [2013] to examine the effect of mandated 
regulation on accounting practice in both crounties. As is shown in Table 9, compared to 
the Chinese setting, Japan has a better enforcement enviorment to improve accounting 
quality. In particular, it nulified stable shareholder’s disclosure preference over less 
conservative accoutnting. On the contray, it is less influencial in the Chinese setting to 
offset the negative impact of state shareholdings on timely loss recgnition. Nontheless, 
evidence with regard to the effect of cross-listing suggest that firms dual-list in the B-
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share or H-share market execute more conservative accounting, whih further 
emphasizes the importance of a better information enviornment on quality accounting 
reporting. This result holds in the four model specifications analyized in this study. On 
the other hand, no substancial proof verifies or subverts hypothses with regards to effects 
of foreign equity.     
Although the core evidence in this study is on average robust, test results may suffer 
from model misspecifications and omitted variables. Variables proxy for ownership 
structure also need further screening to account for their genuine effects over accounting 
policies. Furthermore, other measures (e.g., 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉) employed in this study may not 
be sophisticated enough to pick up the actual effects as intended. Finally, more work is 
required to enhance theoretical establishment. 
To my knowledge, this study constitutes the first effort to examine how differential 
ownership structure, debt contracting arrangements, and accounting regulations 
interplay over accounting conservatism. Most importantly, this study highlights the 
notion that accounting quality is a function of institutional setting in which the firm 
resides. As data become more widely available, future work will focus on identifying and 
evaluating the effects of institutional differences on accounting conservatism and other 
earnings qualities.  
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Table 9 Summary of Test Results B 
Panel A : Japan 
  Basu Accrual  T_SCORE CONSKEW 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ＋ － －* 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 
 
－** 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + ＋* ＋*** 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 
  
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 － －*** ＋*** 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1  －*** 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 － －*** －* 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 －***  
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 － ＋*** ＋*** 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 ＋*** ＋*** 
𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － ＋ － 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1  
 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － +* －*** 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 ＋*** ＋** 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － +* ＋*** 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 ＋***  
Notes: 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders and other persons or 
companies affiliated with the company as defined in Quants Research. 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the 
value of one if the proportion of stable shareholders is above the mean and zero otherwise. 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the 
percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in Japan. 𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes 
the value of one if the proportion of foreign shareholders is above the mean and zero otherwise.  𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1: change 
in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 : total assets / market 
capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Table 9 Summary of Test Results B 
Panel B : China 
  Basu Accrual  T_SCORE CONSKEW 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ? + －*** 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ＋***  
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 + － －*** 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ＋***  
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 － －* －** 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 － + － 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 －*** －** 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 － －* ＋ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 －*** 
 
𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － － － 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － + ＋* 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 － +* ＋ 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1   
𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  － +*** ＋* 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1   
 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  － － ＋*** 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  
 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷. 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  － － ＋* 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1  +** 
Notes: 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1: the percentage of state-owned shares deflated by the total number of shares outstanding as of the fiscal 
year-end. 𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of state shareholders is above the 
mean and zero otherwise. 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the number of shares issued to foreign investors at initial public offering. 
𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁t−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of foreign ownership is above their means 
and zero otherwise.  𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: the percentage of H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total number of shares 
outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 𝐷. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the firm is cross-
listed on the B-share market and/or Hongkong stock exchange. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1: change in total liabilities deflated by 
beginning-of-period market capitalization. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common 
equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% 
confidence level, respectively. 
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Appendix 1:  
Table A:Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 the percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders 
and other persons or companies affiliated with the company as defined in Quants 
Research 
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of stable shareholders 
is above the mean and zero otherwise 
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in Japan 
𝐷. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of foreign shareholders 
is above the mean and zero otherwise 
𝐴. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 the relative proportion of foreign investors in total shareholding 
𝐴. 𝐽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 = 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1/(1 − 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1) 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 the percentage of state-owned shares deflated by the total number of shares 
outstanding as of the fiscal year-end 
𝐷. 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of state shareholders is 
above the mean and zero otherwise 
𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 the number of shares issued to foreign investors at initial public offering 
𝐷. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 a dummy variable takes the value of one if the proportion of foreign ownership is above their 
means and zero otherwise 
𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 the percentage of H-shares and B-shares deflated by the total number of shares 
outstanding as of the fiscal year-end 
𝐷. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 a dummy variable takes the value of one if the firm is cross-listed on the B-share 
market and/or Hongkong stock exchange 
𝐸𝑡 net income in fiscal year t deflated by market capitalization measured at the end 
of fiscal year t－1. 
𝑅𝑡 the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending three 
months after the end of fiscal year t. 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝑅𝑡 is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 total assets deflated by the sum of market capitalization and total assets minus 
common equity 
𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 a firm-year conservatism measure devised in Khan and Watts [2009] 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 the difference between the skewness of cash flows from operating activities and 
the skewness of net income using a three-year rolling window 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 accruals deflated by average total assets 
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∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 changes in cash flows from operations deflated by average total assets 
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if ∆𝐶𝐹 is negative and 0 otherwise 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 the proportion of property, plant and equipment assets to total assets  
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalization 
𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑡 a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  or 𝐿𝑅𝑡  is below 5% and 0 
otherwise. 𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴t is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed as the average value of 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2 . 𝐿𝑅𝑡  is a lag indicator for 𝑅𝑂𝐴, computed as the average 
value of 𝑅𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑡−2. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 is measured as income before extraordinary items 
deflated by book value of total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year t. 𝑅𝑡 
is the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending three 
months after the end of fiscal year t 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 proceeds from the issuance of bonds in year t－1 deflated by market capitalization 
of common equity at the end of year t－1 
𝐺𝑊𝑡−1 book value of goodwill deflated by total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal 
year t－1 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 book value of intangible assets deflated by total assets, both measured at the end 
of fiscal year t－1 
𝑅𝐷𝑡−1 expenditure on research and development deflated by total sales, both measured 
at the end of fiscal year t－1 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1 the natural logarithm firm age 
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix for the variables. Spearman correlations in the upper quadrant and Pearson correlations in the lower 
quadrant. 
Table B Panel A: Japan Correlation matrix 
 
𝐸𝑡 𝐷𝑅𝑡 𝑅𝑡−1 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 
𝐸𝑡 1.000  －0.1023* 0.134* 0.184* 0.081* －0.073* 0.088* －0.073* 0.067* 0.127* －0.026* 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 －0.052* 1.000  －0.861* 0.034* －0.082* 0.072* －0.102* 0.034* 0.061* 0.018* 0.017* 
𝑅𝑡−1 0.001  －0.108* 1.000  －0.038* 0.097* －0.080* 0.135* －0.033* －0.073* －0.039* －0.019* 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 0.265* 0.0162* 0.014  1.000  －0.476* 0.365* －0.050* 0.006  0.081* －0.018* 0.010  
∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 0.024* －0.032* 0.012  －0.290* 1.000  －0.865* －0.016* －0.002  0.044* 0.019* 0.009  
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 －0.037* 0.074* －0.014  0.275* －0.348* 1.000  0.033* －0.039* －0.034* 0.000  －0.039* 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 0.010  －0.099* 0.002  －0.057* －0.002  0.032* 1.000  －0.450* －0.091* 0.033* －0.267* 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 0.019* 0.048* －0.015* 0.015  0.000  －0.034* －0.393* 1.000  0.097* －0.247* 0.737* 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 0.014  0.011  －0.002  0.024* 0.053* －0.012  －0.010  0.010  1.000  0.041* 0.087* 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 0.042* 0.020* －0.023* －0.005  0.006  －0.005  0.004  －0.252* 0.015* 1.000  －0.219* 
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 －0.012  0.005  －0.012  0.010  0.002  －0.039* －0.234* 0.669* 0.003  －0.188  1.000  
Notes:  
𝐸𝑡 denotes the net income in fiscal year t deflated by market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝑡−1: the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve 
months ending three months after the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐷𝑅𝑡: dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝑅𝑡−1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡: accruals in year t deflated by 
average total assets. ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: changes in cash flows from operations deflated by average total assets. 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡is negative and 0 otherwise. 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets market capitalization +  total assets 
－common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1 is measured as the change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization.  𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 : the 
percentage of shares owned by the largest to the tenth-largest shareholders and other persons or companies affiliated with the company as defined in Quants Research. 
𝐽. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1: the percentage of shares owned by foreign individuals or institutions in Japan.  
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Table B Panel B: China Correlation matrix 
 
𝐸𝑡 𝐷𝑅𝑡 𝑅𝑡−1 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 
𝐸𝑡 1.000  －0.212* 0.263* 0.069* 0.098* －0.095* 0.266* 0.228* 0.148* 0.105* 0.033* 0.109* 
𝐷𝑅𝑡 －0.059* 1.000  －0.866* －0.017* －0.065* 0.060* －0.054* 0.076* 0.001  0.004  －0.004  0.016* 
𝑅𝑡−1 0.233* －0.593* 1.000  0.023* 0.080* －0.070* 0.067* －0.075* 0.003  －0.006  0.007  －0.013  
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 －0.004  0.003  －0.003  1.000  0.062* －0.053* －0.054* 0.063* 0.016* －0.060* －0.005  －0.015  
∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 0.013* －0.041* 0.056* －0.568* 1.000  －0.862* 0.012  0.018* 0.020* 0.004  0.010  －0.009  
𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡 －0.016* 0.058* －0.058* －0.001  －0.508* 1.000  －0.018* －0.025* －0.020* －0.001  －0.013* 0.003  
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1 0.176* －0.157* 0.030* 0.007  －0.006  0.008  1.000  0.106* 0.231* 0.231* 0.024* 0.170* 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 －0.099* 0.189* －0.090* 0.005  0.015* 0.035* －0.354* 1.000  0.082* －0.061* 0.0323* 0.141* 
𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 0.267* －0.034* －0.001  0.000  0.003  0.002  0.074* －0.118*  1.000 0.0734* －0.009  0.031* 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡−1 －0.021* 0.050* －0.010  0.000  0.004  0.059* 0.038* 0.093* －0.010  1.000  0.019* 0.113* 
𝐶. 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡−1 －0.008  －0.002  0.004  0.002  0.006  －0.027* －0.036* 0.041* －0.008  －0.030* 1.000  0.040* 
𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 －0.001  0.006  －0.013  －0.001  －0.006  0.020* 0.091* 0.137* －0.003  0.139* 0.011  1.000  
Notes:  
𝐸𝑡 denotes the net income in fiscal year t deflated by market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝑡−1: the buy-and-hold return on common stock for the twelve 
months ending three months after the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐷𝑅𝑡: dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if 𝑅𝑡−1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡: accruals in year t deflated by 
average total assets. ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: changes in cash flows from operations deflated by average total assets. 𝐷∆𝐶𝐹𝑡: a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if ∆𝐶𝐹𝑡is negative and 0 otherwise. 
𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑡−1: total assets / market capitalization + total assets －common equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1: the natural logarithm of market capitalization 
at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉t−1: change in total liabilities deflated by beginning-of-period market capitalization. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: the percentage of H-shares and B-shares 
deflated by the total number of shares outstanding as of the fiscal year-end. 𝐷. 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡−1: a dummy variable takes the value of one if the firm is cross-listed on the B-share 
market and/or Hongkong stock exchange.  
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Appendix 3: Regression Results for T_SCORE 
 Khan and Watts [2009] incorporated three firm-specific characteristics into the Basu 
model to estimate an annual across-sectional Basu coefficient. These are firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), 
marker-to-book ratio (𝑀𝑇𝐵), and market value leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉). 𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 in Eq. 3 
denotes the timeliness of good news being reflected on income statements, and 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 
in Eq. 4 denotes the incremental timeliness of bad news being reflected on income 
statements. However, Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 are not regression models. Instead, Khan and 
Watts [2009] substituted them into the Basu model to estimate parameters 𝜇𝑖 and  𝛾𝑖 
(i=1~4). Then, 𝜇𝑖  and  𝛾𝑖  (i=1~4) were in turn substituted into Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 as 
empirical estimators to compute annual 𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸  and 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸  for each firm/year 
sample. 𝑇_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸  is thus the sum of 𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸  and 𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 , which measures the 
degree of conditional conservatism.  
The model applied in this study is outlined below, where 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 represents the natural 
log of market capitalization; 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 represents the ratio of market capitalization to the 
book value of common equity at the end of the year t. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑡 represents leverage which 
is calculated as book value of total liabilities deflated by the market capitalization. In 
this study, 𝐸𝑡, the dependent variable in Eq.5, denotes the net income in fiscal year t 
deflated by market capitalization measured at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝑡 is the buy-
and-hold return on common stock for the twelve months ending three months after the 
end of fiscal year t. As with Basu [1997], 𝐷𝑅𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 𝑅𝑡 is 
negative and is 0 otherwise. Table 9 reports the regression results for Japan and China. 
T_SCORE used in this study is measured on the basis of Eq. 3 and 4.  
 
𝐺_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸＝𝛽3 =  𝜇1̂ + 𝜇2̂𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇3̂𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜇4̂𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡                                  Eq.3 
 
𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 =  𝛽4 =  𝛾1̂ + 𝛾2̂𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3̂𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛾4̂𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡                                   Eq.4 
 
𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡(𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡   +  𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡   ) + 𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡( 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡  ) + ( 𝛿1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  +   𝛿3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡   +  𝛿4𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛿6𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡   ) +  𝜀𝑖                                                                  Eq.5 
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Table C : Regression Results for T_SCORE 
 Japan China 
𝛽2(𝐷𝑅) 0.036 0.065*** 
 (0.075) (0.001) 
𝜇1(𝑅) 0.028* 0.175*** 
 (0.039) (0.000) 
𝜇2(𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) －0.003* －0.011*** 
 (0.023) (0.000) 
𝜇3(𝑅 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵) －0.0003 －0.0007*** 
 (0.546) (0.000) 
𝜇4(𝑅 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉) －0.009*** 0.042*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
𝛾1(𝐷𝑅 ∗ 𝑅) 0.142* 0.205** 
 (0.025) －0.004 
𝛾2(𝐷𝑅 ∗  𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) －0.006 －0.014** 
 (0.286) －0.004 
𝛾3(𝐷𝑅 ∗  𝑅 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵) －0.0007 0.005 
 (0.230) －0.072 
𝛾4(𝐷𝑅 ∗  𝑅 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉) 0.005 0.066*** 
 (0.055) (0.000) 
𝛿1(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) 0.003*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
𝛿2(𝑀𝑇𝐵) 0.0004 0.0005*** 
 (0.310) (0.000) 
𝛿3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉) －0.006*** －0.004** 
 (0.000) －0.006 
𝛿4(𝐷𝑅 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)  －0.001 －0.005*** 
 (0.466) (0.000) 
𝛿5(𝐷𝑅 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵) －0.001 －0.0001 
 (0.117) (0.778) 
𝛿6 (𝐷𝑅 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉)  －0.001 0.011*** 
 (0.322) (0.000) 
intercept 0.053*** －0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐹  24.37 2998.98 
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𝑁   18255 25414 
Note: 
𝑁 denotes the number of observations in each ASSET-BTM group. 𝐸𝑡 denotes the net income in fiscal year t, 
deflated by market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t－1. 𝑅𝑡 is the buy-and-hold return on common stock for 
the twelve months ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 𝐷𝑅𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals one if 
𝑅 is negative and is zero otherwise. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 represents the natural log of market capitalization. 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 represents 
market capitalization to book value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑀𝑉
𝑖,𝑡
 represents leverage, which 
is calculated as book value of total liabilities deflated by market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level, respectively. 
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Chapter 4  
Conclusion and Future Research  
 
Conservatism is among the most important characteristics guiding accounting practice. 
However, to the extent management’s human capital and financial gains are tied with 
the firm, it is axiomatic for them to emphasize available good news and delay the 
disclosure of bad news. Extant literature is replete with empirical evidence for 
opportunistic use of managerial discretion owing to the subjectivity in accounting 
standards. In comparison, there is a relative paucity in the literature on the regulatory 
power of accounting standards. Lawrence et al. [2013] make an insightful contribution 
in this area wherein the authors provide initial evidence on a firmly restraining power 
of accounting standards in the U.S. through an empirical examination on the 
implementation of asset impairment. The findings in Lawrence et al. [2013] attest to the 
existence of a non-discretionary factor inherent in procedural accounting rules (i.e., non-
discretionary conservatism) and therefore evidence the importance of accounting 
standards. It also calls for further attention on the recent initiatives to converge 
accounting standards which have received considerable attention from international 
investors, standards setters, and academics across the world. If changes in accounting 
standards (i.e., move closer to the U.S GAAP or the international accounting standards) 
could have similar impacts on financial reporting quality in different accounting realms, 
a unified set of accounting standards could lead to a fundamental improvement in 
information infrastructure.  
The question addressed in the first study is whether application of asset impairment 
accounting standards effectively regulates the implementation of impairment losses and 
improves accounting conservatism in Japanese listed firms. Test results suggest that the 
recent change in accounting rules with respect to asset impairment is less likely to result 
in better accounting quality. As with prior research, I examine the relationship between 
asset write-downs and beginning-of-period ASSET-BTM, which is a metric represents 
the extent to which a company’s book value is under/over evaluated against its market 
value. As the market value deviates from the book value, the principle of conservatism 
requires a timelier disclosure of a downward change in asset values than that of an 
upward change. Aside from conventional regression method, this study employs a model 
selection technique (LASSO: Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection Operator), through 
which determinants for asset impairment will be ranked in terms of relevance. On the 
other hand, a quantile regression assesses effects of the chosen predictors on the 
implementation of asset write-downs at a specific quantile, thereby providing a thorough 
 128 
 
understanding of the underlying relationship between ASSET-BTM and the disclosure 
of asset impairment losses. Findings in the first essay show that, although the degree of 
accounting conservatism for sub partitions sharply intensifies as the indicator for loss 
recognition points to greater demands for timely disclosure of bad news, the growth in 
the level of accounting conservatism fluctuates and demonstrates a different pattern 
when compared with that identified in the U.S. Specifically, test results by the LASSO 
analysis and quantile regression implies that firms exhibiting greater needs for value 
correction do not execute asset write-downs in accordance with accounting standards. 
Moreover, an additional test using samples drawn from China and the U.S. verifies that 
the most important driver for asset impairment in Japan and China is debt contracting 
when that for the U.S is the regulatory power of accounting standards.   
The second essay investigates impacts of ownership structure on accounting 
conservatism in Japanese and Chinese listed firms. It is motivated by the first essay, 
whose test results indicate that accounting conservatism in Japan and China is affected 
more by other institutional factors than requirements of accounting standards. I expect 
further analysis involving institutional difference in Japan and China could help to 
answer the question left in the first essay since it is unclear what hinders proper 
disclosure of loss information. In particular, I examine effects of stable (state) 
shareholdings, an underlying feature which greatly differentiate Japan (China) from the 
U.S. in institutional framework, on accounting conservatism. Furthermore, I incorporate 
debt contracting and the regulatory force of accounting standards in both settings so as 
to extend findings in the first essay. Consistent with the hypothesis, findings in this 
study proves that variations in market infrastructure lead to differences in conservative 
accounting policy in Japanese and Chinese listed firms. Test results document in the 
second study show that stable (state) shareholdings reduces bad news sensitivity and 
such effects are more profound in firms with higher proportion of stable (state) 
shareholders. More importantly, evidence in the second essay implies that institutional 
framework with distinct traits could generate similar economic consequences even 
though domestic accounting standards are different. For example, although accounting 
standards in China are more similar to the U.S., than to those adopt in Japan, a 
presumably increased demand for accounting conservatism from debtholders fail to 
evoke timelier loss recognition in China and Japan. This can be attributed to a close 
firm-bank relationship which is more common in Japan and China, but is less likely in 
the U.S. The second essay further extends the first essay by examining whether 
regulatory force could outweigh impacts of ownership structure in the two unique 
settings. The inclusion of the interaction with non-discretionary conservatism 
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demonstrates a significantly positive effect of accounting standards in Japanese listed 
firms, suggesting an overall better regulatory environment in Japan. On the other hand, 
the inclusion of interaction with debt contracting (non-discretionary conservatism) and 
foreign equity indicates that foreign investors tend to play a supportive role in enhancing 
conservative accounting in Japan and China. Nevertheless, evidence also suggests that 
a domestically listed Chinese firm will tend to release adverse accounting information in 
a timelier manner when it also lists in Hong Kong stock exchange or the B-share market.    
In general, empirical evidence is consistent with the hypotheses in this study. However, 
this study still has several limitations stated as follows. First, I could not entirely rule 
out the possibilities that test results are biased due to model misspecification and 
measurement errors in proxies for accounting conservatism. For example, the measure 
of ASSET-BTM ratio, which stands for effects of accounting standards, is computed on 
an aggregate level and is therefore influenced by factors other than the intrinsic value 
of assets (e.g., macroeconomic influence on stock price, temporary downward bias at the 
beginning of an investment cycle). Test results of the accrual model in the second essay 
are also partly inconsistent with evidence produced by analyses in previous sections. 
Future research will focus on refinement of both the models (e.g., screen out time-series 
change in level of accounting conservatism) and metrics (e.g., proxy for firm-bank 
relationship and cross shareholdings) used in this study.  
Second, this study fails to consider other institutional differences suggest in earlier 
research. For example, litigation concern is an alternative explanation for accounting 
conservatism (e.g., Watts [2003a], Qiang [2007]). However, this area is relatively 
underexplored in Japan and China. For example, prior studies employ a dummy variable 
to proxy for litigious industry such as biochemistry or retailing firms (e.g., Francis et al. 
[1994]). I incorporate a dummy variable in the U.S setting based on previous studies to 
test its effects on accounting conservatism, but the correlation between this variable and 
accounting conservatism is weak and insignificant (test results are unreported42). It is 
also unclear whether such classification based on industries could be readily applied to 
firms domiciled in other countries where shareholders are relatively reticent about their 
rights (i.e., lower possibilities of being sued by shareholders). On the other hand, prior 
research has also sought to address this issue by classifying different realms by their 
jurisdictional origins (i.e., code law versus. common law). Such research design helps to 
comprehensively understand the role of legal and political system on accounting 
conservatism. However, it is difficult to filter out the possible confounding effects 
                                                   
42 The variable (LITIGATION) is set to one if a firm is in the following industries (SIC codes 2833–2836, 
3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370) and zero otherwise 
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existing across the borders. Future research could try to explore the impact of litigation 
on reporting quality and conservatism by incorporating a difference-in-difference 
research (e.g., the passage of an accounting rule or law code) wherein the country serves 
as its own control.  
Finally, research design in this study fails to take the endogeneity concerns into 
consideration. Specially, although little evidence is found with regards to the influence 
of foreign equity on accounting conservatism in the second essay, it is still possible that 
foreign investors incline to choose firms with lower information asymmetric and such 
firms are thus expected to be more sensitive to bad news. To validate these arguments 
in prior studies, I investigate investment of foreign equity drawing on anecdotal evidence 
from two Japanese listed companies. Table 1 exhibits changes in the ten largest 
shareholders in TOSHIBA and Olympus in fiscal year 2012 and 2017, respectively. Both 
companies have been reported to engage in inappropriate accounting practices, which 
have raised concerns over the credibility of financial reporting in the public. In panel A, 
it is clear that foreign investment only accounts for 2.2% of the whole equity in fiscal 
year 2012 for TOSHIBA. However, the proportion of foreign equity rose to 19.6% (8.9% 
+ 6.9% + 3.8%) after its accounting scandal came into light in fiscal year 2017. The case 
of Olympus is similar to that of TOSHIBA. In fiscal year 2012, foreign equity accounted 
for about 4.3% (2.5% + 1.8%) of the whole equity and has gradually risen to 10.8% (4.9% 
+4.1% +1.8%) through fiscal year 2017. The rise in proportion of foreign equity can be 
viewed as a signal to the market as well as to other stakeholders by showing its 
commitment to corporation governance reformation. Another possible explanation could 
be that foreign investors will opt for bargains due to lack of investment opportunity. In 
other words, there is a great likelihood that such incidents present an otherwise 
extremely rare chance for foreign investors to buy in stocks with great value at a much 
lower cost. Although such evidence hinges to a peculiar situation and is inadequate to 
fully disentangle the puzzles posed in prior research, it is possible that foreign equity 
does not necessarily a priori prone for more conservative firms. Moreover, test results in 
this study also show that higher foreign equity does not directly link with higher 
accounting quality, implying that foreign investors are not capable of influencing 
managerial decisions or reinforcing public information production. Future research could 
explore effects of foreign investment by tracing the change in equity holdings and 
variations in expected length of shareholdings (long-term, mid-term or short-term 
foreign investors).   
As a final note in this section, this study is a preliminary attempt to explore effects of 
accounting standards as well as its association with other influential factors on 
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accounting conservatism. Although findings in this study provides some important 
implications for investors, accounting regulators and standards setters, great gaps 
remain between theoretical construction and the application of accounting standards on 
a practical level. Future work will seek to address this issue through model 
sophistication and data mining techniques. On the other hand, like most of the previous 
research on accounting conservatism, validity of the findings in this study relies on the 
reliability of measurement suggested in Basu [1997] and Ball and Shivakumar [2006b]. 
Future work will also put an importance on exploring a more reliable firm-specific 
indicator for accounting conservatism. 
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43 Founded in 1792, State Street Corporation is the second oldest financial institution in the United States of America. 
Table 1 Panel A : Antidotal Evidence in Case of TOSHIBA (The largest ten shareholders) 
2012 2017 
The Master Trust Bank of Japan 5.8 GOLDMAN SACHS INTERNATIONAL 8.9 
Japan Trustee Services Bank (JTSB)  5.5 JP MORGAN CHASE BANK 380055 6.9 
The Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company, Ltd  2.7 CHASE MANHATTAN BANK GTS CLIENTS ACCOUNT ESCROW 3.8 
Nippon Life Insurance Company  2.6 The Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company, Ltd 2.7 
SSBT OD05 OMNIBUS ACCOUNT-TREATY CLIENTS 2.2 employee stock ownership committee 2.7 
employee stock ownership committee 2.2 Nippon Life Insurance Company  2.6 
Japan Trustee Services Bank (JTSB) Account 9 1.9 Japan Trustee Services Bank (JTSB) 2.2 
Japan Trustee Services Bank (JTSB) Account 4 1.5 Japan Trustee Services Bank (JTSB) Account No.5 1.9 
NIPPONKOA INSURANCE CO., LTD 1.2 The Master Trust Bank of Japan 1.6 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC) 1.2 Japan Trustee Services Bank (JTSB) Account No 1 1.4 
 
Table 1 Panel B : Antidotal Evidence in Case of Olympus (The largest ten shareholders) 
2012 2017 
Nippon Life Insurance Company 4.8 The Master Trust Bank of Japan 8.0 
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. 4.8 Sony, Ltd. 5.0 
The Master Trust Bank of Japan 3.7 State Street Corporation 505001 4.9 
Japan Trustee Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Account  3.3 Japan Trustee Services Bank 4.5 
Japan Trustee Services Bank  3.1 State Street Corporation 505223 4.1 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC) 3.0 Nippon Life Insurance Company 3.9 
Morgan Stanley Capital International 2.5 The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. 3.9 
TERUMO CORPORATION 2.0 Japan Trustee Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Account 3.3 
State Street Corporation43  1.8 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC) 2.4 
Treasure Stock 1.6 State Street Corporation 1.8 
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